* If there are blanks left in a deed, affecting its meaning and operation in a material way, and they are filled up after execution, * there should be a re-execution, and a new ac knowledgment. (z) 2 But no alteration in a deed defeats parent on the note itself, from which the jury might decide whether the note had been altered or not; but the judge overruled the evidence offered, and charged the jury that the mere appearance of alterations on the face of the note, unaided by any proof as to the character of the persons through whose hands it had passed, was not sufficient to support the defence set up. The jury, accordingly, found a verdict for the plaintiff, for the full amount on the face of the note, with interest. The verdict was set aside because other competent evidence was not admitted; but the court observed: "The alterations on the face of the note, unsupported by other proof, would not be competent evidence; but if any previous testimony had been offered, to show that the note was given for a less sum, or to render it probable that a fraud had been committed, the alteration on the face of the note would have been a strong corroborating circumstance, if not decisive, of the truth of the fact. On the first ground, we think that there ought to be a new trial, with costs, to abide the event of the suit." In Bailey v. Taylor, 11 Conn. 631, the whole reasoning of the court is against the principle that a party claiming under an instrument which has been obviously altered, must necessarily, and in all cases, explain such alteration be fore he can recover upon the paper. And see Matthews v. Coalter, 9 Mo. 705; North River Meadow Co. v. Shrewsbury Church, 2 N. J. 424; Cole v. Hills, 44 N. H. 227.

(yy) Bigelow v. Stilphen, 35 Vt. 521.

(yw) Ames v. Colburn, 11 Gray, 390.

(yx) Miller v. Reed, 3 Grant, 51.

(yz) Kendall v. Kendall, 12 Allen, 92.

(z) Hibblewhite v. McMorine, 6 M. & W. 200. But see, upon this point, Smith v. Crooker, 5 Mass. 538; Wiley v. Moor, 17 8. & R. 438; Duncan v. Hodges, 4 McCord, 239; Stone v. Wilson, id. 203; Fulton's case, 7 Cowen, 484; Bank v. Curry, 2 Dana, 142; Jordan v. Neilson, 2 Wash. (Va.) 164; Boardman v. Gore, 1 Stew. 517; Bank v. McChord, 4 Dana, 191; Getty v. Shearer, 28 Penn. St. 12. See Drury v. Foster, 2 Wallace, 24.

1 See Cutler v. Rose, 35 la. 456.

2 Where a party to a negotiable instrument intrusts it to another for use as such, with blanks not filled, it carries on its face an implied authority to complete it by filling them, but not to vary or alter its material terms by erasing what is written or printed as a part thereof, nor to pervert its scope or meaning by filling the blanks with stipulations repugnant to what was plainly and clearly expressed in the instrument. Angle v. North Western Ins. Co. 92 U. S. 330. But this rule only applies where the maker has, by his own act, or the act of another, authorised, confided in or invested with apparent authority by him, put the instrument in circulation as negotiable paper. Ledwich v. McKim, 53 N. Y. 307. See Coburn v. Webb, 56 Ind. 96. If blank spaces in a check be carelessly left and filled to a larger amount, the maker is liable rather than the banker. Halifax Union v. Wheelwright, L. R. 10 Ex. 183. A person negligently delivering to another a blank note, having the name of the payee and the words "or order" therein, intending that it shall he used for a specified purpose, will be liable thereon if the blanks are wrongfully filled, and the note then transferred to a bona fide holder for value without notice of the fraud. Abbott v. Rose, 62 Maine, 194. But the alteration of a promisan estate or interest granted by it, if the estate or interest have vested; for, in that case, "the moment after its execution the deed becomes valueless, so far as it relates to the passing of the estate, except as affording evidence that it was executed." (a) And no alteration of an executed deed can revest the title in the grantor. (aa) But if the party in possession of the land under the deed, is suing the grantor on any of his covenants contained in the deed, an alteration of the deed, subsequent to the execution, would have the same effect as if made in any other instrument. (b)

(a) Per Lord Abinger, in Davidson v. Cooper, 11 M. & W. 800. So in Chessman v. Whittemore, 28 Pick. 231, it was held, that where the title to real estate under a deed has once vested in the grantee, by transmutation of possession, it will not be divested or invalidated by a subsequent material alteration of the deed. And Morton, J., said : "There is a manifest distinction between executory contracts and conveyances of property. When deeds of conveyance of real, or bills of sale of personal, property are completed, and possession delivered under them, so far as the change of ownership depends on them they are executed, and the property passes and vests in the grantee. The instruments may become invalid, so that no action can be maintained upon the covenants contained in them, and yet the titles which have been acquired under them remain unaffected. When a person has become the legal owner of real estate, he cannot transfer it or part with his title, except in some of the forms prescribed by law. The grantee may destroy his deed, but not his estate. He may deprive himself of his remedies upon the covenants, but not of his right to hold the property. This distinction has existed from the earliest times." And see Barrett v. Thorndike, 1 Greenl. 78; Withers v. Atkinson, 1 Watts, 236; Smith v. McGowan, 3 Barb. 404; Bolton v. The Bishop of Carlisle, 2 H. Bl. 259. But in Bliss v. Mclntyre, 18 Vt. 406, it was held, that if a lessee fraudulently alter his lease in a material part, subsequent to its execution, he thereby destroys all his future right under the lease, either to retain the possession of the premises, or to preclude the lessor from re-entering upon them. See Lord Ward v. Lumley, 6 H. & N. 87, 656.