366; Richardson v. Nourse, 3 B. & Ald. 237; Delver v. Barnes, 1 Taunt 48; Cramp v. Symons, 1 Bing. 104; Anonymous, 1 Chitty, 674; Pulliam v. Pensonneau, 33 111. 376.

(g) Blagrave v. Bristol Waterworks Co. 1 H. & N. 869.

(h) As to the effect of a mistake in fact, see an elaborate review of the authorities by Ch. Kent, in Underbill v. Van Cortlandt, 2 Johns. Ch. 339. See also The Boston Waterpower Co. v. Gray, 6 Met. 131, cited supra, where Shawt C. J., said: "Another ground for setting aside the award is a mistake of fact, apparent upon the award itself; and this is held to invalidate the award, upon the principle stated in the preceding proposition, that the award does not conform to the judgment of the arbitrators; and the mistake, apparent in some material and important particular, shows that the result is not the true judgment of the arbitrators. The mistake, therefore, must be of such a nature, so affecting the principles upon which the award is based, that if it had been seasonably known and disclosed to the arbitrators, if the truth had been known and understood by them, they would probably have come to a different result A familiar instance of this class of mistakes, is an obvious error in computation, by which the apparent result, in sums or times, or other things of like kind, is manifestly erroneous. In such case it is clear that the result stated is not that intended; it does not express the real judgment of the arbitrators. The class of cases in which the court will set aside an award, upon matter not arising out of the submission or award, is, where there is some corruption, partiality, or misconduct on the part of the arbitrators, or some fraud or imposition on the part of the party attempting to set up the award, by means of which the arbitrators were deceived or misled. In neither of these cases is the result the deliberate and fair judgment of the judges chosen by the parties; the former is the result of prejudice uninfluenced by law

*If the submission authorize the arbitrators to refer questions of law to the court, this may be done; otherwise, such reference would, in general, either be itself declared void, or would have the effect of avoiding the award, because it prevented it from being certain, or final and conclusive. (i) The arbitrators, by a general submission, are required to determine the law; and only a decided and important mistake could be shown and have the effect of defeating the award; it has been said, that only a mistake amounting to a perverse misconstruction * of the law, would have this effect; certainly a very great power is given to arbitrators in this respect, and it has even been expressly declared, that they have not only all the powers of equity as well as of law, but may do what no court could do, in giving relief or doing justice. (j) 1 and fact; the latter may be a true judgment, but upon a case falsely imposed on them by the fraud of a party. Under this class of cases, where the award may be set aside, upon matter not arising out of the submission or award, another was stated at the trial; that is, where the arbitrators make a mistake in matter of fact by which they are led to a false result. This would not extend to a case where the arbitrators come to a conclusion of fact erroneously, upon evidence submitted to and considered by them, although the party impeaching the award should propose to demonstrate that the inference was wrong. This would be the result of reasoning and judgment, upon facts and circumstances known and understood; therefore a result which, upon the principles stated, must be deemed conclusive. But the mistake must be of some fact, inadvertently assumed and believed, which can now be shown not to have been so assumed; and the principal illustration was that of using a false weight or measure, believing it to be correct. Suppose, as a further illustration, that a compass had been used to ascertain the bearings of points, and it should be afterwards found, that, by accident, or the fraud of the party, a magnet had been so placed as to disturb the action of the needle, and this wholly unknown to the arbitrators; it is not a fact, or the inference of a fact, upon which any judgment or skill had been exercised, but a pure mistake, by which their judgment, as well as the needle, had been swerved from the true direction, which it would have taken had it followed the true law understood to govern it. One test of such a mistake is, that it is of such a kind, and so obvious, that when brought to the notice of the arbitrators, it would induce them to alter the result to which they had come in the particular specified. It is not to be understood that such mistake can be proved only by the testimony or by the admission of the arbitrators. They may, from various causes, be unable to testify, or may not be able to recollect the facts and circumstances sufficiently. It is not, therefore, as matter of law, confined to a case of mistake admitted or proved by the arbitrators; but it must be of a fact upon which the judgment of the arbitrators has not passed as a part of their judicial investigation, and one of such a nature, and so proved, as to lead to a reasonable belief that they were misled and deceived by it, and that if they had known the truth, they would have come to a different result."

(i) Sutton v. Horn, 7 S. & R. 228 (j) The power of arbitrators to disregard strict principles of law, and to decide upon principles of equity and good conscience, was warmly claimed by Story, J., in Kleine v. Catara, 2 Gallis. 61: "Under a general submission," said he, "the arbitrators have rightfully a power to decide on the law and the fact; and an error in either respect ought not to be the subject of complaint by either party, for It is their own choice to be concluded by

1 An award will not be sent back to the arbitrator on the ground that he has made a mistake in the legal principle on which his award is based, except where the arbitrator himself admits the mistake. Dion v. Blake, L. R. 10 C. P. 388.