In Haver v. Yaker37 Justice Davis speaking with reference to the date at which a treaty goes into effect, says: "It is undoubtedly true as a principle of international law, that, as respects the rights of either government under it, a treaty is considered as concluded and binding from the date of its signature. In this regard the exchange of ratifications has a retroactive effect, confirming the treaty from its date, (Wheat. Int. Law, by Dana, 336.) But a different rule prevails where the treaty operates on individual rights. The principle of relation does not apply to rights of this character, which were vested before the treaty was ratified. In so far as it affects them, it is not considered as concluded until there is an exchange of ratifications, and this we understand to have been decided by this court, in Arredondo's case, reported in 6 Peters. The reason of the rule is apparent In this country, a treaty is something more than a contract, for the federal Constitution declares it to be the law of the land. If so, before it can become a law, the Senate, in whom rests the authority to ratify it, must agree to it. But the Senate are not required to adopt or reject it as a whole, but may modify or amend it, as was done with the Treaty under consideration. As the individual citizen, on whose rights of property it operates, has no means of knowing anything of it while before the Senate, it would be wrong in principle to hold him bound by it, as the law of the land, until it was ratified and proclaimed. And to construe the law, so as to make the ratification of the treaty relate back to its signing, thereby divesting a title already vested, would be manifestly unjust, and cannot be sanctioned."

36 Mr. Wheaton, Minister at Copenhagen, to Mr. Butler. Attornoy-General, January 20. 1835, adopted in Lawrence's Wheaton (1863), 459: and quoted also with approval in Meier, Abschluss von Staatsvertrrigcn, Leipzig, 1, 1874, p. 168. See Moore's Digest of Int. Laic, V, 231.

37 9 Wall. 32; 19 L. ed. 571.