(c) Gage v. Gage, 10 Foster (N. H.), 420; Clark, v. Graham, 6 Wheat. 577.

.(d) Shaw v. Nudd, 8 Pick. 9; Coles v. Trecothick, 9 Ves. 234; Clinen v. Cooke, 1 Sch. & L. 22; McComb v. Wright, 4 Johns. Ch. 659; Graham v. Musson, 5 Bing. N. C. 607. See Baum v. Dubois, 43 Penn. St. 260.

(e) This point, upon which there seems to be no express decision, arose in the case of Wood v. Goodridge, 6 Cash. 117. This was the case of a mortgage deed and note made under a power of attorney under seal, by simply signing the name of the principal opposite to a seal, in the case of the deed, and in the ease of the note, by simply writing the principal's name at the foot. It was not necessary to decide the point, the court being of opinion that the power though very general in its terms, did not confer authority to mortgage, nor to borrow money and bind the principal by a promissory note. But the question of the manner of execution was much considered, and the court, per Fletcher, J., signified an inclination to hold, that where an attorney signs the name of his principal to an instrument which contains nothing to indicate that it is executed by attorney, and without adding his own signature as such, it is not a valid execution. - A deed was signed in the presence and by the direction of P. G. (and in the presence of an attesting witness), thus: " P. G. by M. G. G." It was objected that M. G. G., signing in that manner for the principal, should have had a power under seal; but the deed was held valid. Gardner v. Garner, 5 Cush. 48.3. In delivering the judgment in this case, Shaw, C. J., said: "The name being written by another hand, in the presence of the grantor, and at her request, is her act. The disposing capacity, the act of mind, which are Unessential and efficient ingredients of the deed, are hers; and she merely uses the hand of another, through incapacity or weakness, instead of her own, to do the physical act of making a written sign. Whereas, in executing a deed by attorney, the disposing power, though delegated, is with the attorney, and the deed takes effect from his act; and therefore the power is to be strictly examined and construed." - Perhaps it will still be regarded as an open question whether the simple signing of the principal's name, without evidence on the face of the instrument that the execution is by an agent, may not be sufficient. From a passage in Dixon on Title Deeds, vol. ii. p. 533, it may be inferred that the author's view is similar to that now taken by the Supreme Court of Massachusetts, On the other hand the books contain numerous intimations that it has not generally been supposed, heretofore, that auy other form is necessary to the valid execution of a deed by attorney than is requisite when the principal makes a deed in his proper person. See 1 Prest. Abstr. 2d ed. 293, 294; Smith, Mer. Law. I!. I. ch. 5, § 4; Wilks v. Back, 2 East, 142, 145; Elliot v. Davis. 2 B. & P. 338; Bac. Abr. Leases, J. § 10, also Hanson v. Rowe, 6 Foster (N. H.), 327. It seems the better opinion that, even since the Statute of Frauds, a signing is not essential to a deed. Aveline v. Whisson, 4 Man. & G. 801; Cherry v. Homing, 4 Exch. 631; Shep. Touch. by Preston, 56, n. If this be so, it may be considered going very far to hold that the addition of the name of the principal, by the hand of an authorized attorney, invalidates an instrument which would have been perfectly good without any signature at all. In some States the Statutes of Conveyance modify the common law in this particular, and require signing as well as the affixing of a seal. With respect to instruments not under seal, the opinion seems equally to have prevailed that an authority to sign for a principal is well executed by the mere subscription of the principal's name. Chitty on Bills, 9th ed., 33; Byles on Bills, 6th ed., 26.- An auctioneer or auctioneer's clerk performs his implied authority by simply writing the purchaser's name in the memorandum of sale. Bird v. Boulter, 4 B. & Ad. 443. This indeed is of no great weight in itself, since that case might be viewed as falling within the class expressly distinguished by the Supreme Court of Massachusetts, namely, where the signature is made in the presence of the principal, and by his immediate direction: vet there is a case of White v.

1 See Mutual Ben. Ins. Co. v. Brown, 3 Stewart, 193. and reporter's note.

The power of the court to disbar an attorney is not unfrequently exercised. And it is said that the court is bound to prefer charges against an attorney, whenever satisfied that the ends of justice require this.(hh) But an attorney should not be disbarred, unless a case of malpractice is proved with certainty. (hi) And where a statute declares the causes for which an attorney may be disbarred, it is said that he may not be for a cause not declared in the statute. (hj)

Proctor, 4 Taunt. 209, where the objection was expressly taken that the name of the auctioneer ought to appear as well as that of the purchaser. There Best, Serjeant, referring to Emerson v. Helis, 2 Taunt. 38, said that in that case the auctioneer wrote his own name in the heading of the paper, and that the decision was given on that ground. But Mansfield, C. J. replied: "In that case there was no argument upon the circumstance that the auctioneer had signed, nor was the case at all decided upon that ground: his saying ' sold by John Wright,' did not make him agent for the buyer; the only question was whether his sign-ing the purchaser's name was done by him as agent for the purchaser." The power of one partner to bind the firm by a note or bill has been referred to principles of agency; and it is well established that the signature of the firm name without more is a complete execution. See Norton v. Seymour, 3 C. B. 792; Kirk v. Blurton, 9 M. and W. 284. - Watkins v. Vince, 2 Stark. 368, though meagrely reported, seems to be a case where Lord Ellenborough entertained no doubt that the signing of the principal's name, by an agent having authority to contract in his behalf, was a sufficient signature. And see Helms-ley v. Loader, 2 Camp. 450, which is somewhat more explicit.