It is the essence of the contract of bottomry and respondentia, that the lender runs the marine risk, to be entitled to the marine interest. The rate of interest, and the manner of securing the payment of what may become due upon such contracts, are to be regulated by the parties. Those considerations are not to be regarded by the court, excepting only to ascertain whether they were colorably put forth to evade the statute against usury. We do not perceive anything in the facts which would warrant that conclusion. If the ship had been lost immediately after she sailed, it is perfectly clear that the plaintiff would have lost all his money."

(m) Roberts v. Tremoille, 2 Rolle, 47; Fountain v. Grymes, Cro. Jac. 252, 1 Bulst. 36; Flower v. Sherard, Ambler, 18; Lloyd v. Scott, 4 Pet. 205; Scott v. Lloyd, 9 Pet. 418. In Richards v. Brown, Cowp. 770, Lord Mansfield treats an annuity upon the borrower's life. with a right, on his part, to redeem at the end of three months, as involving only the contingency of the borrower's dying within that three months; and after showing that the transaction between the parties was essentially a loan, savs: " It is true, there was a contingency during the three months. It was that which occasioned the doubt, whether a contingency for three months is sufficient to take it out of the statute. As to that, the cases have been looked into, and

* It has been held that loans, of which the repayment is made to depend on the life of the parties, come within the same principle. (n) So also with regard to loans to be repaid from them it appears, that if the contingency is so slight, as to be merely an evasion, it is deemed colorable only, and consequently not sufficient to take it out of the statute. Here the borrower was a hale young man, and therefore we are of opinion that there was no substantial risk, so as to take this case out of the statute." But it seems that where the right to redeem is optional with the seller, the purchase is not usurious, because the purchaser or lender cannot compel a repayment of his principal, and it is therefore a risk, King v. Drury, 2 Lev. 7; Murray v. Harding, 2 W. Bl. 859. See also Bayley, J, White v. Wright, 3 B. & C. 273; Chippindale v. Thurston, 1 Moody & M. 411; Earl of Mansfield v. Ogle, 24 Law J. (n. s.) Ch. 450, 31 Eng. L. & Eq. 357. Since the introduction of life insurance, the purchase of an annuity may be made the means of effecting a loan at more than legal interest, and that certainly secured, as the purchaser may guard against the contingency of the grantor's death by effecting insurance on his life. Hardwicke, L. C, Law-ley v. Hooper, 3 Atk. 278; Blackstone, J., Murray v. Harding, 2 W. Bl. 865. And where an annuity was granted for four lives, with a covenant that the grantor, within thirty days after the expiration of the third life, should insure the principal sum upon the life of the survivor, the covenant was held not to make the transaction usurious. In re Naish, 7 Bing. 150. See also Morris v. Jones. 2 B. & C. 232; Holland v. Pelham, 1 Cromp. & J. 575, 1 Tyrw. 438. It was anciently decided, that annuities for terms of years, by which it was evident that eventually more than the principal sum and legal interest would be paid, were not usurious, being merely purchases. Fuller's case, 4 Leon. 208; Svm-onds v. Cockerill, Nov, 151; Cotterel v. Harrington, Browul. & G. 180; King v. Drury, 2 Lev. 7; Twisden, J., in Rowe 9. Bellaseys, 1 Sid. 182. But in Doe v. Gooch, 3 B. 6 Ald. 666, upon Sir James Scarlett's saying, that if a person have an annuity secured, on a freehold estate, with a power of redemption, such power will not make the bargain usurious, Bayley, J., remarked: " In that case the principal is in hazard, from the uncertain duration of life. Here it is in the nature of an annuity for years, and there is no case in which such an annuity has been held not to be usurious, where. on calculation, it appeared that more than the principal, together with legal interest, is to be received." And where an annuity was granted for 11 1/2 years, payable half-yearly, the seller giving twenty-three promissory notes for the half-yearly payments; and it appeared in evidence that these payments would pay the purchase-money of the annuity, and interest, at nearly £12 per cent. per annum, the Master of the Rolls said: "With respect to this question of usury, I shall not refer to the old cases which have been cited. This, in effect, is an agreement to repay the principal sum of £4,000, with interest, by twenty-three instalments, and, as it appears that the interest thus paid will exceed legal interest, the transaction is plainly usurious."

(n) In Burton's case, 5 Rep. 69, Pop-ham, C. J., said: "If A comes to B to borrow £100, B lends it to him, if he will give him for the loan of it for a year, £20, if the son of A be then alive." This is usury within the statute; for if it should be out of the statute, for the uncertainty of the life of D, the statute would be of little effect; and by the same reason that he may add one life, he may add many, and so like a mathematical line, which is divisibilis in semper divisibilia." In accordance with this principle, Clayton's case, 5 Rep. 70, in which Reighnolds lent Clayton £30 for six months, to be paid at that time £33 if Reighnolds' son should be then alive; if not, to be paid £27, was decided to be usurious. Button v. Down-ham, Cro. Eliz. 643, was similarly decided; but in Bedingfield v. Ashley, Cro. Eliz. 741, in which Ashley, for £100, covenanted with Gower to pay to every one of Gower's five daughters, who should be alive in ten years, £80, this transaction was resolved by all the judges not to be usury; "for it is a mere casual bargain, and a great hazard, but that in ten years, all the daughters, or some of them, will be dead; and if any of them be not alive, he shall thereby save £80. But if it were that he should pay £400 at the end of ten years, if any of them were alive, it were a greater doubt. Or if it had been that he should pay at the end of one or two years, £300, if any of the said children were alive, that had been usury; for in probability one of them would continue alive for so short a time, but in ten years are many alterations." And in Long & Wharton's case, 3 Keble, 304, which was "Error of judgment, in debt, on obligation to pay £100, on mar-riage of the daughter, and if either plainon the * death of a party, or post-obit contracts, which, even if excessive and oppressive, and on that ground avoided in equity, are, nevertheless, not usurious. (o) tiff or defendant die before, nothing. The defendant pleads the statute of usury, and that this was for the loan of £30 before delivered, to which the plaintiff demurred, and per curiam, this is plain bottomry, and judgment affirmed."