With the motives of the legislators the courts cannot concern themselves. " The judiciary can only inquire whether the means devised in the execution of a power granted are forbidden by the Constitution. It cannot go beyond that inquiry without intrenching upon the domain of another department of government. That it may not do with safety to our institutions." 12

10 207 U. S. 463; 28 Sup. Ct. Rep. 141; 52 L. ed. 297.

11Citing Trade Mark Cases, 100 U. S. 82; 26 L. ed. 550; Cooley, Const. Lim. 178.

12 Interstate Commerce Commission v. Brimson, 154 U. S. 447; 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1125; 38 L. ed. 1047.

"So long as Congress keeps within the limits erf its authority as defined by the Constitution, infringing no rights recognized or secured by that in-stiument, its regulations of interstate and international commerce, whether founded in wisdom or not, must be submitted to by all. ... To depart from [this rule of construction] because of the circumstances of special cases, or because the rule, in its operation, may possibly affect the interests of business is to endanger the safety and integrity of our institutions and make the Constitution mean not what it says but what interested parties wish it to mean at a particular time and under particular circumstances. . . .

In Ex parte MeCardle13 the court declined to take appellate jurisdiction because of the enactment by Congress of a law which it was well known had been passed for the express purpose of preventing the court from questioning the constitutionality of certain measures which the Federal Government had taken for the "Reconstruction" of the Southern States after the termination of the Civil War. "We are not at liberty," said the court, "to inquire into the motives of the legislature. We can only examine into its power under the Constitution; and the power to make exceptions to the appellate jurisdiction of this court is given by express words." 14