In a late case it is intimated, that the adverse opinions of conveyancers and lawyers will not alone suffice to make a title deficient in the view of the court (j) And this must certainly be true to the letter. For there can be nothing to prevent the court from going behind such opinions and examining into the grounds of them. And, of course, if they are found to be dishonest, or merely frivolous, the court would disregard * them. But this, although a possible, is hardly a supposable, case. And it must be true always, that the deliberate, adverse opinion of one or more persons known to be largely employed in the

(h) And that may be a good title at law. which a court of equity will uot exercise its discretionary power to force upon a reluctant purchaser. Lord Truro, Ch., Grove v Bastard, 1 De G., M. & G. 75. And Lord Cottenham, when the same case was before him, made some observations upon the delicate and responsible duty thrown upon the court, when it is required to decide, as between vendor and purchaser, a question of title which it cannot conclude as against the party from whom the adverse claim may be expected. 2 Phillips, 621. Compare Vancouver v. Bliss, 11 Ves. 465.

(i) The principles upon which a court of equity determines whether a title is such as a purchaser must be required to take, were much considered in Pryke v. Waddingham, 10 Hare, 1, 17, Eng. L & Eq. 534. See also Freer v. Hesse, 4 De G., M. & G. 495, 21 Eng. L. &. Eq. 82;

Collard v. Sampson, 4 De G., M. &. G. 224,21 Eug. L. & Eq 352. And upon this subject (which is much too extensive to be here treated of in detail), the 3d section [on Doubtful Titles], and the 4th section [containing Examples of Bad, Good, and Doubtful Titles in Equity], of 1 Sugd. Vend. &' Purch. c. 10 (Am. ed.) 185, may be consulted with advantage. See also Owings v. Baldwin, 6 Gill, 337; Vancouver v. Bliss, 11 Ves. 458; Garnett v. Macon, 2 Brock. 244. An unfavorable decision in the inferior court does not render the title doubtful; and, on appeal, the judge of the Superior Court is still bound to exercise his own discretion, and decide according to his own Judgment. Sheppard v. Doolan, 3 Drurv & W. & For statement of the general rule, see Luckett v. Williamson, 31 Mo 54.

(j) Dalzell v. Crawford, 1 Pan. Eq. Cas. 37.

1 Tillotson v. Gesner, 6 Stewart, 313, quotes the text with approval. - K.

2 Equity will not compel a person, agreeing to buy land, to accept a title so doubtful that it may be exposed to litigation. Jeffries v. Jeffries. 117 Mass. 184; Gill v. Wells, 59 Md. 492; Smith v. Turner, 50 Ind. 367; Powell v. Conant.33 Mich. 396; Tillotson v. Gesner, 6 Stewart, 313; Snell v. Mitchell, 65 Me. 48; Mitchell o. Steinmetz, 97 Pa. 251; Close v. Stuyvesant, 132 111. 607; Kilpatrick v. Barron, 125 N. Y. 751. - K investigation of titles, and believed to have competent skill and knowledge, must be regarded as going very far indeed against a title, because, if it did nothing else, it could hardly fail to lessen the marketable value of the land. (k)

Sometimes an objection to title may be a valid one, but capable of ready and entire removal; as a charge or incumbrance which can be paid off, and which the plaintiff is ready to pay off; or releases or grants are wanted from persons who are ready to give them, if required to complete a title. In such cases it would seem inconsistent with the purpose and character of a court of equity to refuse a decree of performance, if the vendor is able to make a good title at any time before the decree is pronounced. (l) We do not say that it should be enough if the plaintiff can make it certain before a decree is made that * the title will be made good afterwards; for, although he might in such a case ask for reasonable delay of the decree, that he may have the desired opportunity to complete the title, this is as much as he should have.(m)1

(k) We say this, although Lord Eldon, in Boehm v. Wood, 1 Jacob & W. 422, declared that the doubts of conveyancers, whether the title was rood or not, amounted to nothing, unless the court, by its own observation, perceived in the abstract of the title a reasonable ground for refusing to compel a purchaser to take it. Viae supra, note (i).

(l) Upon a bill filed by a vendor it is generally sufficient if he can show a good title at the hearing, although he had not a good title at the time of the contract; for, if the defendant wished to take advantage of the want of title, he should have rescinded the contract on that ground while the defect existed. Hog-gart v. Scott, I Russ. & M. 293, 2 Dan. Ch. Pr. (Boston, 1846) 1195) Salisbury 9. Hatcher, 2 Younge & C, Ch. 54. The plaintiff may make a good title if he can, when the cause comes on upon further directions, though he could not do so when the title was examined previously by the Master. In such case, however, the defendant may be relieved from costs. Paton v. Rogers, 6 Madd. 256. See 2 Dan. Ch. Pr. 1196 (Boston, 1846). But Lord Eldon, in Lecnmere v. Brasier, 2 Jacob & W. 289, said, that he would not extend the rule which the court had adopted, of compelling a purchaser to take the estate where a title was not made till after the contract, to any case to which it had not already been applied, and that the rule had, in many cases, been productive of great hardship. And in that case the purchaser of real estate sold under a decree, was discharged from his purchase for an error in the decree, although the parties were proceeding to rectify it See also Coster v. Turnor, 1 Russ. & M. 811; Wright v. Howard, 1 Sim. & S. 190, 205 And whether it is sufficient that the plaintiff can perform his part at the time of the decree, depends upon the circumstances of the particular case, and especially upon, the question whether, if he could not have performed the contract originally, there has since been such a change of circumstances as renders it inequitable for him to insist now upon a specific performance. Marshall, C. J., Garnett v. Macon, 2 Brock 212. While it is competent to the plaintiff to perfect his title in the progress of the cause, his right to force upon the defendant a new title, acquired since the filing of the bill, only exists under certain limitations i with respect to which, it is held, he may rely upon a title acquired in point of form after the bill is filed, provided that title is consistent with his original rights, and is one which can operate by relation back. Doyle v . Callow, 12 Irish Eq. 241; 244.