The series of cases, culminating in that of United States v. Ju Toy, considered in the preceding paragraphs, are to be construed as determining simply that when, by statute, the conclusive determination of facts has been vested in administrative agents, a judicial review thereof may not be demanded as a constitutional right In two respects, however, such administrative acts are, and constitutionally must be, reviewable in the courts. In the first place, as has already been pointed out, the question of the jurisdiction of the administrative agents or bodies to act is always open to judicial examination. In the second place, it is always open to the courts to determine whether, in the administrative procedure which has been followed, the essential procedural requirements of due process of law have been present. As said by the court in Yamataya v. Fisher,26 the court " must not be understood as holding that administrative officers, when executing the provisions of a statute involving the liberty of persons, may disregard the fundamental principles that inhere in ' due process of law' as understood at the time of the adoption of the Constitution."

In this case it was held that due process was satisfied by an informal notice to the plaintiff that an investigation was to be had to determine whether she should be deported, although it was alleged that, because of her lack of knowledge of the English language, she did not understand the import of the questions propounded to her, and that, in fact, she did not know that these questions related to the matter of her possible deportation.

24 Cf. article by Professor Powell, cited above.

25 192 U. S. 1; 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 171; 48 L. ed. 317.

26 189 U. S. 86; 23 Sup. Ct. Rep. 611; 47 L. ed. 721.

Where, from the nature of the case, the determination of the fact at issue, as, for example, the ascertainment of the character of a commodity, which character may be ascertained by comparing it with an established standard, it has been held that a hearing is not needed.27 And in Ekiu v. United States,27a earlier referred to, it will be remembered that it was held that the statute was held not to require inspectors to take testimony, but that they might decide upon their own inspection, whether an alien immigrant was entitled to enter the country; but that upon habeas corpus the question could be determined by the courts whether one prevented from landing had had an opportunity to ascertain whether his detention was lawful.

In Chin Low v. United States,28 however, a habeas corpus having been denied by the lower federal courts, the Supreme Court, upon appeal, held that the writ should have been issued for the determination of the allegation that the petitioner had been prevented by the administrative officials from obtaining the testimony of certain witnesses in her behalf. In its opinion the court is, however, careful to say that the only question before it is whether a fair opportunity to a hearing has been given the petitioner, and not the correctness of the determination. The court do, however, go on to say that in those cases in which it is determined that the action of the administrative body has been unfair, in that it has denied a fair hearing, it becomes the necessary duty of the court to determine whether, in fact, upon the merits of the case, the petitioner is entitled to enter. As to this the court say: " The decision of the Department is final, but that is on the presupposition that the decision was after a hearing in good faith, however summary in form. As between the substantive right of citizens to enter and of persons alleging themselves to be citizens to have a chance to prove their allegation, on the one side, and the conclusiveness of the commissioner's fiat on the other, when one or the other must give'way, the latter must yield. In such a case something must be done, and it naturally falls to be done by the courts. . . . The courts must deal with the matter somehow, and there seems to be no way so convenient as a trial of the merits before the judge. If the petitioner proves his citizenship, a longer restraint would be illegal. If he fails, the order of deportation would remain in force." .

27Public Clearing House v. Coyne, 194 U. S. 497; 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 789; 48 L. ed. 1092.

27a 142 U. S. 651; 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 336; 3.1 L. ed. 1146. 28 208 U. S. 8; 28 Sup. Ct. Rep. 201; 52 L. ed. 369.