Sec 33

No person but the infant, or his personal representatives, is entitled to set up his infancy.5 It is a privilege, however, on which he is entitled to fall back in connection with contracts concerning personal,6 as well as real estate.7 And though the infant's heirs,8 and administrators,9 can thus take advantage of his incapacity, this is not the case with his assignee.10 And it is not enough for the infant, when sued after majority, on a debt incurred by him in infancy, simply to plead infancy. He must aver that he disaffirmed the contract within a reasonable time after coming of age.11

Sec 34

As a rule, voidable contracts may be avoided during infancy, or within a reasonable time after coming of age.12

Only the infant can set up the privilege.

Warwick, 6 Taunt. 118 ; Thompson v. Hamilton, 12 Pick. 425; Boyden v. Boyden, 9 Met. 519 ; McGinn v. Shaef-fer, 7 Watts, 412.

1 Grey v. Cooper, 3 Doug. 68; Jones v. Darch, 4 Price, 300; Nightingale v. Withington, 15 Mass. 273; Dulty v. Brownfield, 1 Barr, 497.

2 Flight v. Bolland, 4 Russ. 298.

3 Warwick v. Bruce, 2 M. & S. 205.

4 Infra, sec 523.

5 U. S. v. Bainbridge, 1 Mason, 71;.

Hartness v. Thompson, 5 Johns. 160;

Voorhees v. Wait, 3 Green (N. J.),

343; Gullett v. Lumberton, 1 Eng.

.Ark. 109.

6 Skinner v. Maxwell, 66 N. C. 45.

7 Irvine v. Irvine, 9 Wal. 67 ; Spencer v. Carr, 45 N. Y. 406.

8 Nelson v. Eaton, 1 Redfield, 498; Austin v. Female Sem., 8 Met. 196; infra, sec 55.

9 Martin v. Mayo, 10 Mass. 137; Parsons v. Hill, 8 Mo. 135; infra, sec 55.

10 Hoyle v. Stowe, 2 Dev. & B. 323; that an indorsee cannot set up an indorsees infancy, see supra, sec 32; infra, sec 35, 37.

11 Dublin, etc. v. R. R., 1 Black, 8 Exch. 181.

12 Pollock on Cont. p. 42, citing Newry, etc. R. R. v. Coome, 3 Ex. 565; North Western R. R. v. McMi-chael, 5 Ex. 114; Derocher v. Mills, 58 Me. 217; Vent v. Osgood, 19 Pick. 572; Gaffney v. Hayden, 110 Mass. 137 ; Whitmarsh v. Hall, 3 Denio, 375 ; Meredith v. Crawford, 34 Md. 399 ; Ray.

"Whether an avoidance during minority is final, is doubtful. On the ground that an infant's contract, unless for necessaries, does not absolutely bind, it would seem that he is not absolutely bound by his rescission of a contract, but that such rescission is open to repudiation by him when at full age.1 It has, however, been otherwise ruled in Massachusetts;2 and there may be cases (e. g., subscriptions by infant shareholders) in which,it is argued by Mr. Pollock, the nature of the case is such as to make a rescission by such infant necessarily final.3 And sales of laud cannot ordinarily be avoided during minority.4

Sec 35

There can be no question that an infant may be the recipient of property, unless of a character which the policy of the law debars him from holding.5 He may also pass title. This is the case with regard to negotiable paper ;6 and it has been held 'that a transfer over by an infant transferee of stock is valid.7 A gift to an infant, also, may be supported, if accompanied by delivery of the chattel.8