21. The acceptance of an offer to result in a contract must be -

(a) Absolute and unconditional.

(b) Identical with the terms of the offer.

(c) In the mode, at the place, and within the time expressly or impliedly required by the offer.

The acceptance of an offer must be absolute, and identical with the terms of the offer; or, as it has been expressed, "an acceptance to be good must in every respect meet and correspond with the offer, neither falling within nor going beyond the terms proposed, but exactly meeting them at all points and closing with them just as they stand."64 Unless this is so, there is no meeting of minds and expression of one and the same common intention - the intention expressed by one of the parties is either doubtful in itself, or is different from that of the other. The intention of the parties must be distinct and common to both.65

62 9 Cyc. 297. In the English case of Ex parte Cote, L. R. 9 Ch. 27, it was held that the posting of a letter in France, where it was subject to be reclaimed by the sender until its dispatch from the office of transmission, did not transfer title to certain bills of exchange inclosed. But in Canterbury v. Sparta, 91 Wis. 53, 64 N. W. 311, 30 L. R. A. 845, 51 Axa. St. Rep. 870, upon a very similar state of facts, the sender was held liable to the extent of an inclosed draft, even though he had reclaimed it from the post office authorities. And see, also, McDonald v. Chemical Nat. Bank, 174 U. S. 610, 19 Sup. Ct. 787, 43 L. Ed. 1106; Crown Point Iron Co. v. Ętna Ins. Co., 127 N. Y. 608, 28 N. E. 653, 14 L. R. A. 147. See "Contracts," Dec. Dig. (Key-No.) § 26; Cent. Dig. §§ 119, 120.

63 Scottish-American Mortgage Co. v. Davis (Tex. Civ. App.) 72 S. W. 217 (quoting with approval the statement of Vredenburgh, J., in Hallock v. Ins. Co., 26 N. J. Law, 268, 2S0, that "the acceptor can no more overtake and countermand his letter mailed, than he can his words of acceptance after they have issued from his lips"). See "Contracts," Dec. Dig. (Key-No.) § 26; Cent. Dig. §§ 119, 120.

64 Knowlton's Anson, Cont. 22, note; ELIASON v. HENSHAW, 4 Wheat. 225, 4 L. Ed. 556, Throckmorton Cas. Contracts, 18; Potts v. Whitehead, 23 N. J. Eq. 512; Thomas v. Greenwood, 69 Mich. 215, 37 N. W. 195; Mactier's Adm'rs v. Frith, 6 Wend. (N. Y.) 103, 21 Am. Dec. 262; Eggleston v. Wagner, 46 Mich. 610, 10 N. W. 37; Jordan v. Norton, 4 Mees. & W. 155; Corcoran v. White, 117 111. 118, 7 N. E. 525, 57 Am. Rep. 858; Siebold v. Davis, 67

If a person offers to do a definite thing, and the person to whom the offer is made accepts conditionally, or introduces a new term into the acceptance, his answer is not an acceptance. It is either a mere expression of willingness to treat, or it is in effect a counter offer.68 A proposal to accept, or an acceptance varying the terms from those offered, is a rejection of the offer, and the offer is then no longer open to acceptance.67