The so-called "natural" or unwritten laws defining the natural, inalienable, inherent rights of the citizen, which, it is sometimes claimed, spring from the very nature of free government, have no force either to restrict or to extend the written provisions of the Constitution. The utmost that can be said for them is that where the language of the Constitution admits of doubt, it is to be presumed that authority is not given for the violation of acknowledged principles of justice and liberty.

In not a few instances, especially during early years, the binding force of natural laws is declared, but a careful examination of these cases shows that, practically without exception, the doctrine was used not as the real ratio decidendi, but to support, upon grounds of justice and expediency, a decision founded upon the written constitutional law.

Prior to the separation from England, the colonial courts were naturally inclined to minimize the power of the English Parliament, and, therefore, to uphold Coke's dictum in the famous Bonham case that an act of Parliament contrary to natural rights and justice is void. And in the political controversies which preceded the Revolution the doctrine of natural rights was relied upon.43 It would appear, however, that, though often asserted by the courts, no legislative act was held void solely because it was conceived to exceed the proper limits of all legislative power.44

When American independence came, it was to be expected that the Americans would apply the doctrine of natural rights and justice in limitation of the law-making powers of their own legislatures, and thus, as said, we do find the principle not infrequently stated, during the early years of the Constitution.45 Even Chief Justice Marshall lent it, upon occasion, a qualified sanction. "It may well be doubted," he observes in Fletcher v. Peck46 whether the nature of society and of government does not prescribe some limits to the legislative power; and if any be prescribed, where they are to be found, if the property of an individual, fairly and honestly acquired, may be seized without compensation? To the [state] legislature all legislative power is granted; but the question whether the act of transferring the property of an individual to the public be in the nature of the legislative power is well worthy of serious reflection." 47

43 For instance by Otis in his arguments against writs of assistance.

44As to whether the South Carolina case of Bowman v. Middleton, 1 Bay, 252, was such a case, see Thayer, Cases on Const. Law, I, 53, note 2.

45 Cf Stimson, Handbook of American Labor Law, p. 4, note.

46 Cr. 87; 3 L. ed. 162.

47 One of the clearest statements of the doctrine, though given obiter, is that of Justice Chase in Calder v. Bull (3 Dall. 386; 1 L. ed. 648). He says: "I cannot subscribe to the omnipotence of a state legislature, or that it should