Sec 370

"Contracts to commit an immoral offence, or to give money or reward to another to commit an immoral offence, or to induce another to do something against the general rules of morality, though far more indefinite than the previous class (contracts to commit a crime), have always been held to be void."3 " Generaliter novimus, turpes stipulationes nullius esse momenti."4 - "Cum omnia, quae contra bonos mores vel in pactum vel in stipuv. Noble, 2 Russ. & Myl. 506, said: 'Common or universal error may be said to make the law, especially if the opinion of lawyers and the decisions of judges have been ruled by it'

But void contract cannot be validated.

Agreements to induce immorality void.

"Justice Blackburn says, in Jones v. Tapling, 12 C. B. (N. S.) 846: ' There are cases in which a decision originally erroneous has been so long acquiesced in and acted on, that a return to the proper principle would greatly affect existing interests. This is peculiarly the case in questions of conveyancing law. In such cases the maxim, communis error facit jus, may be applied.'

"The error approved in Morecock v. Dickins, Amb. 678, was one that had been sanctioned by a prior adjudication. So, too, in D'Arcy v. Blake, 2 Sch. & Lef. 387, the error approved by Lord Redesdale was one which prior decisions had made law. He said: 'The decisions to the full extent are so old, so strong, and so numerous, so adopted in every book on the subject, and so considered as settled law, that it would be very wrong to attempt at this time to alter them.' In my opinion, there is no evidence whatever, in this case, that the error which the complainants insist shall have the force of law, has ever been recognized or applied by any authority competent to give it the force of law." Runyan, C, Ocean Beach Ass. v. Brinley, 34 N. J. Eq. 448.

1 Isherwood v. Oldnow, 3 M. & S. 382; R. v. Sussex, 2 B. & S. 680; Phipps v. Ackers, 9 Cl. & F. 598.

2 Milne v. Huber, 3 McL. 212; Robinson v. Barrows, 48 Me. 186; Ludlow v. Hardy, 38 Mich. 690; Anding v. Levy, 57 Miss. 51; Decell v. Lowen-thal, 57 Miss. 331; see Mays v. Williams, 27 Ala. 267.

3 Jessel, M. R., Printing Registering Co. v. Sampson, L. R. 19 Eq. 465; S. P. Howson v. Hancock, 18 T. R. 577; Lowell v. R. R., 23 Pick. 32; Bredine's App., 92 Penn. St. 241; see White v. Bank, 22 Pick. 184; Belding v. Pitkin, 2 Caines, 149; Forsythe v. State, 6 Ohio, 19.

4 L. 26, de V. O. (45, 1).

lationem deducuntur, nullius momenti sunt."1 A printer, in conformity with this rule, cannot recover the price of work done on a libellous book;2 nor is a promise to indemnify the publisher of such a book binding.3 In such cases the court, on the immorality of the transaction appearing from the plaintiff's opening, will refuse to hear the suit. - "The court will not listen to claims founded upon services rendered in violation of common decency, public morality, or the law. History furnishes instances of robbery, arson, and other crimes committed for hire. If after receiving a pardon or suffering the punishment imposed upon him, the culprit should sue the instigator of the crime for the promised reward - if we may suppose that audacity could go so far - the court would not hesitate a moment in dismissing his case and sending him from its presence, whatever might be the character of the defence. It would not be restrained by defects of pleading, nor indeed could it be by the defendant's waiver, if we may suppose that in such a matter it would be offered. "What is so obvious in a case of such aggravated criminality as the one supposed, is equally true in all cases where the services for which compensation is claimed are forbidden by law or condemned by public decency or morality."4 It has consequently been held that an action cannot be maintained for a breach of a contract in renting rooms which the owner refused to allow the lessee to use when it appeared that they were to be opened for irreligious lectures.5