The master is under no legal obligation to give a testimo-nial * of character to his servant. If he does, it will be presumed that he speaks the truth, or what he believes to be true; and therefore if he says what injures the standing and prospects of the servant, and this turns out not to be true, the master is nevertheless not liable, unless the servant can prove that the falsity was uttered in malice. (d) Such is the English rule; but it may be supposed that in this country, if the master is proved to have said what is untrue, he would be responsible for any injury arising therefrom to the servant; at least unless he could satisfy the jury that he spoke from sufficient cause, and not from malice.

In order to constitute a contract of hiring and service, there must be a mutual engagement, on the one part to serve, and on the other to employ and pay. (e) But these engagements cannot always be implied one from the other, or measured one by the other. If a servant agrees to serve for a term of two years, and the master only agrees to pay so much weekly, the master is under no obligation to keep or employ him during the two years, but only to pay so much while he does employ him. (f) But where the contracts are mutual, and cover * the same ground, for both parties, then the master has at once a right to require the servant to enter upon the discharge of his duty during the term, and the servant has a right to require the master to employ him during the whole of the term.

(cf) Hunt v. Chicago, etc. R. R. Co. 26 la. 363.

(cg) Lalor v. C. B., etc. R. Co. 52 111. 401; Spelman v. Fisher Iron Co. 56 Barb. 151; Louisville, etc. R. R. Co. v. Filbern, 6 Bush, 574.

(ch) Davis v. Detroit, etc. R. R. Co. 20 Mich. 105.

(d) Rogers v. Clifton, 3 B. & P. 591; Edmonson v. Stephenson, Bull. N. P. 8: Weatherston v. Hawkins. 1 T. R. 110.

(c) See Sykes v. Dixon, 9 A. & E. 693, where B. contracted in writing to work for the plaintiff in his trade, and for no other person, during twelve months, and so on from twelve months to twelve months, until B. should give notice of quitting. Held, that such agreement was invalid under the statute of frauds for want of mutuality.

Like other agreements, a contract for labor and service, if not to be performed within a year, is within the statute of frauds, and if by parol, is wholly void. (g) And if the contract of service is begun within a year from the making of it, but by the terms of the agreement is not to be completed within that time, it is within the statute and void. (h) It must be certain, however, from the terms of the contract, or be necessarily implied therefrom, that the contract cannot be performed within a year, or it will not be void. (i) This subject will be, however, * considered more * 46

(f) In Williamson v. Taylor, 5Q.B. 175, by an agreement between the defendant and plaintiff, the defendant, being the owner of a colliery, retained and hired the plaintiff to hew, work, etc., at the colliery, for wages at certain rates in proportion to the work done, payable once a fortnight; and the plaintiff agreed to continue the defendant's servant during all times the pit should be laid off work, and, when required (except when prevented by unavoidable cause), to do a full day's work on every working day. Held, that the defendant was not obliged by this contract to employ the plaintiff at reasonable times for a reasonable number of working days during the term. In Asp-din v. Austin, 5 Q. B. 671, by an agreement between the plaintiff and defendant, the plaintiff agreed to manufacture cement for the defendant, and the defendant, on condition of the plaintiff's performing such engagement, promised to pay him £4 weekly during the two years following the date of the agreement, and £5 weekly during the year next following, and also to receive him into partnership as a manufacturer of cement at the expiration of three years; and the plaintiff engaged to instruct the defendant in the art of manufacturing cement. Each party bound himself in a penal sum to fulfil the agreement. The defendant afterwards covenanted by deed for the performance of the agreement on his part. Held, that the stipulations in the agreement did not raise an implied covenant that the defendant should employ the plaintiff in the business for three or two years, though the defendant was bound by the express words to pay the plaintiff the stipulated wages during those periods respectively, if the plaintiff performed, or was ready to perform, the condition precedent on his part. See Dunn v. Sayles, 5 Q. B. 685; Pilkington v. Scott, 15 M. & W. 657; Elderton v. Emmens, 6 C. B. 160; Rust v. Nottidge, 16 E. L. & E. 170, s. c. 1 E. & B. 99; Regina v. Welch, 20 E. L. & E. 82, s. c. 2 E. & B. 857.

(g) Bracegirdle v. Heald, 1 B. & Ald. 722. In this case the contract was by parol on the 27th of May, for a year a service from the 30th of June following, and was held void. See also Snelling v. Lord Huntingfield, 1 C. M. & R. 20; Hinckley v. Southgate, 11 Vt. 458; Tattle v. Swett, 31 Me. 555.

(A) Id.; and see Pitcher v. Wilson, 5 Mo. 46; Drummond v. Burrell, 13 Wend. 307 ; Squire v. Whipple, 1 Vt. 69; Birch v. Earl of Liverpool, 9 B. & C. 392.

(i) A parol agreement to labor for a company "for the term of five years, or so long as A, shall continue to be agent of the company" is not void under the statute, as it might have been completed within a year, although in some contingencies it might extend beyond a year. Roberts v. Rock-bottom Company, 7 Met. 47. - This construction of the statute is supported also by the cases of Kent v. Kent, 18 Pick. 569 ; Peters v. Westborough, 19 Pick. 364; Wells v. Horton, 4 Bing. 40. - In Broad-well v. Getman, 2 Demo, 87, it was held, that a parol agreement which is not wholly to be performed within one year, is void, though some of the stipulations are to be executed within the year. And fully in the second part of this work, in the chapter upon the statute of frauds.