(ll) Dawson v. Chamney, 5 Q. B. 164, and Merritt v. Claghorn, 23 Vt 177. Dawson v. Chamney was an action on the case to recover damages for an injury to the plaintiff's horse. It appeared that the defendant was an innkeeper; that the plaintiff gave the horse in charge to the defendant's hostler, who placed him in a stall where there was another horse; and that the injury was done by the other horse kicking the horse of the plaintiff. The defendant having called witnesses to show that proper care had been taken of the horse, the learned judge directed the jury to find for the plaintiff, if they were of opinion that the defendant, by himself or servants, had been guilty of direct injury, or of negligence, but otherwise recent case in New York where an innkeeper was held responsible for the loss of the goods of his guest by fire of which the cause was unknown, the guest not having been negligent, two of the judges dissented from this opinion. (lm) l Where a woman for the defendant The jury found a verdict for the defendant, and the Court of Queen's Bench held the direction proper. This decision was considered in the case of Mateer v. Brown, 1 Cal. 221. The court adopt the dictum of Mr. Justice Bayley in Richmond v. Smith, 8 B. & C. 9, that the innkeeper very closely resembles a common carrier, and is liable for any loss not occasioned by the act of God or the king's enemies, except where the guest chooses to have the goods under his own care; and after a lengthy and able consideration of the subject they say, that although that dictum of Mr. Justice Bayley has been overturned in England by the decision of Dawson v. Chimney, they think the dictum right and the decision wrong. The case of Merritt v. Claghorn was also an action on the case to recover the value of two horses, a double harness, two horse-blankets and two halters. On the trial, it was conceded that the defendant was the keeper of an inn, and that the agent of the plaintiff was received as a guest at the defendant's inn, with the property in question, belonging to the plaintiff; and that the horses and other property were, as is usual in such cases, put into the barn of the defendant, which was a part of the premises, and, at the usual time for closing the stable, the barn was locked by the defendant; and that about daylight the next morning, and while the property was thus in the custody of the defendant, as an innkeeper, the barn was discovered to be on fire, supposed to be the work of an incendiary, and the horses and other property were burned and destroyed; and that there was no negligence, in point of fact, in the defendant or his servants, in the case of the barn and of the property in question. On these facts, the court held that the plaintiff was not entitled to recover. And Redfield, J., in giving the opinion of the court, said: "The case finds that the plaintiffs loss was without any negligence, in point of fact, in the defendant or his servants. From this we are to understand that no degree of diligence on his part could have prevented the loss. If, then, the defendant is liable, it must be for a loss happening by a cause beyond his control, in saying this we have reference only to the highest degree of what would be esteemed reasonable diligence, under the circumstances known to exist, before the fire occurred. We are aware that it would doubtless have been possible, by human means, to have so vigilantly guarded those buildings as probably to have prevented the fire. But such extreme caution in remote country towns is not expected, and if practised, as a general thing, must very considerably increase charges upon guests, which they would not wish to incur, ordinarily, for the remote and possible advantage which might accrue to them. The question, then, is, whether the defendant is liable? Do the authorities justify any such conclusion? For it is a question of authority merely. We know that many eminent judges and writers upon the law have considered that innkeepers are liable to the same extent as common carriers. It may be true, that the cases are much alike in principle. For one, I should not be inclined to question that. But if the case were new, it is certainly not free from question how far any court would feel justified in holding any bailee liable for a loss like the present. But in regard to common carriers, the law is perfectly well settled, and they contract with the full knowledge of the extent of their liability, and demand not only pay for the freight, but a premium for the insurance, and may reinsure if they choose. And the fact that carriers are thus liable no doubt often induces the owners to omit insurance. But, unless the law has already affixed the same degree of extreme liability to the case of innkeepers, we know of no grounds of policy merely which would justify a court in so holding." After a careful examination of the authorities, the learned judge concludes: "It is certain no well-considered case has held the innkeeper liable in circumstances like the present. And no principle of reason, or policy, or justice, requires, we think, any such result, and the English law is certainly settled otherwise. See also McDaniels v. Robinson, 26 Vt. 316; Met-calf v. Hess, 14 Ill. 129.

1 An innkeeper may excuse himself by proof that the loss did not happen through his negligence or that of his servants. Baker v. Dessauer, 49 Ind. 28. - Pullman Palace Car Co. v. Smith, 73 Ill. 360, decided that the owner of sleeping-car was not liable, as an innkeeper, for money stolen from a passenger in such a car.

(lm) Hulett v. Swift, 88 N. T. 671.

1 In Cutler v. Bonney, 80 Mich. 859, it was decided that an innkeeper was not liable leaving an inn where she had been a guest, left a trunk, saying she would send for it in ten minutes, and some days after sent for it, and the trunk was lost, the innkeeper was held liable, on the ground that he was liable for a reasonable time after the guest had left his house. (ln) He would then be liable *for a loss occasioned by his own servants, by other guests, by robbery or burglary from without the house, or by rioters or mobs. Nor will it excuse him if he were sick, insane, or absent, at the time; for he is bound to have competent servants and agents. (m)