(h) Weed v. Ellis, 8 Caines, 255; Gordon v. Tucker, 6 Greenl. 247; Gaylord v.

ing no certain means of payment, the award under the circumstances of the case was decided to be binding on the city, although the fund proved insufficient. Sage v. Brooklyn, 89 N. Y. 189.

by an infant or married woman, against the other party, will not be set aside on the ground that it would not have been enforced if against the infant or married woman. (hh)

Lastly, the award must be final and conclusive. (i) 1 This necessity springs also from the very purpose for which the law favors arbitration, namely, the settlement and closing of disputes. (j) But here, too, as on other points, the law is now more rational and

Gaylord, 4 Day, 422; -- v. Palmer, 12 Mod. 284; Horton v. Benson, Freeman, 204; Doolittle v. Malcom, 8 Leigh,

608.

(kk) Palmer v. Davis, 28 N. Y. 242.

(i) See Goode v. Waters, 20 Law J. (N. S.) Ch. 72,1 Eng. L. & Eq. 181; Wood v. The Company of Copper Miners, 16 C. B. 464. 28 Eng. L. & Eq. 369; Mays v. Cannell, 16 C. B. 107, 28 Eng. L. & Eq. 328; Carnochan v. Christie, 11 Wheat. 446. An award, which, after disposing of the claims of some of the parties, declared that as to the claims of certain other parties, they should be at liberty to prosecute the same, either at law or equity, in like manner as if the order of reference had never been made, is not final. Turner v. Turner, 8 Russ. Ch. 494. But an award directing the execution of mutual and general releases is final. Bell v. Gipps, 2 Ld. Raym. 1141; Birks v. Trippat, 1 Saund. 32; Wharton v. King, 2B.& Ad. 628. So of an award that plaintiff has no good cause of action. Dibben v. Marquis of Anglesea, 4 Tyrwh. 926; M'Dermott v. U. S. Ins. Co. 3 8. & R. 604; Craven v. Craven, 1 J. B. Moore, 403; Jackson v. Yabsley, 6 B. & Ald. 840; Angus v. Redford, 11 M. & W. 60.

(j) An award settling the costs on both sides, without saving more, is final and conclusive. Buckland v. Conway, 16 Mass. 396; Stickles v. Arnold, 1 Gray, 418; Tarquair v. Redinger, 4 Yeates, 282; Hartnell v. Hill, Forest, 73. An award that defendant should pay costs, without saying to whom, is not uncertain. Baily v. Curling, 20 Law J. (N.S.) Q. B. 236, 4 Eng. L. & Eq. 201; and see Drew v. Woolcock, Bail Court, 1864, 28 Eng. L. & Eq. 223. In Hancock v. Reede, 16 Jur. 1036, 6 Eng. L. & Eq. 368, H. & M. being partners, had covered wires with guttapercha for R., in pursuance of a contract less technical than it was formerly. Thus, it was once a rule that an award of nonsuit was not good, * because not final, as the plaintiff might immediately renew his action; (k) but this would hardly be held now. An award of discontinuance of a suit has always been held sufficient. (l) It is not a valid objection to an award, that it is upon a condition, if the condition be clear and certain, consistent with the rest of the award, in itself reasonable, and such as to cause no doubt whether it were performed or not, or what were the rights or objections dependent upon it. (m)

They afterwards assigned the partnership business to C. H., with power to him to take proceedings in their name for the recovery of debts due to them, to enforce existing contracts, and to deal in respect thereof as they themselves might have done. C. H., after the assignment, also covered wires for R. on his own account, and brought two actions against him, one in his own name, the other in the name of H. & M. It had been agreed between C. H. and R. to refer both actions, and all matters in difference, as well between H. & M. and R. as between C. H. and R., to arbitration; whereupon an order of reference was drawn up, and an award had been made. Held, that the award was not bad for want of finality in awarding a discontinuance of H. & M.'s action without determining the cause of action, as it appeared that the discontinuance had been entered before or at the time of making the order of reference, and that it was left to the arbitrator to decide whether the discontinuance should remain, and it was intended that he should not proceed further in that action. And see Nicholson v. Sykes, 9 Exch. 867, 25 Eng. L. & Eq. 400. - Where several issues are involved in the pleadings, and the whole case is referred, the costs to abide the result, it ought to appear that each issue was disposed of. See Pearson v. Archbold, 11 M. & W.477; Bourke v. Lloyd, 10 M. ft W. 660; Stonehewer v. Farrer, 6 Q. B. 730; Phillips v. Higgins, 20 Law J. (n. s.) Q. B. 367, 6 Eng. L. & Eq. 295; Wilcox v. Wilcox, 4 Exch. 500; Kilburn v. Kilburn, 13 M. & W. 671. So where a cause, and all matters in difference, are referred, the costs to abide the result, the award ought to distinguish between the matters in the cause and other matters of difference. See Morton v. Burge, 4 A. & E. 073.

1 An architect occupying the position of an arbitrator in ascertaining an amount due under a building contract is not liable to an action for refusing to reconsider his certificate, or give the grounds of his opinion, no fraud or collusion being alleged. Stevenson v. Watson, 4 C. P. D. 148. A person called upon to act as an arbitrator is not liable to an action for want of care or skill or for negligence. Pappa v. Rose, L R. 7 C. P. 525; Tharsis Sulphur Co. v. Loftus, L. R. 8 C. P. 1.

Any delegation or reservation of their authority by the arbitrators, which would have the effect of leaving anything to the future judgment or power of the arbitrators, would vitiate the award. (n) But where arbitrators are unable to decide accurately upon some particular point, requiring some technical knowledge, they may refer the settlement of the details to some third person having such knowledge, the arbitrators, however, accurately determining the principles by which such person is to be governed. (o)

(k) Knight v. Burton, 1 Salk. 75; 1 Roll. Abr. tit. Arb. (I.) pl. 16; Philips v. Knightley, 1 Barnard. 463. But in Miller v. Miller, 6 Binn. 62, it was said that arbitrators had no power to award a nonsuit. Nor have they to arrest judgment, if their power be only to direct how a verdict shall be entered. Angus v. Redford, 11 M. & W. 69.