reference to the insurance or to the risk, or to the value of the property, the policy shall be void. In such a case the insured must make true answers to all the interrogatories, although they may be on subjects not material to the risk. (s) So, if the policy provides that any change in the premises insured, such as the erection or alteration of a building, shall avoid the policy, unless the written consent of the insurers is first obtained, the question whether the change is material or not is of no importance. (t) If, however, the policy contains the clause, that the description of the property or answers are correct,"so far as regards the condition, situation, value, title, * and risk of the same," and that the misrepresentations or suppressions of material facts shall destroy the claim of the insured for damage or loss, the answers to the questions are not warranties. (u) l

If the contract is entire, although different subjects are insured, a false representation as to one will avoid the entire contract. (v) 2

Concealment is the converse of representation. The insured is bound to state all that he knows himself, and all that it imports the insurer to know for the purpose of estimating accurately the risk he assumes. A suppression of the truth has the same effect as an expression of what is false. And the rule as to materiality, and a substantial compliance, are the same. (w) And we know

(s) Bnrritt v. Saratoga Co. Ins. Co. 5 Hill, 188; Williams v. New England Ins. Co. 31 Maine, 224; Murdock v. Chenango Co. Ins. Co. 2 Comst. 210; Sexton v. Montgomery Co. Ins. Co. 9 Barb. 200; Kennedy v. St Lawrence Co. Ins. Co. 10 id. 285; Honghton v. Manuf. Ins. Co. 8 Met. 114; Lee v. Howard Ins. Co. 3 Gray, 583; Macomber v. Howard Ins. Co. 7 id. 257; Bowditch Ins. Co. v. Winslow, 8 id. 38; Tebbitts v. Hamilton Ins. Co. 1 Allen, 305, 3 id. 569; Abbott v. Shawmut Ins. Co. 3 Allen, 213; Hardy v. Union Ins. Co. 4 Allen, 217; Chase v. Hamilton Ins. Co.

20 N. T. 52; Patten v. Merchants Ins. Co. 38 N. H. 338. And policies made by stock and mutual companies stand on the same footing in this respect. Draper v. Charter-Oak Ins. Co. 2 Alien, 569.

(t) Calvert v. Hamilton Ins. Co. 1 Allen, 308.

(u) Elliott v. Hamilton Ins. Co. 13 Gray, 139; Richmondville Un. Sem. v. Hamilton Ins. Co. 14 Gray, 459; Parker v. Bridgeport Ins. Co. 10 id. 302.

(v) Lovejoy v. Augusta Ins. Co. 45 Maine, 472.

(w) See Daniels v. Hudson River Ins.

1 Where there is a stipulation in the policy that the omission "to make known a material fact respecting the condition, situation, value, or occupancy of the property" shall invalidate the policy, the insured, in the absence of fraud, is not bound, unless asked, to disclose a lieu for taxes. Alkan v. New Hampshire Ins. Co. 53 Wis. 136.

2 Where a policy covers both realty and personalty, a misrepresentation regarding the former avoids the entire policy. Hinman v. Hartford Ins. Co. 36 Wis. 159. A policy covering both real and personal estate is not to be held a divisible contract, part of which may remain in force, though the rest be invalid, where it is not perfectly clear that the insurer would have assumed both risks separately. .AEtna Ins. Co. v. Resh, 44 Mich. 55. See National Bank v. Ins. Co. 95 U. S. 673; Day v. Charter Oak Ins. Co. 51 Me. 91; Bowman v. Franklin Ins. Co. 40 Md. 620; Gottsman v. Ins. Co. 56 Penn. St. 210; Plain v. Minn., etc Ins. Co. 23 Minn. 479.

no reason why the distinction above mentioned between fire policies and marine policies as to representation, should not be made for the same reason in regard to concealment. (x) Matters of common information need not be communicated. (y) But any special circumstance, such as a great number of fires in the neighborhood, and the probability of belief that incendiaries were at work, should be communicated. (z) But the omission to disclose to the insurers repeated incendiary attempts to destroy the property insured, after the insurance is effected, will not vitiate the policy, although the insurers have the right by the terms of the contract to terminate the same, if the continuance of the risk is considered unequal or injurious to the company. (a)

Any questions asked must be answered, and all answers must be as full and precise as the questions require. Concealment in an answer to a specific question can seldom be justified by showing that it was not material. (b) Thus, in general, nothing need

Co. 12 Cush. 416; Lindenau v. Desbor-ough, 8 B. & C. 592; Pirn v. Reid, 6 Man. & G. 1; Columbian Ins. Co. v. Lawrence, 2 Pet. 49; Clark v. Manufacturers Ins. Co. 8 How. 248. The plaintiff having one of several warehouses, next but one to a boat-builder's shop which took fire, on the same evening, after it was apparently extinguished, sent instructions to his agent by extraordinary conveyance, for insuring that warehouse, without apprising the insurers of the neighboring fire. It was held, that although the terms of the insurance did not expressly require the communication of this fact, the concealment avoided the policy. Bufe v. Turner, 6 Taunt. 338, 2 Marsh. 46. Where, pending the negotiations for a policy, the insurers expressed an objection to insuring property in the vicinity of gambling estabishments, and the applicant knew at the time that there was one on the premises; it was held, that if, in the opinion of the jury, the risk was materially increased by such occupancy, the policy would be avoided. Lyon v. Commercial Ins. Co. 2 Rob. La. 266. So it seems, that the fact that a particular individual had threatened to burn the premises, in revenge for a supposed injury, should be disclosed to the insurer. Curry v. Commonwealth Ins. Co. 10 Pick. 537, 542. The rumor of an attempt to set fire to a neighboring building should be communicated. Walden v. La. Ins. Co. 12 La. 135. The insurer should be informed of any unusual appropriation of the building materially enhancing the risk. Clark v. Manufacturers Ins. Co. 8 How. 249. Where the plaintiffs underwrote a policy on the household goods and stock in trade of a party, and after being informed that the character of the insured was bad, that he had been insured and twice burnt out, that there had been difficulty in respect to his losses, and he was in bad repute with the insurance offices, effected a reinsurance with the defendants without communicating these facts; and the property insured was shortly after destroyed by fire; it was held, that there had been a material concealment, which avoided the policy, and whether occasioned by mistake or design was immaterial. N. Y. Bowery Ins. Co. v. N. Y. Fire Ins. Co. 17 Wend. 359. A pending litigation, affecting the premises insured, and not communicated, will not vitiate the policy. Hill v. Lafayette Ins. Co. 2 Mich. 476.