This section is from the book "Business Law - Case Method", by William Kixmiller, William H. Spencer. See also: Business Law: Text and Cases.
The Farrell Dry Goods Company loaded a car of freight in Dayton, Ohio, for shipment to Walton, Pennsylvania, over the Pennsylvania Railroad. The car was billed out on March 29, 1913, but its shipment was delayed by the railroad company for two days, and then was caught in the Dayton flood, and totally destroyed. The company maintained that it was not liable for the loss, because it was caused by the act of God. The dry goods company contended that the railroad company was liable, since the goods would have escaped the loss had the company not delayed its shipment. Has the company a valid defense?
McMechen was the owner of a sloop, used by him, as a common carrier, on the Hudson River. On one trip, he was carrying goods belonging to Colt up the river. At the time, he was tacking up the river against a light wind; while near the shore and on the point of changing the tack, the wind suddenly failed. By reason of the failure of the wind, the vessel floated on the shore, and subsequently, went down. Colt brought this action against McMechen, as a common carrier, for damages.
McMechen contended that he was not liable, because the loss was due to an act of God - the failure of the wind - and was in no sense due to any fault on his part.
Mr. Justice Spencer said: "There can be no con-trarity of opinion on the law which renders common carriers liable. However rigid the rule may be, they are responsible for every injury done to goods intrusted to them to carry, unless it proceeds from the act of God or the enemies of the land." The court was of the opinion that the cessation of the wind at the time in question was an act of God, and that loss was due to such act of God, and in no way attributable to any fault or negligence on the part of McMechen. Judgment was given for McMechen.
As pointed out heretofore, a carrier is not liable for loss occasioned by an act of God. An act of God has been defined as any act beyond the control of a human being; it includes an unusual flood, earthquake, great droughts, severe frosts, and similar events of nature. The act of God must be the approximate cause of the loss. If it could have been avoided by due diligence on the part of the company, the latter will not be excused. There is a conflict of authority on the point of law involved in the Story Case. Many jurisdictions hold that the negligent delay in shipping is not the immediate cause of a loss, since the carrier could not have reasonably foreseen or anticipated that the goods would be overtaken by such an accident. Similar rulings have been made in fire and frost cases.
It has been held in a New York case, however, that the preceding negligent delay on the part of the carrier, as a result of which the goods were destroyed by a flood, was sufficient to make the carrier liable. The same court adhered to this rule in the case of a loss by fire, following negligent delay in shipping. The Illinois Supreme Court has held to a similar ruling in a flood case, and in a frost case. In New York and Illinois, therefore, the railroad company is liable for the loss in the Story Case.
 
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