As a rule, the defrauded party must elect to rescind within a reasonable time after discovering the fraud,74 or", what amounts to the same thing, after he could have discovered it by the use of due diligence.75 It has been said that mere lapse of time, in the absence of statutory regulation, will not bar his right to rescind, though it would be evidence tending to show an intention to affirm.76 A delay in rescinding which is unreasonable in view of the particular circumstances, however, will generally be regarded, even at law, as an election to affirm,77 and will bar relief in equity on the ground of laches.78

Any acts which unequivocally treat the contract as subsisting will constitute an affirmance. If, after discovering the fraud, the party injured acts on the contract by accepting some benefit under it, or otherwise, he affirms it, and cannot afterwards rescind, for after an affirmance the election is determined.79 Bringing an action on the

74 Johnson v. McLane, 7 Blackf. (Ind.) 501, 43 Am. Dec. 102; Schiffer v. Dietz, 83 N. Y. 300; Strong v. Strong, 102 N. Y. 69, 5 N. E. 799; Bailey v. Fox, 78 Cal. 389, 20 Pac. S68; Young v. Arntze, 86 Ala. 116, 5 South. 253; Pence v. Langdon, 99 U. S. 578, 25 L. Ed. 420; Taylor v. Short, 107 Mo. 384, 17 S. W. 970; Rugan v. Sabin, 10 U. S. App. 519, 3 C. C. A. 578, 53 Fed. 415; Wilbur v. Flood, 16 Mich. 40, 93 Am. Dec. 203; Conlan v. Roemer, 52 N. J. Law, 53, 18 Atl. 858; Foley v. Crow, 37 Md. 62; Fleming v. Hanley, 21 R. I. 141, 42 Atl. 520. Delay alone, without discovery of the fraud, will not, bar the right to rescind. Smith's Adm'r v. Smith, 30 Vt. 139; Brown v. Norman, 65 Miss. 369, 4 South. 293, 7 Am. St. Rep. 663; Bowman v. Patrick (C. C.) 36 Fed. 138; Shevlin v. Shevlin, 96 Minm 398, 105 N. W. 257. See "Contracts," Dec. Dig. (Key-No.) § 270; Cent. Dig. §§ 11S9, 1200.

75 Redgrave v. Hurd, 20 Ch. Div. 1; Georgia Pac. R. Co. v. Brooks, 66 Miss. 583, 6 South. 467; Bostwick v. Insurance Co., 116 Wis. 392, 89 N. W. 538, 92 N. W. 246, 67 L. R. A. 705. See "Contracts;' Dec. Dig. (Key-No.) 5 270; Cent. Dig. §§ 1189, 1200.

76 Anson, Cont (8th Ed.) 177; Clough v. Railroad Co., L. R. 7 Exch. 35; Wicks v. Smith, 21 Kan. 412, 30 Am. Rep. 433. See "Contracts," Dee. Dig. (Key-No.) § 210; Cent. Dig. §§ 1189, 1200.

7 Masson v. Bovet, 1 Denio (N. Y.) 69, 43 Am. Dec 651; Perry v. Pearson. 135 I11. 218 25 X. E. 636: Carrol! v. People. 13 I11. App. 206: note 74. supra. See "Contracts" Dec. Dig. (Key-No.) § 210; Cent. Dig. §§ 1189, 1200.

78 Cox v. Montgomery, 36 I11. 396; Perry v. Pearson, 135 I11. 218, 25 N. E. 636; Whittaker v. Improvement Co., 34 W. Va. 217, 12 S. E. 507; Barnard v. Iron Co., 85 Tenn. 139, 2 S. W. 21; Burkle v. Levy, 70 Cal. 250, 11 Pac. 643; Wilkinson v. Sherman, 45 N. J. Eq. 413, 18 Atl. 228; Coles v. Vanneman, 51 N. J. Eq. 323, 18 Atl. 468, 30 Atl. 422. See "Contracts," Dec. Dig. (Key-No.) & 270; Cent. Dig. §§ 1189, 1270.

79 Grymes v. Sanders, 93 U. S. 55, 23 L. Ed. 798; Dennis v. Jones, 44 N. J. Eq. 513, 14 Atl. 913, 6 Am. St Rep. 899; Pence v. Langdon, 99 U. S. 578, 25 L. Ed. 420; Lockwood v. Fitts, 90 Ala. 150, 7 South. 467; Crooks v. Nippolt, 44 Minn. 239, 46 N. W. 349; Eberstcin v. Willets, 134 I11.. 101, 24 N. E. 967; Troup v. Appleman, 52 Md. 456; Wyeth v. Walzl, 43 Md. 426; Cobb v. Hatcontract, or otherwise seeking to enforce it, after knowledge of the fraud, is an affirmance.80 It is otherwise if an action is brought, or the contract otherwise acted upon, in ignorance of the fraud.81 As already stated, an affirmance of the contract is no bar to an action to recover damages for the deceit.82