By the Fifth Amendment it is provided: "Nor shall any person be compelled, in any criminal case, to be a witness against himself." The guaranty thus furnished is one independent of the guaranty of "due process of law" and is thus one which, so far as the federal Constitution is concerned, is not secured to the individual in the state courts. After an elaborate consideration of the meaning of the phrase "due process of law" and an historical review of English practice with reference to the immunity of the accused from self-incrimination, the court, in Twining v. New Jersey,67 say: "We think it is. manifest, from this review of the origin, growth, extent and limits of the exemption from compulsory self-incrimination in the English law, that it is not regarded as a part of the law of the land of Magna Charta or the due process of law, which has been an equivalent expression, but, on the contrary, is regarded as separate from and independent of due process. It came into existence not as an essential part of due process but as a wise and beneficent rule of evidence developed in the course of judicial decision." Continuing, the court show from the circumstances attending the incorporation of the privilege in the federal Constitution and from the fact that four of the States in their first constitutions did not insist upon the privilege where it would have a much wider application, that it was not considered to be inherent in due process of law. Finally, the court say: "Even if the historical meaning of due process of law and the decisions of this court did not exclude the privilege from it, it. would be going far to rate it as an immutable principle of justice which is the inalienable possession of every citizen of a free government. Salutary as the principle may seem to the great majority, it cannot be ranked with the right to hearing before condemnation, the immunity from arbitrary power not acting by general laws, and the inviolability of private property. The wisdom of the exemption has never been universally assented to since the days of Bentham, many doubt it to-day, and it is best defended not as an unchangeable principle of universal justice, but as a law proved by experience to be expedient.68 It has no place in the jurisprudence of civilized and free countries outside of the domain of the common law, and it is nowhere observed among our own people in the search for truth outside the administration of the law."
65 Cf. Harvard Law Rev., XX, 219. 66 34 Stat, at L.. Pt. T. 1246.
67 211 U. S. 78; 29 Sup. Ct. Rep. 14; 53 L. ed. 97.
68 Citing Wigmore on Evidence, § 2251.