This section is from the book "Business Law - Case Method", by William Kixmiller, William H. Spencer. See also: Business Law: Text and Cases.
Frank Shepherd and his wife, Laura, lived in the state of New York before that state made any change by statute with reference to the ability of married women to contract. The wife, Laura, owned a strip of land which was given to her by her father as her own separate estate to be free of the claims or debts of her husband. Two years after the parties had married, the husband and wife together made a contract to build a house upon the land. The contract was made with Howard Davis. After this contract was made Shepherd and his wife refused to comply with it. Shepherd himself was not financially responsible and therefore in a suit against both of them, Davis tried to make the land accountable for his loss because of the breach of contract. The wife put in defense the inability of a married woman to make a contract. Davis answered that a married woman could make a contract with reference to her own separate estate. Is this correct?
The defendant's husband wished to purchase a cow from the plaintiff on credit. The plaintiff was unwilling to make the sale unless the husband procured the signature of his wife to the note which he was giving as payment. The wife consented, saying at the time that if her husband was not able to pay it, she was. This action was brought by the plaintiff upon the note, seeking to obtain satisfaction from the separate estate of the wife. The trial judge found that the defendant "intended to charge and expressly charged her separate estate for the payment of the note." He gave as his judgment that enough of her estate be sold to satisfy the demand of the plaintiff. Defendant appealed to this judgment.
Decision: A married woman can bind her separate estate, provided, that there is a clear intention to do so, and that the contract is connected with, or made for the benefit of, such separate estate. In this case there was a clear and unequivocal intention to bind her separate estate; but it did not appear that there was any connection between the subject matter of the sale and her separate estate. In other words, it did not appear that the purchase of the animal would benefit, in any wise, her separate property. Judgment was given for the defendant.
A married woman cannot assume any contractual obligation at common law; she could not even contract for necessaries of life. She was so far merged into the identity of her husband that she scarcely had any legal recognition. When the courts of equity created her separate estate, obviously this estate would do her little good, unless she likewise was given the right and power to make some contracts. The courts then permitted her to make contracts in regard to, and for the benefit of, her separate estate; such a contract created no personal obligation upon her, but only bound her estate.
In the Story Case, Davis could hold the wife accountable on the building contract because it was made to bind her separate estate and to benefit her own separate estate. These difficulties are practically obviated today, because the state legislatures have enacted laws giving married women the right to make contracts. The question may be of importance, however, in fixing rights that came into existence before modern statutes on this point were enacted.
 
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