(s) Jones v. Richardson, 10 Met. 481. In this case the property mortgaged was thus described, namely: "The whole stock in trade of said A., as well as each and every article of merchandise which the said A. (the mortgagor) bought of one T W., as every other article constituting said A.'s stock in trade, in the shape the same is and may become, in the usual course of the said A.'s business as a trader." It was admitted that the goods in question, which had been attached by a creditor of the mortgagor, were at the time of the attachment the stock in trade of the said A., but that only a part of them was owned by him, until after he had made said mortgage. The court after a what he has not at the time; but an assignment of property, with what may be its future increase or incidents, is valid, at least in equity, as the assignment of a ship, with the oil then in her, and all the oil to be taken during the voyage. (t)1

Where the mortgagee permitted the mortgagor to remain in possession, for the purpose and with the power of selling the goods, such mortgage, although recorded, would not avoid the sale, even if it did not express in any way such purpose and power, if they could be inferred from the circumstances. Supposing the whole transaction to be bona fide, the mortgagor would be considered as selling the goods as the agent of the mortgagee, and the proceeds would belong to the mortgagee; and, if sold on credit, the debt could not be reached by an attaching creditor of the mortgagor through the trustee process. (u) critical review of the authorities bearing upon this point, held, that the mortgagee could not, as against third persons, acquire under this mortgage any valid title to those goods purchased by the mortgagor after the giving of the mortgage. The same view is supported by the case of Lunn v. Thornton, 1 C. B. 379; Rhines v. Phelps, 3 Gilman, 455; Barnard v. Eaton, 2 Cush. 294; Pettis v. Kellogg, 7 Cush. 471; Winslow v. Merchants' Ins. Co. 4 Met. 306; Otis v. Sill, 8 Barb. 102. The case of Abbott v. Goodwin, 20 Me. 408, which may seem to conflict with the rule laid down in the text, does not seem to us correct, and is apparently inconsistent with the views of the same court as expressed in the later case of Goodenow v. Dunn, 21 Me. 96. And see also Hope v. Hayley, 5 E. & B. 830.

(t) Langton v. Horton, 1 Hare, 549 (u) Unless there is some stipulation in the mortgage, allowing the mortgagor to remain in possession of the goods, the right of immediate possession vests, together with the property in them, in the mortgagee; and he may have an action against any one taking them from the mortgagor. Pickard v. Low, 15 Me. 48; Brackett v. Bullard, 12 Met. 308; Coty v. Barnes, 20 Vt. 78 And parol proof is not admissible to show an agreement that the mortgagor should remain in possession, the mortgage itself being silent upon the subject. Case v. Win-ship, 4 Blackf. 425. And although the mortgage contains an express stipulation that the mortgagor shall remain in possession, until default of payment, and with a power to sell for the payment of the mortgage debt, the mortgagee may nevertheless sustain trover against an officer attaching the goods as the property of the mortgagor. Melody v. Chandler, 3 Fairf. 282; Forbes v. Parker, 16 Pick. 462; Welch v. Whittemore, 25 Me. 86; Ferguson v. Thomas, 26 Me. 499. In the case of Barnard v. Eaton, 2 Cush. 294, where a mortgage was made of all the goods then in the mortgagor's store, and of all goods, etc, which might be afterwards substituted by the mortgagor for those which he then possessed, - the mortgage providing that until default the mortgagor might use and make sales of the mortgaged property, other goods, etc, of equal value being substituted therefor, - it was held, that the mortgage could not apply to goods not in existence, or not capable of being identified, at the time it was made, or to goods intended to be afterwards purchased to replace those which should be sold. It was also held, in the same case, that an agreement, in a mortgage of the stock of goods then in the mortgagor's store, that until default, the mortgagor might retain possession of the property, and make sales thereof in the usual course of his trade, other goods of equal value being substi tuted by him for those sold, will not authorize the mortgager to put the mortgaged property into a partnership as his share of the capital. In New York, unless the mortgage is filed in pursuance with the statute, the mortgagor cannot remain in possession for the purpose of selling the goods. Camp v. Camp, 2 Hill (N. Y.), 628. See also Collins v. Myers, 16 Ohio, 547. And in Edgell a Hart, 13 Barb. 380, where a mortgage, although recorded, was intended to cover property afterwards to be procured by the mortgagor, and in it the mortgagee gave him the right to sell the goods for ready pay, without being under any obligation to apply the proceeds to the discharge of the mortgage, or any other debt, it was held, that the mortgage was void, as calculated to delay, hinder, and defraud other creditors of the mortgagor.

1 As to a valid chattel mortgage upon the product of property in which the mortgagor has a present interest, see Conderman v. Smith, 41 Barb. 404; Wilson p. Wilson, 37 Md. 1, 11; Robinson v Elliott, 22 Wall. 513; Tennessee Bank v. Ebbert, 9 Heiskell, 153; Meyer v. Johnston, 53 Ala. 237; Gittings v. Nelson, 86 Ill. 591. In California, a mortgage of a crop before seed-sowing, if the mortgagor owns the land, may be made Arques v. Wasson, 51 Cal. 620. In Indiana, after-acquired property may be mortgaged. Headrick v. Brattain, 63 Ind. 438. - K.