1 Nugent v. Smith, 1 C. P. D. 423, defines the term "act of God," as regards the degree of care to be applied by the carrier in order to entitle himself to its protection, as such an irresistible act of nature as the carrier by the use of no reasonable precaution or foresight under the circumstances could have prevented." A common carrier is not liable for any accident as to which he can show that it is due to natural causes directly and exclusively, without human intervention, and that it could not have been prevented by any amount of foresight and pains and care reasonably to be expected from him." Per James, L. J. - That small-pox is not an "act of God," see Dewey v. School District, 43 Mich. 480.

(l) Thus where a vessel was beating up the Hudson River against a light and variable wind, and being near shore, and while changing her tack, the wind suddenly failed, in consequence of which she ran aground and sunk; it was held, that the sudden failure of the wind was the act of God, and excused the master; there being no negligence on his part. And Spencer, J., said:"The case of Amies v. Stevens, 1 Stra. 128, shows that a sudden gust of wind, by which the hoy of the carrier, shooting a bridge, was driven against a pier, and overset by the violence of the shock has been adjudged to be the act of God, or vis divina. The sudden gust in the case of the hoyman, and the sudden and entire failure of the wind sufficient to enable the vessel to beat, are equally to be considered the acts of God. He caused the gust to blow in the one case; and in the other the wind was stayed by Him." Colt v. McMechen, 6 Johns. 160. This case, however, has met with the disapprobation of Mr. Wallace. See the note to Coggs v. Bernard, 1 Smith, Lead. Cas. 82.

(m) Smith v. Shepherd, Abbott on Shipping, 888 (6th Am. Ed.), was an action brought against the master of a vessel navigating the rivers Ouse and Humber from Selby to Hull, by a person whose goods had been wet and spoiled. At the trial, it appeared in evidence, that at the entrance of the harbor at Hull there was a bank on which vessels used to lie in safety, but of which a part had been swept away by a great flood some short time before the misfortune in question, so that it had become perfectly steep, instead of shelving towards the river; that a few days after this flood a vessel sunk by getting on this bank, and her mast, which was carried away, was suffered to float in the river tied to some part of the vessel; and the defendant, upon sailing into the harbor, struck against the mast, which, not giving way, forced the defendant's vessel towards the bank, where she struck, and would have remained safe had the bank remained in its former situation, but on the tide ebbing, her stern sunk into the water, and the goods were spoiled; upon which the defendant tendered evidence to show that there had been no actual negligence. Mr. Justice Heath, before whom the cause was tried, rejected the evidence; and he further ruled that the act of God, which could excuse the defendant, must be immediate; clusion *that it must be the sole cause. If, therefore, the carrier wrongfully delays the transportation of goods, and they are injured because of the delay by a flood, the carrier would be held liable, not only because the act of God was, although the proximate, not the sole cause, but because such a delay operates as a deviation in marine insurance, changing the risk. (n)

But whether the loss be caused by excess or deficiency of wind, or any other act of God, if the negligence of the carrier mingles with it as an active and sufficiently proximate cause, he is responsible. (o) So he is for a loss by fire, whether on land or at sea, unless it is caused by lightning; (p) 1 and this rule is applied to steamboats. (q) But the freezing of our navigable waters, whether natural or artificial, excuses the carrier, unless his negligence co-operates in causing the loss. (r) but this was too remote; and directed the jury to find a verdict for the plaintiff, and they accordingly did so. The case was afterwards submitted to the consideration of the Court of King's Bench, who approved of the direction of the learned judge at the trial, and the plaintiff succeeded in the cause. There does not appear to have existed in this case any bill of lading, or other instrument of contract; and the question, therefore, depended upon general principles, and not upon the meaning of any particular word or exception. Mr. Justice Story, in commenting upon this case, says: "If the mast, which was the immediate cause of the loss, had not been in the way; but the bank had been suddenly removed by an earthquake, or the removal of the bank had been unknown, and the vessel had gone on the bank in the usual manner, the decision would have been otherwise." Story on Bailm. § 517. And this opinion seems to be supported by the case of Smyrl v. Niolon, 2 Bailey, 421, where it is held, that a loss caused by a boat's running on an unknown "snag" in the usual channel of a river is referable to the act of God; and the carrier will be excused. See also Faulkner v. Wright, Rice, 107; and Williams v. Grant, 1 Conn. 487. On the other hand, in Friend v. Woods, 6 Gratt. 189, where a common carrier on the Kanawha River stranded his boat upon a bar recently formed in the ordinary channel of the river, of the existence of which he was previously ignorant, he was held liable for damage done to the freight on board his boat And this last case has received the support of Mr. Wallace, one of the learned American editors of Smith's Leading Cases. See his note to Coggs v. Bernard, 1 Smith, Lead. Cas. 82. See also Steamboat Lynx v. King, 12 Mo. 272.

(n) Read v. Spaulding, 5 Bosw. 895; same case, 80 N. T. 630: Lowe v. Moss, 12 Ill. 477; Michaels v. N.Y.R.R. Co. id. 664.

(o) Amies v. Stevens, 1 Stra. 128; Williams v. Branson, 1 Murphey, 417; Williams v. Grant, 1 Conn. 487; Campbell v. Morse, Harp. L. 468; Clark v. Barnwell, 12 How. 272; New Brunswick S. Co. v. Tiers, 4 Zab. 607.