It is well to state this rule here, as indicating a necessary element in consideration. It will be treated when we come to consider, as an element in the formation of contract, the legality of the objects for which the parties to a contract enter into it.
57 White v. Bluett, 23 Law J. Exch. 36, 2 Com. Law Rep. 301. And see Bal-lou v. March, 133 Pa. 64, 19 Atl. 304. See "Contracts," Dec. Dig. (Key-No.) § 9; Cent. Dig. §§ 10-20.
58 HART v. RAILROAD CO., 101 Ga. 188, 28 S. E. 637, Throckmorton Cas. Contracts, 126. See "Contracts," Dec. Dig. (Key-No.) § 9; Cent. Dig. §§ 10-20.
59 Ante, p. 54.
60 BISHOP v. PALMER, 146 Mass. 469, 16 N. E. 299, 4 Am. St. Rep. 339, Throckmorton Cas. Contracts, 290; Hatch v. Mann, 15 Wend. (N. Y.) 45; Hartley v. Rice, 10 East, 22. See post, p. 314 et seq. See "Contracts," Dec. Dig. (Key-No.) § 103; Cent. Dig. §§ 468-476.
80. A consideration may be executory or executed, but it cannot be past, except -
(a) Where the past consideration was given at the request of the promisor.
(b) Where the promise is to pay for something voluntarily done by the promisee, which the promisor was legally bound to do.
(c) Where a person, by a new promise, revives an agreement by which he has benefited, but which is not void, but voidable or unenforceable against him, by reason of a rule of law, meant for his advantage, which he may waive.
The consideration for a promise is executory when it is a promise given in return to do something in the future. In regard to this, there is nothing to be added to what has already been said with regard to the nature of consideration in general. We have seen that a promise on one side is a good consideration for a promise on the other.