Duress per minas, as defined at common law, is where a person is forced to enter into a contract (a) from fear of loss of life; (b) from fear of loss of limb; (c) from fear of mayhem; (d) from fear of imprisonment, - and there is no doubt but that threats of such injuries will constitute duress.8 The older English authorities restrict the operation of the rule within the limits mentioned. They deny that contracts procured by menace of a mere battery to the person can be avoided on that ground; and the reason assigned for this rule is that such threats are not of a nature to overcome the mind and will of a firm and prudent man.7 There are cases to the same effect in this country, and some of the text writers have adopted the old rule.8

Throckmorton Cas. Contracts, 200; Cribbs v. Sowle, 87 Mich. 340, 49 N. W. 587, 24 Am. St Rep. 166; Baldwin v. Hutchinson, 8 Ind. App. 454, 35 N. E. 711; Parmentier v. Pater, 13 Or. 121, 9 Pac. 59; International Harvester Co. v. Voboril, 187 Fed. 973, 110 C. C. A. 311; McCarthy v. Tanska, 84 Conn. 377, 80 Atl. 84; Williamson-Halseil, Frazier Co. v. Ackerman, 77 Kan. 502, 94 Pac. S07, 20 L. R. A. (N. S.) 484; Brown v. Worthington, 162 Mo. App. 508, 142 S. W. 1082; Nebraska Mut. Bond Ass'n v. Klee, 70 Neb. 383, 97 N. W. 476. See "Contracts," Dec. Dig. (Key-No.) § 95; Cent. Dig. §§ 431-440.

5 Feller v. Green, 26 Mich. 70; Flanigan v. City of Minneapolis, 36 Minn. 406, 31 N. W. 359; Schwartz v. Schwartz, 29 I11 App. 516; Inhabitants of Whitefield v. Longfellow, 13 Me. 146; Alexander v. Pierce, 10 N. H. 494; Bosley v. Shanner, 26 Ark. 280; Stone v. Weiller, 57 Hun, 588, 10 N. T. Supp. 828; Post v. Bank, 138 I11. 559, 28 N. E. 97a See "Contracts;1 Dec Dig. (Key-No.) § 95; Cent. Dig. §§ 431-440.

6 3 Bac. Abr. "Duress," 252; Baker v. Morton, 12 Wall. 150, 20 L. Ed. 262; and cases hereafter cited. Threat of personal violence. Pierce v. Brown, 7 Wall. 205, 19 L. Ed. 134; Baker v. Morton, supra; Magoon v. Reber, 76 Wis. 392, 45 N. W. 112; Anderson v. Anderson, 74 Hun, 56, 26 N. Y. Supp. 492. Threat of criminal prosecution and Imprisonment. Foshay v. Ferguson, 5 Hill (N. Y.) 154; 2 Co. Inst. 483; Co. Litt. 253b; Eadie v. Slimmon, 26 N. Y. 9, 82 Am. Dec. 395; Inhabitants of Whitefield v. Longfellow, 13 Me. 146; Bane v. Detrick, 52 I11. 19; James v. Roberts, 18 Ohio, 548; Baldwin v. Hutchison, 8 Ind. App. 454, 35 N. E. 711; Maricle v. Brooks, 51 Hun, 638, 5 N. Y. Supp. 210; Morrison v. Faulkner, 80 Tex. 128, 15 S. W. 797; Landa v. Obert, 78 Tex. 33, 14 S. W. 297; Winfield Nat. Bank v. Croco, 46 Kan. 620, 26 Pac. 939. See post, p. 301, and cases cited. A threat to "make complaint" and send the person threatened to prison is not duress, where the threats do not specify an offense for which imprisonment may be had. Kruschke v. Stefan, 83 Wis. 373, 53 N. W. 679. See "Contracts," Dec. Dig. (Key-No.) § 95; Cent. Dig. §§ 431-440.

7 2 Co. Inst. 483; Shep. Touch. 6; post, p. 300. • 1 Pars. Cont 393.

By_the modern rule, however, threats and fear of battery to the person are sufficient to constitute duress, if the mind of the party is actually overcome thereby.9

It is not necessary that the threats be made directly to the person to be influenced; it is sufficient if they are made to a third person with intent that they be communicated to him, and they are actually communicated.19