This section is from the book "Business Law - Case Method", by William Kixmiller, William H. Spencer. See also: Business Law: Text and Cases.
Mr. Norton sold lot number 25 of block 10, in Evans-ville, Indiana, to Frank Sievers. After the latter had contracted to buy the lot, he was surprised one day to notice that Joseph Stryker was removing certain lawn fountains which Norton had previously placed on the lot. Upon inquiry, Frank Sievers learned that Mr. Norton, after selling the lot, sold these fountains to the Western Marble and Stone Company, to be used in the beautifying of a neighboring lawn. Sievers sued the "Western Marble and Stone Company for removing the fountains, claiming that they were a part of the real estate passing to him under the contract. Is there justice in his suit?
Thompson was originally the owner of certain lands which he conveyed to Jenkins, the plaintiff in this action. Subsequently, Thompson sold certain wood, which was lying on the lands, to McCurdy, the defendant. Jenkins contended that the wood was part of the real estate and passed to him by the deed from Thompson, and that, therefore, the latter had no title to the wood when he made his attempted sale to McCurdy; and that such sale, therefore, was of no effect.
McCurdy contended that the wood was personal property, and did not pass by Thompson's deed of real estate to Jenkins, and, therefore, the subsequent sale by Thompson to him was a valid sale, giving him a right to take the wood. This is an action by Jenkins to recover the taking of the wood by McCurdy.
Mr. Justice Orton delivered the opinion of the court and decided as follows: "The question of whether material lying on the land is personal or real property depends upon whether it was intended to be used separately from the land or as a part of the land and only in connection with it. Here, if the wood was to be used as firewood, its use was separate from the land, and it would be personal property; but if it was to be used as a filling for low places, etc., its use was in connection with and part of the land, and it was a part of the real estate. Since, here, the intended use was for firewood, the wood was personal property, and judgment should be given for the defendant McCurdy."
The term "property" used in a strictly legal sense, denotes the rights to objects against others; but in the broad sense, as commonly understood, the term signifies the ownership of things or objects. It will be used in this sense in the present work. Personal property includes all those objects which man has taken into possession, except real property. The latter includes any interest in land for one's life, or longer. Any interest for a stated number of years is considered less than a life interest; therefore, an interest in land for ninety-nine years is not real property, but personal property. Leaseholds are personal property.
Personal property may be divided into two classes: chattels real, and chattels personal. Leaseholds are chattels real, because they pertain to real estate, and have the general characteristics of real estate; so also are growing crops and emblements. Chattels personal consist of corporeal and incorporeal objects. The first consists of objects of which the owner may take bodily possession - such as money, furniture, live stock, etc. The second consists of rights against other persons - such as debts, obligations on contracts, trade marks, etc. These are invisible property rights, and cannot be manually delivered, but only symbolically. Stocks, bonds, bills, notes, and insurance come under this classification.
In the Story Case, we have a case converse from that of the Ruling Court Case. In the latter, real property, by physical severence from the land, becomes personalty. In the Story Case, property once obviously personalty is placed in permanent contact with the soil for the improvement of the same, and has become real estate. Sievers, therefore, was correct in his contention.
 
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