Sec 260

We have noticed in the last section, the limitations under which opinions as to value may bind the party giving them. It may be said, in addition, that a value given conjecturally, or as an estimate, or an expression of opinion, by a party negotiating a sale, is not ordinarily to be regarded as a representation of a fact whose falsity exposes the party making it to rescission of the contract made by him, or to an action for deceit,2 unless such value be And so of conjectural value.

11 Allen, 622; Cooper v. Lovering, 106 Mass. 79; Homer v. Perkins, 124 Mass. 431; Wolcott v. Mount, 38 N. J. L. 496; Merwin v. Arbuckle, 81 111. 501; McClanahan v. McKinley, 52 Iowa, 222.

1 Fisher v. Budlong, 10 R. I. 525; Harris v. McMurray, 23 Ind. 9; Picard v. McCormick, 11 Mich. 68; Kost v. Bender, 25 Mich. 515; see Power v. Barham, 4 Ad. & E. 473; Payne v. Smith, 20 Ga. 654; and cases cited above, see supra, sec 254 as to fiduciary relations.

In Power v. Barham, 4 Ad. & El. 476, 6 N. & M. 62, 7 C. & P. 356, it was held that where a bill of sale described certain pictures as "Four pictures, views in Venice, Canaletti," it was for the jury to determine whether this was a conjectural opinion or absolute statement that the pictures were by Canaletti (see supra, sec 220). In Jendwine v. Slade, 2 Esp. 573 (Story on Cont. sec 639), Lord Kenyon said: " It was impossible to make this the case of a warranty; the pictures were the work of artists some centuries back, and there being no way of tracing the picture itself, it could only be matter of opinion whether the picture in question was the work of the artist whose name it bore, or not." In Power v.

Barham, supra, Lord Denman said: "It may be true that, in the case of very old pictures, a person can only express an opinion as to their genuineness; and that is laid down by Lord Kenyon in the case referred to (Jendwine v. Slade). But the case here is, that pictures are sold with a biU of parcels, containing the words, ' Four pictures, views in Venice, Canaletti.' Now, words like these must derive their explanation from the ordinary way in which such matters are transacted. It was, therefore, for the jury to say, under all these circumstances, what was the effect of the words, and whether they implied a warranty of genuineness or conveyed only a description or expression of opinion."

2 Story, Eq. Jur. sec 201; Sug. V. & P. 543; Bramley v. Alt, 3 Ves. 624; Smith v. Clark, 12 Ves. 483; Bexwell v. Christie, 1 Cowp. 395; Holbrook v. Connor, 60 Me. 578; Morrill v. Wallace, 9 N. H. 111; Medbury v. Watson, 6 Met. 246; Davis v. Meeker, 5 Johns. 354; People v. Crissie, 4 Denio, 525; Sandford v. Handy, 23 Wend. 260; Sankey v. Bank, 78 Penn. St. 48; Bristol v. Braidwood, 28 Mich. 191; Noetling v. Wright, 72 111. 390; Tuck v. Downing, 76 111. 71; Walker v. R given by an expert as such;1 nor, such is the prevalent opinion, is a statement of the price an article brought at a prior sale,2 unless such price be an important factor in determining the question whether a purchase be made.3 And a misrepresentation of the price at which property offered for sale has been let, imposes liability.4 And when an opinion as to value has a material influence in the adoption of the contract, and when the party accepting a proposal accepts it on this basis, then an intentionally false statement of value avoids the contract and exposes the party making it to an action for deceit.5.