Mr. Holmes, in his thoughtful chapter on the history of contracts, " The Common Law, by 0. W. Holmes, Jr., Boston, 1881," maintains (p. 251) that debt was "simply the general form in which any money claim was collected, except unliquidated claims for damages by force, for which there was established the equally general remedy of trespass." So far from saying that debt was taken from the Roman law, he holds that it "is of pure German surrenders something in exchange;1 and this, even though such gift be sustained by the consideration of natural love descent." - The rule that in simple contract debts a consideration must be proved, he attributes to the fact that such debts were proved by witnesses (the old official witnesses), who " could only swear to facts within their knowledge, coupled with the accident that these witnesses were not used in transactions which might create a debt, except for a particular fact, namely, the delivery of property, together with the further accident that this delivery was quid pro quo;" and this, he argues, is " equivalent to the rule that, when a debt was proved by witnesses, there must be quid pro quo." "But these debts proved by witnesses," he adds, " instead of by deed, are what we call simple contract debts, and thus, beginning with debt, and subsequently extending itself to other contracts, is established our peculiar and most important doctrine that every simple contract must have a consideration." "The action of debt," he proceeds to say, "has passed through three stages. At first, it was the only remedy to recover money due, except when the liability was simply to pay damages for a wrongful act. . . . The second stage was when the doctrine of consideration was introduced in its earlier form of a benefit to the promisor. . . . The third stage was reached when a larger view was taken of consideration, and it was expressed in terms of detriment to the promisee." - To this, however, it may be replied that, as is stated in the text, mere benefit to the promisor cannot, from the nature of things, be a consideration, unless it be accompanied by detriment to the promisee (infra, sec 505). Mr. Holmes, in saying that debt could only be used where the consideration was a benefit actually received by the promisor, no doubt accurately states one of the necessary constituents of the action. But this is not enough. Debt could at no time be maintained, unless the consideration proceeded from the promisee; in other words, unless the promisee suffered some detriment from the contract.

1 Wilkinson v. Buyers, 1 Ad. & El. 108; 2 N. & M. 853; Holliday v. Atkinson, 5 B. & C. 501; Dodge v. Adams, 19.

Pick. 429; Thorne v. Deas, 4 Johns. 84; Philadelphia etc. R. R. v. Johnson, 7 W. & S. 317.

The topic in the text is discussed in an interesting essay by Seuffert, entitled Zur Geschichte der obligatoris-chen Vertrage, Nordlingen, 1881. He shows by abundant citations that in the old jurisprudence of Franks and Lombards a nudum pactum was a contract not clothed in a form the law prescribed. In secular jurisprudence this was the doctrine of the continent of Europe during the middle ages; but it gradually gave way to the doctrine that a naturalis obligatio would sustain an informal promise, which was the rule of the Roman law. According to Seuf. fert, informal contracts (formlase Ver-trage) could not be sued on in the old German law. - According to Stobbe (Privat. R. 3, 64), a more liberal ten-

1 Bisp. Eq. sec 372; Benj. on Sales, 3d Am. ed. sec 12; Mahon v. U. S., 16 Wall. 143; Dorsey v. Packwood, 12 How. 126; Hanson v. Millett, 55 Me. 184; Wing v. Merchant, 57 Me. 383; Loring v. Sumner, 23 Pick. 98; Stone v. Hack-ett, 12 Gray, 227; Kimball v. Leland, 110 Mass. 325; Dodge v. Burdell, 13 Conn. 170; Curry v. Powers, 70 N. Y, and affection.1 A warranty, also, given after a sale, is void as without consideration;2 and so of a promise to leave a proposal open when the promisee does nothing whatever on faith of the promise,3 though such a promise binds if the other party does or omits to do anything, no matter how slight, in return.4 - A promise, also, to pay for unsolicited past services is void for want of consideration;5 and so of promises to pay to religious or charitable objects, when purely gratuitous;6 and of promises to pay debts that have been released.7.

212; Carhart's App., 78 Penn. St. 100; Hitch v. Davis, 3 Md. Ch. 266; Shepherd v. Shepherd, 1 Md. Ch. 244; Bu-ford v. McKee, 1 Dana, 107; Holland v. Hensley, 4 Iowa, 222; People v. Johnson, 14 111. 342; Adams v. Hayes, 2 Ired. L, 366; Sims v. Sims, 2 Ala. 117 1 Barkley v.. Hanlan, 55 Miss. 606.