It is sometimes difficult to know who is the guest of an innkeeper. (h) 1 In this country it is very common for perchattels and money of their guests, is founded on the great principle of public utility, and is not restricted to any particular or limited amount. . . . The principle for which the defendants contend, that innkeepers are liable for such sums only as are necessary and designed for the ordinary travelling expenses of the guest, is unsupported by authority, and wholly inconsistent with the principle upon which the liability of an innkeeper rests."

(y) Dickinson v. Winchester, 4 Cush. 114.

(yy) Sasseen v. Clark, 87 Ga. 842. In this case the liability of an innkeeper is much considered.

(z) Hawthorn v. Hammond, 1 Car. & K. 404; Kirkman v. 8hawcross, 6 T. R.14.

(a) White's case, Dyer, 168 b, 1 Boll. Abr. 3, (F) pl. 1.

(b) Rex v. Ivens, 7 C. & P. 218.

(c) Howell v. Jackson, 6 C. * P. 728; Rex v. Ivens, 7 C. & P. 218.

(d) Proctor v. Nicholson, 7 C. & P. 67.

(e) Fell v. Knight, 8M.& W. 260.

(f) Markham v. Brown, 8 N. H. 623.

(g) Lane v. Cotton, 12 Hod. 472,487.

(h) Purchasing liquor at an inn has enough to make a boarder, and not a guest, that he has stayed a long time in the inn in this way. This we hold to be the general rule; but * there may be some difficulty in the application of it; for, on the one hand, the special contract between the boarder and the master of the house may be express or implied, and a length of residence, upon certain terms, might certainly be one circumstance, which, with others, might lead to the inference of such a contract. On the other hand, if a traveller on a journey stops at an inn for three days, and makes a bargain for that time, it would be difficult to say that he thereby ceased to be a guest, and that the innkeeper was exonerated from liability as such. (j) l So if a company gave a ball at an inn, the guests present cannot hold the innkeeper to his liability, as he did not receive them in that character. (jj) Another test is that a boarding-house receives only such guests as the master chooses; but an innkeeper must receive all who come, unless there be a special reason for refusal. (jk) This question must always be one of mixed law and fact.

1 See Mowers v. Fethers, 61 N. Y. 34, as to whether the owner of goods must be a guest, to recover. See also Healey v. Gray, 68 Me. 489.

sons to * become boarders at an inn; and then they cease to be guests in such a sense as to hold the innkeeper to his peculiar liability, and, on the other hand, give him his lien. (i)

We take the distinction between the guest and the boarder to be this. The guest comes without any bargain for time, remains without one, and may go when he pleases, paying only for the actual entertainment which he receives; (ii) and it is not been held sufficient to constitute one a guest. Bennet v. Mellor, 5 T.R 273. In this case the plaintiff's servant had taken some goods to market at Manchester, and not being able to dispose of them, went with them to the defendant's inn, and asked the defendant's wife if he could leave the goods there till the following week, and she said she could not tell, for they were very full of parcels. The plaintiff's servant then sat down in the inn, had some liquor, and put the goods on the floor immediately behind him, and when he got up, after sitting there a little while, the goods were missing. There was a verdict for the plaintiff for the value of the goods; and, on a motion for a new trial, the Court of King's Bench sustained the verdict, deciding that the plaintiff's servant was to be deemed the guest of the defendant. See also McDonald v. Edgerton, 6 Barb. 600; Washburn v. Jones, 14 Barb. 108. Nor is it necessary that the owner of the goods be himself a guest, in order to entitle him to an action against an innkeeper. If his servant or friend to whom he has intrusted the possession of the goods is a guest, it is sufficient. This is held in the following cases: Mason v. Thompson, 9 Pick. 280; Towson v. Havre de Grace Bank, 6 Har. & J. 47; Berkshire Woollen Co. v. Proctor, 7 Cush. 417.

(i) Manning v. Wells, 9 Humph. 746; Ewart v. Stark, 8 Rich. L. 423; Huron v. Byers, 29 Mo. 469. The liability of boarding-house keepers for the goods of their guests was much discussed in the case of Dansey v. Richardson, 25 E. L. & E. 76; s. c. 8 E. & B. 144. The declaration stated that the plaintiff had become a guest in the boarding-house of the defendant upon the terms, among others, that the defendant would take due and reasonable care of the goods of the plaintiff while they were in the house of the defendant, for hire and reward, and it then became the duty of the defendant, by herself and servants, to take such care of the plaintiff's goods while a guest in the defendant's house. Breach of the alleged duty, and a loss of the plaintiff's goods, by the neglect of the defendant and her servants. On the trial it appeared that the plaintiff had been received as a guest in the defendant's boarding-house, at a weekly payment, upon the terms of being provided with board and lodging and attendance. The plaintiff being about to leave the house, sent one of the defendant's servants to purchase some biscuits, and he left the front door ajar, and while he was absent on the errand a thief entered the house and stole a box of the plaintiff's from the hall. The learned judge directed the jury that the defendant was not bound to take more care of the house and the things in it than a prudent owner would take, and that she was not liable if there were no negligence on her part in hiring and keeping the servant; and he left it to the jury to say whether, supposing the loss to have been occasioned by the negligence of the servant in leaving the door ajar, there was any negligence on the part of the defendant in hiring or keeping the servant. Held by the court that at least it was the duty of the defendant to take such care of her house and the things of her guests in it as every prudent householder would take; and, by Lord Campbell, C. J., and Coleridge, J., that she was bound, not merely to be careful in the choice of her servants, but absolutely to supply the plaintiff with certain things, and to take due and reasonable care of her goods; and that if there had been a want of such care as regarded the plaintiff's box, it was immaterial whether the negligent act was that of the defendant or her servant, though every care had been taken by the defendant in employing such servant; and, consequently, that the direction of the learned judge was not correct; but, by Wightman, J., and Erle, J., that the duty of the defendant did not require that she should do more than take all requisite care to employ and keep none but trustworthy servants; and that if that had been done, the defendant was not liable for the single act of negligence on the part of the servant in leaving the door open; and, therefore, that the direction at the trial was right. See ante, p. * 145, note (k).