The mere fact that the ascertainment of the damages is difficult cannot deprive him of his right to whatever damages he has suffered as the natural consequence of the breach; the difficulty, when it arises, must be met by the jury. Thus, where a manufacturer, who was in the habit of sending his goods for exhibition to agricultural shows, and made a profit by the practice, intrusted goods to a carrier to be sent to a show, under circumstances which should have brought his object to its notice, and they delayed the goods so that they were too late for exhibition, it was held that, though the ascertainment of damages was difficult and speculative, this was no reason for not giving damages.47 It is generally held, however, that while profits which would have been realized but for the breach of contract may be allowed as a proper element of damages,48 they must be proved with reasonable certainty, and not be merely conjectural, and that speculative or contingent profits cannot be recovered.49
(b) Where the matter of the contract is such that the court cannot supervise performance.
(c) Where the enforcement of specific performance would be inequitable and unjust.
47 Simpson v. Railway Co., 1 Q. B. Div. 274. And see Wakeman v. Manufacturing Co., 101 N. Y. 205, 4 N. E. 264, 54 Am. Rep. 676; Swain v. Schieffe-lin, 134 N. Y. 471, 31 N. E. 1025, 18 L. R. A. 3S5. See "Damages," Dec. Dig. (Key-No.) § 22; Cent. Dig. §§ 59-61.
48 Wells v. National Life Ass'n of Hartford, 99 Fed. 222, 39 C. C. A. 476. 53 L. R. A. 33, and note; Emerson v. Pacific Coast & Norway Packing Co.. 96 Minn. 1, 104 N. W. 573, 1 L. R. A. (N. S.) 445, 113 Am. St. Rep. 603, 6 Ann. Cas. 973. See "Damages," Dec. Dig. (Key-No.) § 40; Cent. Dig. §§ 72-88.
49 Griffin v. Colver, 16 N. Y. 4S9, 69 Am. Dec. 718; Dennis v. Maxfield. 10 Allen (Mass.) 138; U. S. v. BEHAN, 110 U. S. 338, 4 Sup. Ct. 81. 28 L. Ed. 168, Throckmorton Cas. Contracts, 409; Howard v. Manufacturing Co., 139 U. S. 199, 11 Sup. Ct 500, 35 L. Ed. 147; Brigham v. Carlisle, 78 Ala. 243, 56 Am. Rep. 28; Fairchild v. Rogers, 32 Minn. 269, 20 N. W. 191; Martin v. Deetz, 102 Cal. 55, 36 Pac. 368, 41 Am. St. Rep. 151; Ętna Life Ins. Co. v. Nexsen, 84 Ind. 347, 43 Am. Rep. 91; Allis v. McLean, 48 Mich. 428, 12 N. W. 640; Howe Mach. Co. v. Bryson, 44 Iowa, 159, 24 Am. Hep. 735; Hubbard v. Rowell, 51 Conn. 423; Rice v. Caudle, 71 Ga. 605; Lewis v. Insurance Co., 61 Mo. 534; Danforth v. Railroad Co., 99 Ala. 331, 13 South. 51. See "Damages," Dec. Dig. (Key-No.) § 40; Cent. Dig. §§ 72-88.
The courts of common law have no power to compel specific performance, and specific performance is often the only adequate remedy. This remedy, however, is given by courts of equity. They can enforce a promise to do a thing by a decree for specific performance, and a promise to forbear from doing a thing by an injunction.
The exercise of this jurisdiction by courts of equity is limited by certain rules, some of which we have already noticed in other connections.50 The subject being one relating more peculiarly to the jurisdiction of courts of equity, we can only deal with it in a very general way.