"In all of these cases the agents were guilty of criminal misconduct or of positive dishonesty. In the last case it was expressly held that the agent may be trusted so long as the circumstances indicate a want of diligence or punctuality, and not a want of integrity. Under the facts disclosed in this case, the court, in our opinion, erred, both in giving the instructions complained of and in refusing those asked." that the fact of the occurrence of an event on which the debt becomes payable, is one which would naturally come first to the knowledge of the creditor. In such case a stipulation that notice of the happening of the event should be given by the creditor to the debtor before the maturing of the debt is a matter of substance, and will be enforced as a condition precedent.1 Even without such a stipulation, when a debt is made payable on an event whose occurrence is from the nature of things to be within the peculiar knowledge of the creditor, then notice of the event to the debtor is a condition precedent to the maturing of the debt. "The reason of the rule is that when a thing is in the knowledge of the plaintiff, but cannot be in the knowledge of the defendant, but the defendant can only guess or speculate about the matter, then notice is necessary."2 - It is otherwise when the occurrence of the event is not more distinctively in the knowledge of one party than of the other.3 The true test is declared by When debt is conditioned on event within creditor's peculiar knowledge, notice should be given to debtor.

1 Watson v. Walker, 23 N. H. 471; Lent v. Padelford, 10 Mass. 230; Tas-ker v. Bartlett, 5 Cush. 359; Clough v. Hoffman, 5 Wend. 500; see Benj. on Sales, 3d Am. ed. sec 577; Webber v. Dunn, 71 Me. 331.

2 Bramwell, B., Makin v. Watkinson, L. It. 6 Ex. 25. To same effect see Vyse v. Wakefield, 6 M. & W. 453; but see Hayden v. Bradley, 6 Gray, 425.

3 Leake, 2d ed. 644; citing 1 Wms. Saund. 117 a; Watson v. Walker, 23 N. H. 471. The following cases are given by Mr. Leake as illustrations of the rule in the text: -.

"A buyer promised to pay for barley as much as the seller sold it for to any other man; the seller was held bound to give notice before he could call upon the buyer to pay, because the person to whom the barley would be sold was altogether at the option of the seller, who might sell it to whom he pleased. Haule v. Homyng, Cro. Jac. 432; cited this has been held to be the case with regard to conditions printed in small type in such a way that an ordinary observer would not notice them.1 - An ordinary printed heading to a telegraph blank is a notice to a party sending a message on such blank, although the heading was never read by him.2 sec 573. By the law merchant, the drawer and indorsers of a bill of exchange, and the indorsers of a promissory note, are entitled to notice of dishonor of the paper by the party by whom it is primarily due.3 Whether the paper is properly presented for payment, and whether the notice of dishonor is adequate, depends upon the law of the place of payment.4 Notice, however, is not required in cases where the drawer or indorser, as the case may be, whom the object is to fix with the debt, is the party primarily liable, as where the acceptance was made for the drawer's accommodation.5 Nor is it necessary that notice should be given to a surety, who, without becoming a party to the paper, by a collateral agreement, guarantees the payment of a bill, the guarantee binding him absolutely in default of payment.6 Nor need notice be given to a party who is out of reach, so as to make notification impracticable.7

6 M. & W. 454. The defendant covenanted not to do anything whereby an insurance, to be effected on his life by the plaintiff at any office which the latter should choose, should be avoided or prejudiced; it was held that the defendant was not bound by this covenant until the plaintiff had given him notice that he had chosen an office, and had effected a policy, because the option of the plaintiff as to the office was too indefinite to enable the defendant to inform himself of the conditions of the policy he was to observe. Vyse v. Wakefield 6M. &W.442; see also Rippinghall v. Lloyd, 5 B. & Ad. 742." Upon a covenant in a lease by the lessor to keep the demised premises in repair, it was held that notice of want of repair was a condition precedent without which he could not be sued for non-repair. Makin v. Watkinson, L. R. 6 Ex. 35; though see Hayden v. Bradley, 6 Gray, 425. In Tasker v. Bartlett, 5 Cush. 359, Wilde, J., said it was a settled.

Mr. Benjamin to be this: "that if the obligee has reserved any option to himself, by which he can control the event on which the duty of the obligor depends, then he must give notice of his own act before he can call upon the obligor to comply with his engagement."1