N. W. 409; Chapman & Dewey Land Co. v. Wilson, 91 Ark. 30, 120 S. W. 391. See Anson, Cont (8th Ed.) 269. See "Contracts," Dec. Dig. (Key-No.) § 211;

9 McLean v. Windham Light & Lumber Co., 85 Vt. 167, 81 Atl 613. See "Contracts," Dec. Dig. (Key-No.) § 211; Cent. Dig. §§ 938-943.

10 Lennon v. Napper, 2 Schrales & L. 682; Barnard v. Lee, 97 Mass. 92; Carter v. Phillips, 144 Mass. 100, 10 N. E. 500; Kemp v. Humphreys, 13 111 573; Potter v. Tuttle, 22 Conn. 512; Cheney v. Libby, 134 U. S. 68, 10 Sup. Ct. 498, 33 L. Ed. 818; Wells v. Smith, 7 Paige (N. Y.) 22, 31 Am. Dec. 274; Grigg v. Landis, 21 N. J. Eq. 494; Scott v. Fields, 7 Ohio, 90, pt. 2; Reed v. Breeden, 61 Pa. 460; Grey v. Tubbs, 43 Cal. 359; Kirby v. Harrison, 2 Ohio St. 326, 59 Am. Dec. 677; Young v. Daniels, 2 Iowa, 126, 63 Am. Dec. 477; Bullock v. Adams' Ex'rs, 20 N. J. Eq. 367; Jewett v. Black, 60 Neb. 173, 82 N. W. 375; McLean v. Windbam Light & Lumber Co., 85 Vt. i67, 81 Atl. 613. Even where time is expressly declared to be of the essence, it may be waived by the conduct of the party for whose benefit the stipulation is made; as where he recognizes the contract as in force after the time for performance has passed, or directs changes making a longer time necessary. Brown v. Safe-Deposit Co., 128 U. S. 414, 9 Sup. Ct. 127, 32 L. Ed. 468; Phillips & Colby Const. Co. v. Seymour, 91 U S. 646, 23 L. Ed. 341; Amoskeag Mfg. Co. v. U. S., 17 Wall. 592, 21 L. Ed. 715; Paddock v. Stout, 121 111. 571, 13 N. E. 182; Pinckney v. Dambmann, 72 Md. 173, 19 Atl. 450. If the party prevents performance by the other, he cannot insist on the stipulation. Dan-nat v. Fuller, 120 N. Y. 554, 24 N. E. 815; King Iron Bridge & Mfg. Co. v. City of St Louis (C. C.) 43 Fed. 768, 10 L. R. A. 826; Rees v. Logsdon, 6S Md. 93, 11 Atl. 708; Ward v. Matthews, 73 Cal. 13, 14 Pac. 604; post, p. 5S3. See "Contracts," Dec. Dig. (Key-No.) § 211; Cent. Dig. §§ 938-943.

11Richmond v. Robinson, 12 Mich. 193; Volz v. Grummett, 49 Mich. 453, 13 N. W. 814; Austin v. "Wacks, 30 Minn. 335, 15 N. W. 409; Quinn v. Roath, 87 Conn. 16; Ballard v. Cheney, 19 Neb. 58, 26 N. W. 587. See "Contracts," Dec. Dig. (Key-No.) § 211; Cent. Dig. §§ 938-943.

12 In Oklahoma it is provided by statute that "time is never considered as of the essence of a contract unless by its terms expressly so provided." Clark Cont.(3d Ed.) - 33

Where time is not made of the essence of the contract by express stipulation, it may nevertheless be held to have been intended from the nature of the contract.13 In mercantile contracts, such as contracts for the manufacture and sale of goods, it is generally held that time is of the essence; and, where a term of the contract provides for the time of shipment or delivery, shipment or delivery at the time fixed will usually be regarded as a condition precedent, on the failure of which the other party may repudiate the whole contract.14 In contracts for the sale of land, or for the performance of services, or the construction of buildings, and the like, time will be held of the essence if, from the nature of the property and the circumstances, it seems that the parties must have so intended, but generally, in such contracts, time is not of the essence.15

Snyder v. Stribling, 18 Okl. 1GS, 80 Pac. 222. See "Contracts," Dec. Dig. (Key-No.) § 211; Cent. Dig. §§ 93S-943.

13 New York Life Ins. Co. v. Statham, 93 U. S. 24, 23 L. Ed. 789; Coleman v. Applegarth, 68 Md. 21, 11 Atl. 2S4, 6 Am. St. Rep. 417; Cabot v. Kent, 20 R. I. 197, 37 Atl. 945; Savannah Ice Delivery Co. v. Transit Co., 110 Ga. 142, 35 S. E. 280; Rioux v. Brick Co., 72 Vt. 148, 47 Atl. 406. See "Contracts," Dec. Dig. (Key-No.) § 211; Cent. Dig. §§ 938-943.

14BECK & PAULI LITHOGRAPHING CO. v. COLORADO MILLING & ELEVATOR CO., 52 Fed. 700, 3 C. C. A. 248, Throckmorton Cas. Contracts, 350; Bowes v. Shand, 2 App. Cas. 455; Jones v. U. S., 96 U. S. 24, 24 L. Ed. 644; NORRINGTON v. WRIGHT, 115 U. S. 188, 6 Sup. Ct 12, 29 L. Ed. 366, Throckmorton Cas. Contracts, 386; Cleveland Rolling-Mill Co. v. Rhodes. 121 U. S. 255, 7 Sup. Ct. 882, 30 L. Ed. 920; Cromwell v. Wilkinson, 18 Ind. 365; Camden Iron-Works v. Fox (C. C.) 34 Fed. 200; Scarlett v. Stein, 40 Md. 512; Lefferts v. Weld, 167 Mass. 531, 46 N. E. 107; Hull Coal & Coke Co. v. Coke Co., 113 Fed. 256, 51 C. C. A. 213. Cf. Coyne v. Avery, 1S9 111. 378, 59 N. E. 788. But it seems that, unless a contrary intention appears, stipulations as to the time of payment are not usually to be deemed of the essence. Mar-tindale v. Smith, 1 Q. B. 3S9, 395; Mersey Steel & Iron Co. v. Naylor, 9 App. Cas. 434, 444; Monarch Cycle Mfg. Co. v. Wheel Co., 105 Fed. 324, 44 C. C. A. 523; West v. Bechtel, 125 Mich. 144, 84 N. W. 69, 51 L. R. A. 791. See NORRINGTON v. WRIGHT, supra, per Gray, J. See "Contracts," Dec. Dig. (Key-No.) § 211; Cent. Dig. §§ 938-91,3.

15 Brown v. Safe-Deposit Co., 128 U. S. 403, 9 Sup. Ct. 127, 32 L. Ed. 408; Goldsmith v. Guild, 10 Allen (Mass.) 239; Green v. Covillaud, 10 Cal. 317. 70 Am. Dec. 725; Waterman v. Banks, 144 U. S. 394, 12 Sup. Ct 646, 36 L. Ed. 479; Young v. Daniels, 2 Iowa, 126, 63 Am. Dec. 477; Derrett v. Bowman, 61 Md. 526; BECK & PAULI LITHOGRAPHING CO. v. COLORADO & ELEVATOR CO., 3 C. C. A. 248, 52 Fed. 700, Throckmorton Cas. Contracts, 350; Tayloe v. Sandiford, 7 Wheat. 13, 5 L. Ed. 384; Hambly v. Railroad Co. (C. C.) 21 Fed. 541. See "Contracts," Dec. Dig. (Key-No.) § 211; Cent. Dig. §§ 93S-943; "Vendor and Purchaser," Dec. Dig. (Key-No.) § 78; Cent. Dig. §§ 121-125.