(5) "Language must be interpreted in the sense in which the promisor knew, or had reason to know, the promisee understood it." 91

(6) The courts will construe words most strongly against the party who used them. Words in an offer, for instance, will be construed most strongly against the proposer, and words in an acceptance most strongly against the acceptor; words in a promissory note most strongly against the maker; words in a policy of insurance most strongly against the insurer; and words in a conveyance, particularly of exception or reservation, most strongly against the grantor.92 The principle on which this rule is based has been said to be that a man is responsible for ambiguities in his own expressions and has no right to induce another to contract with him on the supposition that his words mean one thing, while he hopes the court will adopt a construction by which they would mean another thing more to his advantage.83 This rule of construction, it is sometimes said, is the last to be resorted to, and is never to be relied on except where other rules of construction fail.94

88 Archibald v. Thomas, 3 Cow. (N. Y.) 284; Ormes v. Dauchy, 82 N. Y. 443, 37 Am. Rep. 583; Hobbs v. McLean, 117 U. S. 567. 6 Sup. Ct. 870, 29 L. Ed. 940; United States v. Railroad Co., 118 U. S. 235, 6 Sup. Ct. 1038, 30 L. Ed. 173; Lorillard v. Clyde, 86 N. Y. 384; Horton v. Rohlff, 69 Neb. 95, 95 N. W. 36. See "Contracts," Dec. Dig. (Key-No.) § 156; Cent. Dig. § 737.

89 Atwood v. Emery, 1 C. B. (N. S.) 110; Russell v. Allerton, 108 N. Y. 288, 15 N. E. 391; Wilson v. Marlow, 66 111. 385; Town of Royalton v. Turn pike Co., 14 Vt. 311; Bickford v. Cooper, 41 Pa. 142; Gillet v. Bank, 160 N. Y. 549, 55 N. E. 292; Pressed Steel Car Co. v. Railway Co., 121 Fed. 609, 57 C. C. A. 635. See "Contracts," Dec. Dig. (Key-No.) § 15k; Cent. Dig. § 735.

90 McLean v. Windham Light & Power Co., 85 Vt. 167, 81 Atl. 613, 621. And see Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Provolt, 42 Colo. 103, 93 Pac. 1126, 16 L. R. A. (N. S.) 587; Stein v. Archibald, 151 Cal. 220, 90 Pac. 536. See "Contracts," Dec. Dig. (Key-No.) § 154; Cent. Dig. § 735.

91 American Lithographic Co. v. Commercial Casualty Ins. Co., 81 N. J. Law, 271, 80 Atl. 25. See "Contracts," Dec. Dig. (Key-No.) § 155; Cent. Dig. § 736.

92 Barney v. Newcomb, 9 Cush. (Mass.) 46; Noonan v. Bradley, 9 Wall. 394, 19 L. Ed. 757; Jackson v. Gardner, 8 Johns. (N. Y.) 394; Duryea v. Mayor, etc., 62 N. Y. 592; Varnum v. Thruston, 17 Md. 471; Richardson v. People, 85 111. 495; Sharp v. Thompson, 100 111. 447, 39 Am. Rep. 61; Wa. terman v. Andrews, 14 R. I. 589; Hill v. Manufacturing Co., 79 Ga. 105, 3 S. E. 445; Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Slaughter, 12 Wall. 404, 20 L. Ed. 444; American Surety Co. v. Pauly, 170 U. S. 160, 18 Sup. Ct. 563, 42 L. Ed. 987; Snyder v. Insurance Co., 59 N. J. Law, 544, 37 Atl. 1022, 59 Am. St. Rep. 625; Wilson v. Cooper (C. C.) 95 Fed. 625; Bowser v. Patrick (Ky.) 65 S. W. 824. The rule does not apply where it would cause a penalty or forfeiture.

The liability of a guarantor or surety is said to be stricti juris, and is to be determined by the strict interpretation of the words used, and cannot be extended by implication.96 Such contracts are nevertheless to be interpreted reasonably and according to the intention of the parties.96 And if the contract is fairly susceptible of two interpretations, and the other party has acted upon the interpretation most favorable to his rights, it seems that such interpretation will prevail.07

A condition in a bond, for instance, is construed most strongly against the obligee. Butler v. Wigge, 1 Saund. 65; Hoffman v. Insurance Co., 32 N. Y. 405, 88 Am. Dec. 337; Bennehan v. Webb, 28 N. C. 57; Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. City of Aurora, 99 111. 205. But a grant from the government is construed most strongly against the grantee. Canal Com'rs v. People, 5 Wend. (N. Y.) 423, 459; 2 Bl. Comm. 347; Raleigh & G. R. Co. v. Reid, 64 N. C. 155; Mayor, etc., of Allegheny v. Railroad Co., 26 Pa. 355; Hartford Bridge Co. v. Ferry Co., 29 Conn. 210; Northwestern Fertilizing Co. v. Village of Hyde Park, 70 111. 634; Mayor, etc., of City of New York v. Railroad Co., 97 N. Y. 275, 281. It is said, however, that this "rule of construction has been applied to gratuitous grants made by the sovereign of property, franchises, and privileges, upon the solicitation of the grantee," but that it does not apply, "certainly not in its full extent, to grants made for the benefit of the sovereign upon adequate valuable consideration paid to the sovereign for the thing granted." Langdon v. Mayor, etc., 93 N. Y. 132. And see Proprietors of Charles River Bridge v. Proprietors of Warren Bridge, 7 Pick. (Mass.) 344, 485; Garrison v. U. S., 7 Wall. 688, 19 L. Ed. 277. See "Contracts," Dec. Dig. (Key-No.) § 155; Cent. Dig. § 736.

93 Fowkes v. Association, 3 B. & S. 929; Gillet v. Bank, 160 N. Y. 549, 55 N. E. 292. A party must be deemed to have assented to a contract in the sense in which he knew the other intended it to signify, if the language is capable of that meaning. Cowles Electric Smelting & Aluminum Co. v. Low-rey, 79 Fed. 331, 24 C. C. A. 616. See, also, Leete v. Mining Co. (C. C.) 88 Fed. 957; Wood v. Allen, 111 Iowa, 97, 82 N. W. 451; People's Bldg. Ass'n v. Klauber, 1 Neb. (Unof.) 676, 95 N. W. 1072. See "Contracts," Dec. Dig. (Key-No.) § 155; Cent. Dig. § 186.

94 Empire Rubber Mfg. Co. v. Morris, 73 N. J. Law, 602, 65 Atl. 450. See "Contracts," Dec. Dig. (Key-No.) § 155; Cent. Dig. § 186.

95 Douglass v. Reynolds, 7 Pet. 125, 8 L. Ed. 626; People v. Backus, 117 N. Y. 196, 22 N. E. 759; Markland Min. & Mfg. Co. v. Kimmel, 87 Ind. 560; Weir Plow Co. v. Walmsley, 110 Ind. 242, 11 N. E. 232; Hopewell v. Mc-Grew, 50 Neb. 789, 70 N. W. 397; Sherman v. Mulloy, 174 Mass. 41, 54 N. E. 345, 75 Am. St. Rep. 286. See "Principal and Surety," Dec. Dig. (Key-No.) § 59; Cent. Dig. §§ 103, 103 1/2.

96 People v. Lee, 104 N. Y. 441, 10 N. E. 884; Powers v. Clarke, 127 N. Y. 417, 28 N. E. 402; Hooper v. Hooper, 81 Md. 155, 31 Atl. 508, 48 Am. St.

(7) Where the meaning of the terms used is clear, the fact that the parties have themselves, by their subsequent conduct or otherwise, placed an erroneous construction upon them, will not prevent the court from giving the true construction;98 but, where the meaning is doubtful, such construction by the parties is of great weight in determining the true meaning, and in some cases may be controlling."

(8) Where, as in the use of printed forms, a contract is partly printed and partly written, and there is a conflict between the printing and the writing, the latter will control.1 Within the meaning of this rule, typewritten portions are regarded in the* same manner as if written with the pen.2

Rep. 496; Northern Light Lodge v. Kennedy, 7 N. D. 146, 73 N. W. 524. See "Principal and Surety," Dec. Dig. (Key-No.) § 59; Cent. Dig. §§ 103, 103 1/2.

97 Lawrence v. McCalmont, 2 How. 426, 11 L Ed. 326; Smith v. Molleson, 14S N. Y. 241, 42 N. E. 669; London & S. F. Bank v. Parrott, 125 Cal. 472, 58 Pac. 164, 73 Am. St. Rep. 64. See "Principal and Surety," Dec. Dig. (Key-No.) § 59; Cent. Dig. §§ 103, 103 1/2.

98 Railroad Co. v. Trimble, 10 Wall. 367, 19 L. Ed. 948; Holston Salt & Plaster Co. v. Campbell, 89 Va. 396, 16 S. E. 274; Hershey v. Luce, 56 Ark. 320, 19 S. W. 963, 20 S. W. 6; St. Paul & D. R. Co. v. Blackmar, 44 Minn. 514,.47 N. W. 172; Citizens Fire Ins., Security & Land Co. v. Doll, 35 Md. 89, 6 Am. Rep. 360; Russell v. Young, 94 Fed. 45, 36 C. C. A. 71; Menage v. Rosenthal, 175 Mass. 358, 56 N. E. 579; Myers v. Carnahan, 61 W. Va. 414, 57 S. E. 134. See "Contracts," Dec. Dig. (Key-No.) § 110; Cent. Dig. § 753.

99 French v. Pearce, 8 Conn. 439, 21 Am. Dec. 680; Topliff v. Topliff, 122 U. S. 121, 7 Sup. Ct. 1057, 30 L. Ed. 1110; Mitchell v. Wedderburn, 68 Md. 139, 11 Atl. 760; Hosmer v. McDonald, 80 Wis. 54, 49 N. W. 112; Leavitt v. Investment Co., 4 C. C. A. 425, 54 Fed. 439; People's Natural Gas Co. v. Wire Co., 155 Pa. 22, 25 Atl. 749; Hill v. City of Duluth, 57 Minn. 231, 58 N. W. 992; People v. Murphy, 119 111. 159, 6 N. E. 488; District of Columbia v. Gallaher, 124 U. S. 505, 8 Sup. Ct. 585, 31 L. Ed. 526; City of Cincinnati v. Coke Co., 53 Ohio St 278, 41 N. E. 239; Childers v. Bank, 147 Ind. 430, 46 N. E. 825; Hale v. Sheehan, 52 Neb. 184, 71 N. W. 1019; Long-Bell Lumber Co. v. Stump, 86 Fed. 574, 30 C. C. A. 260. See "Contracts," Dec. Dig. (Key-No.) § 170; Cent. Dig. § 753.

1 Thomas v. Taggart, 209 U. S. 3S5, 28 Sup. Ct. 519, 52 L. Ed. 845; Clark v. Woodruff, 83 N. Y. 518; Chadsey v. Guion, 97 N. Y. 333; Thornton v. Railroad Co., 84 Ala. 109, 4 South. 197, 5 Am. St. Rep. 337; Hernandez v. Insurance Co., 6 Blatchf. 317, Fed. Cas. No. 6,415; Murray v. Pillsbury, 59 Minn. 85, 60 N. W. 844; Breyman v. Railroad Co. (C. C.) 85 Fed. 579; City of Chicago v. Weir, 165 111. 582, 46 N. E. 725; Commonwealth Title Ins. & Trust Co. v. Ellis, 192 Pa. 321, 43 Atl. 1034, 73 Am. St. Rep. 816. See, also, Sturm v. Baker, 150 U. S. 312, 14 Sup. Ct. 99, 37 L. Ed. 1093. See "Contracts," Dec. Dig. (Key-No.) § 163; Cent. Dig. § 745.

2 Heyn v. New York Life Ins. Co., 192 N. Y. 1, 84 N. E. 725; Sprague Elec-