1 Where the hirer of a horse placed it for medical treatment, with the owner's knowledge, with a third person, an implied promise is raised on the owner's part to pay that person for his services, of which he may avail himself in an action. Leach v. French, 69 Me. 389.

* The hirer is equally responsible for the negligence of his servants as for his own; provided that this negligence with habits and disposition of obedience implied in his, condition, and on which the hirer has a right to rely, he may be expected to understand and perform many, and indeed most, of his duties, by order or direction more or less general, without constant supervision or physical control, and may be relied on, unless under extraordinary circumstances, for taking care of his own safety without particular instructions on that subject, and a fortiori, without being watched or followed or led, to keep him from running unnecessarily into danger. What sort of care or diligence, then, is the hirer to use for the safety or preservation of the hired slave? Omitting to notice what may be necessary to his health and comfort, we should say that he ought not, by his orders, to expose him to extraordinary hazards, without necessity, though they be incident to the nature of the service; and that when he does expose him to such hazards, necessarily or properly, he should use such precautions, by instructions or otherwise, as the circumstances seem to require, and as a man of ordinary prudence would use in so exposing his own slave. It might be necessary in sending him to the bottom of a deep well, or to the eaves of a steep roof, to tie a rope around his waist. But if he were possessed of ordinary intelligence, it would not be required that, in sending him across a wide bridge, he should even be cautioned not to jump or fall from it Nor if there were a ford as well as a bridge crossing the river, both ordinarily safe, and with each of which the slave was well acquainted, would it be deemed necessary to direct him to take the one and avoid the other, unless there were some circumstances known or apprehended at the time, changing the usual condition of one or the other. Certainly it would not be necessary, when there was on the road which he was accustomed to travel a ford to be crossed, with which be was well acquainted, to tell him either not to go out of the usual track into the deep water, or not to take another road which he was not accustomed to travel, and which passed the river at a more dangerous place. In the navigation of our rivers by steamboats, it might become necessary, in a particular case, that some one on board should swim to the shore with a line, though the attempt might be attended with great danger. This, though incident to the navigation, would be an extraordinary hazard, and doubtless it should not be ordered, nor even permitted to be incurred, without the use of such precautions, within the power of the captain or other officer, as experience might indicate for the occasion. But when the boat is aground, on a bar or shoal, where the water on each side, and to the shore on each side, is not more than three feet deep, it could not be deemed necessary, in ordering a particular individual to go to the shore through the water, to do more, even if he were unacquainted with the bar, and could not see it plainly, than to point out its extent, or the direction which he must take to the shore, or to advise caution in his proceedings, or to give such instruction as was necessary. But if he were well acquainted with the bar, or it were plainly visible through the water, and were, moreover, wide and safe, the direction to go to the shore would of itself be sufficient. It might be ordinarily assumed that the individual, whether white or black, slave or freeman, if he had common sense, would not go from the bar into the deep water, and the person giving the order would not be bound to anticipate such a deviation, and either to forbid it, or in any manner to guard against it, but might pursue his own employment Nor do we suppose that, if he knew the individual to be a swimmer, and saw that he was purposely deviating from the bar, with the view of swimming a few yards to the shore, he would be bound to order him back, or to caution him against it, unless, from the temperature of the water, or some other fact, he had reason to apprehend danger. The direction to go to the shore on such an occasion implies, without more said, that he should go by the known and safe way. It is only when, from the uncertainty or difficulty of the way, or from some other circumstance, there may be danger in executing the order given, that it is necessary, in the exercise of ordinary care or diligence, to accompany it with any other words or acts than such as are essential to make it intelligible and practicable." This point is well illustrated also by the case of Heathcock v. Pennington, 11 Ired. L. 640. The defendant had hired of the plaintiff a slave boy, about twelve years of age, to drive a whim near the shaft of a gold-mine. The boy, while working there at night, being without an overcoat, had gone to the fire to warm himself, and on his being called to start his horse, being drowsy, fell into the mine and was killed.

occurred * when the servant was in the discharge of his duty, or obeying the commands or instructions of his master, express or implied. When not so employed, the person, though generally a servant, does not then stand in the relation or act in the capacity of a * servant so as to fasten a liability for his conduct on his master; and a master, therefore, would not be responsible for an injury committed by a servant from his own wilful malice, in which the master had no share. (z)

If the loss occur though theft or robbery, or the injury result from violence, the hirer is only answerable when his imprudence or negligence caused or facilitated the injurious act. If a bailee for hire sells the property without authority, the bailor may have trover against even a bond fide purchaser. (a)