As in marine insurance, the insurable interest must exist at the time of the loss, but not necessarily at the time of the taking out of the policy.

A creditor has an insurable interest in the estate of his debtor.

"The next proposition involves a question new in this State. Has a creditor an insurable interest in a building, the property of the estate of his deceased debtor, which may be subjected to his debt, the personal property being insufficient to pay the debts of the estate? After much deliberation, our conclusion is that he has an interest which may be insured. We concede and affirm that a simple contract creditor, without a lien, either statutory or contract, without a jus in re or a jus ad rem, owning a mere personal claim against his debtor, has not an insurable interest in the property of his debtor. Such contracts are void, as being against public policy. We do not think the principle applies after the death of the debtor, as to property liable for the debt, and which, if destroyed, will result in the loss of the debt. The real estate as well as personal property of a deceased debtor is liable for his debts, but the real estate cannot be subjected to the payment of his debts until after the personalty has been exhausted. After the death of the debtor the debt is no longer enforceable in personam. The proceedings to reach the property of the estate of the deceased debtor are in rem. The property of the debtor takes the place of the debtor, and becomes, as it were, the debtor. Whoever knowingly receives the property of a deceased debtor, and wrongfully converts it, is answerable to the creditor. 3 Brick. Dig., page 464, Sec. 148; Id., page 465, Sec. 162. The relation of creditor and debtor invests the creditor with an insurable interest in the life of his debtor to the extent of his debt. Alexander vs. Sanders, 93 Ala., 345; 9 South., 521; 11 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law, 319. It would seem upon like principles that, when the property becomes directly subject to proceedings in rem for the satisfaction of the debt, the creditor should become invested with an insurable interest in the property. Certainly, if a creditor cannot obtain satisfaction of his debt from the personal property of his deceased debtor, and has a legal right, which cannot be defeated, to enforce its collection by proceedings in rem against a building belonging to the estate of the deceased debtor, and if it be true that the destruction of the building by fire would immediately and necessarily result in pecuniary loss, the loss being the direct consequence of the fire, the creditor has an interest in the protection of the building. He has no lien as in the case of a mortgagee, nor such lien as the statute may confer on an attaching or execution creditor; but his right to subject the specific property to his debt invests him with an interest but little less, if any, than that of the attaching or execution creditor or mortgagee. In the case of Herkimer vs. Rice, 27 N. Y., 163, the question arose as to whether an administrator of an insolvent estate held an insurable interest in the real estate of the deceased debtor. The court (Denio C. J., rendering the opinion) held that he did, and the conclusion was based in great part upon the proposition that the creditors had such an interest which the administrator could protect by insurance for them. We think that whatever could be done by an administrator for the creditor in this respect could be done directly by the creditor for himself. Rohrbach vs. Insurance Co., 62 N. Y., 47. Other reasons might be given, but we are of the opinion these are sufficient to show that the creditor of a deceased debtor, whose estate is insufficient to pay the debts, has an insurable interest in the property of the estate, which by law may be subjected by proceedings in rem to the payment of the debts. The recovery cannot exceed the amount of the insurable interest." 3

1 Clark vs. Insurance Co. of North America, 89 Me., 26; Mead vs. Phoenix Ins. Co., 158 Mass., 124.

2 See Boardman vs. Merrimack F. & N. Ins. Co., 6 Mass., 102.

A life tenant has an insurable interest,4 as does also a husband in the property of his wife.5

A stockholder has an insurable interest in the property of the corporation.

This question was discussed in the decision in Riggs vs. Commercial Mutual Ins. Co.8 as follows:

3 Creed et al. vs. Sun Fire Office, 101 Ala., 522. 4 Harrison vs. Pepper, 166 Mass., 288.

5 Trade Insurance Co. vs. Barrocliff, 45 N. J. L., 543.

6 125 N. Y., 7.

"Andrew, J. * * * The question whether a stockholder in a corporation, as such, has an insurable interest in the corporate property, which he may protect by an insurance of specific, tangible property of the corporation, is the question now presented. The policy does not disclose the nature of the interest of Tobias in the vessel insured; but this was not necessary, unless required by some condition in the policy. Lawrence vs. Van Home, 1 Caines, 276; Tyler vs. Insurance Co., 12 Wend., 507. The policy, if otherwise valid, attached to whatever insurable interest he had, whether as owner or otherwise. What constitutes an insurable interest has been the subject of much discussion in the cases, and is often a question of great difficulty. It is quite apparent that the tendency of decisions in recent times is in the direction of a more liberal doctrine upon this subject than formerly prevailed. May, Ins., Sec. 76. Contracts of insurance, where the insured had no interest, were permitted at common law (Crawford vs. Hunter, 8 Term R., 13); but the manifest evils attending such contracts, and the temptation which they afforded for fraud and crime, led to the enactment in England of the statute, 19 Geo. II, c. 37, prohibiting wager policies, and this was followed by the enactment in this State of a similar statute (1 Rev. St., 662) prohibiting wagers. But to prevent the application of the statute to cases of insurance by way of security and indemnity it was provided that it should 'not be extended so as to prohibit or in any way affect any insurances made in good faith for the security or indemnity of the party assured, and which are not otherwise prohibited by the law.' Section 10. It would seem, therefore, that whenever there is a real interest to protect, and a person is so situated with respect to the subject of insurance that its destruction would or might reasonably be expected to impair the value of that interest, and insurance on such interest would not be a wager within the statute, whether the interest was an ownership in or a right to the possession of the property, or simply an advantage of a pecuniary character, having a legal basis, but dependent upon the continued existence of the subject. It is well settled that a mere hope or expectation, which may be frustrated by the happening of some event, is not an insurable interest.

"The stockholder in a corporation has no legal title to the corporate assets or property, nor any equitable title which he can convert into a legal title. The corporation itself is the legal owner, and can deal with corporate property as owner, subject only to the restrictions of the charter (Plimpton vs. Bigelow, 93 N. Y., 593; Van Allen vs. Assessors, 3 Wall, 573). But stockholders in a corporation have equitable rights of a pecuniary nature, growing out of their situation as stockholders, which may be prejudiced by the destruction of the corporate property. The object of business corporations is to make profits through the exercise of the corporate franchises, and gains so made are distributable among the stockholders according to their respective interests, although the time of the division is ordinarily in the discretion of the managing body. It is this right to share in the profits which constitutes the inducement to become stockholders. So, also, on the winding up of the corporation, the assets, after payment of debts, are divisible among the stockholders. It is very plain that both these rights of stockholders, viz., the right to dividends and the right to share in the final distribution of the corporate property, may be prejudiced by its destruction. In this case the ships were the means by which profits were to be earned, and their loss would naturally, in the ordinary course of things, diminish the capacity of the corporation to pay dividends, and consequently impair the value of the stock. The same would be true in other cases which might be mentioned; as, for example, where buildings producing rent, owned by a corporation, should be burned. It is not necessary, to constitute an insurable interest, that the interest is such that the event insured against would necessarily subject the insured to loss. It is sufficient that it might do so, and the pecuniary injury would be the natural consequence. Cone vs. Insurance Co., 60 N. Y., 619. "The question now before us was considered by the Supreme Court of Iowa in the case of Warren vs. Insurance Co., 31 Iowa, 464. The court, in a careful opinion, reached the conclusion that a stockholder in a corporation had an insurable interest in the corporate property. In Phillips vs. Insurance Co., 20 Ohio, 174, there is an adverse dictum, but the decision went on another ground. In Wilson vs. Jones, L. R., 2 Exch., 139, the action was upon a policy in favor of the plaintiff, a shareholder in the Atlantic Telegraph Company, a company organized to lay the Atlantic cable. The court construed the contract as an insurance of the plaintiff in respect to the adventure undertaken by the company to lay the cable, and it was held that his interest as shareholder was an insurable interest, and likened it to an insurance on profits. (See, also, Paterson vs. Harres, 1 Best & S., 336.) It is difficult to perceive any good reason why, if a stockholder could be insured on his shares in a corporation against a loss happening in the prosecution of a corporate enterprise, he could not insure specifically the corporate property itself embraced in the adventure, and prove his interest by showing that he was a share holder.

"The question here is, did the plaintiff have an insurable interest covered by the policy? The amount of damages is not in question. Except that the parties have taken that question out of the controversy, the extent of the loss would be a question of fact to be ascertained by proof, and the recovery up to the amount insured would be measured by the actual loss. We are of opinion that the view that a stockholder in a corporation may insure specific corporate property by reason of his situation as a stockholder, stands upon the better reason, and also that it is in consonance with the current of authority defining insurable interests in our courts. The cases of Herkier vs. Rice, 27 N. Y., 163; Rohrbach vs. Insurance Co., 62 N. Y., 47, and National Filtering Oil Co. vs. Citizens' Ins. Co., 106 N. Y., 535; 13 N. E. Rep., 337, sustained policies upon interests quite as remote as the interest now in question. It would be useless reiteration to restate the particular facts and grounds of the decisions in these cases. It is sufficient to refer to them, and to say in conclusion that it seems to us, both upon authority and reason, that the insurance now in question is not a wager policy, but is a fair and reasonable indemnity, founded upon a real interest, though not amounting to an estate, legal or equitable, in the property insured.

"The judgment should therefore be affirmed. All concur."