(p) Hall v. Hall, 3 E. L. & E. 191; s. c. 3 Mac. & G. 79; Roberts v. Eberhardt, 23 E. L. & E. 245; s. c. 1 Kay, 148; Speights v. Peters, 9 Gill, 472; Sloane v. Moore, 37 Penn. St. 217.

(q) Horton's Appeal, 13 Penn. St. 67; Parkhurst v. Kinsman, 1 Blatch. 488; Marquand v. New York Manuf. Co. 17 Johns. 525. - In Whitton v. Smith, 1 Freem. Ch. (Miss.) 231, it was held that a sale or assignment by one partner of all his interest in the partnership property, operates as a dissolution, ipso facto, although the partnership articles provide for a continuance of the partnership for a definite period. - See Conwell v. San-didge, 5 Dana, 213; Cochran v. Perry, 8 W. & S. 262. - But the true principle seems to be stated in Taft v. Buffum, 14 Pick. 322. In this case, one of four members of a firm assigned the whole of his interest in all the personal and real estate of the firm to one of his copartners, but still continued to transact the business of the firm in the same manner as before, until the failure of the company; a suit was commenced against the remaining three members of the firm; they pleaded in abatement the non-joinder of the party who had so assigned his share, and the court held that a conveyance by a partner of all his interest in all the real and personal estate of the firm to one of his copartners, does not ipso facto dissolve the copartnership; it is only evidence tending to show a dissolution. In this case the court say that a person may still be a partner, though he ceases to have any property in the stock of a partnership, on the principle that two persons may become partners, one furnishing money or goods, and the other skill or labor; or after persons have entered into a partnership, and each has furnished capital, one may, with the consent of his associates, and for good consideration, as of great skill or labor, withdraw his funds or share in the stock, and still continue to be a member of the firm. Putnam, J., remarked: " We think that such an arrangement would not necessarily operate as a dissolution of the connection." He adds: " A majority of the court are of opinion that it [the fact of the sale by one partner] was evidence in the case, which might or might not prove a dissolution, as other facts might be proved in the case, all of which should have been left to the jury, to determine the fact whether the partnership had been dissolved or not. For example, if, after a sale, the partner assigning his interest had ceased to have any concern in the establishment, had entered into other business on his own separate account, or, as it might be, had removed to a foreign country or place, and there carried on business for himself, or lived upon his own funds or otherwise; upon such evidence we should all think that the jury ought to find that the copartnership was dissolved. On the other hand, if (as in the present case it is found) the partner so assigning, after the conveyance, continued to act as a partner, making himself liable as such by drafts and other partnership business, just as he had done before the conveyance; then it would seem to a majority of the court that the jury ought to find that the partnership was not dissolved." Coll. on Part. § 110. - See Buford v. McNeeley, 2 Dev. Eq. 481; Dana v. Lull, 17 Vt. 390; Bank v. Carrollton R. Co. 11 Wall. 624; Munroe v. Hamilton, 60 Ala. 226; Miller v. Brigham, 50 Cal. 615; Barkley v. Tapp, 87 Lad. 25; Blaker v. Sands, 29 Kan. 551, Dupont v. McLaran, 61 Mo. 502; Morse v. Gleason, 64 N. Y. 204; Carroll v. Evans, 27 Tex. 262; Ayer v. Ayer, 41 Vt. 346.

As death operates of itself a dissolution, (s)1 so in England civil death has the same effect; as outlawry, or attainder for treason or felony. We have not this civil death in this country; and imprisonment for a term of years, or even for life, would probably have only the effect of other incapacity; and so would absconding for debt or crime. (t) That is, it would not be a dissolution of the partnership, nor cause a dissolution at once, proprio vigore, but it would be good ground for applying to any court having authority, to grant a dissolution. When either partner becomes disabled to act, or when the business becomes wholly impracticable, a court of equity would dissolve the partnership, or treat it as dissolved, as the justice of the case might require. (u) The contract of partnership is mutual; and it would be obviously unjust to hold one party to his contract, when it had become impossible for the other to fulfil his part. If the party so disabled from active aid, was, by the terms of the contract, only a silent or dormant partner, only contributing capital, and sharing with his partner the profit and loss arising from the use made of the capital by the active partner, the above reason would seem not applicable, because his capital might remain as before. But in this case, if an application comes from the active partner, he certainly should be permitted to renounce the benefit of the capital under such circumstances, if he wished to do so. And if the application comes from the party owning the capital, or his representatives, they as certainly ought to be permitted to withdraw the capital from hazards which the owner could no longer estimate nor provide for, nor advise in relation to. And we think with

(r) Heath v. Sansom, 4 B. & Ad. 175; Edens v. Williams, 36 Ill. 252.

(s) Vulliamy v. Noble, 3 Meriv. 593; Murray v. Mumford, 6 Cowen, 441; Cobble v. Tomlinson, 50 Ind. 550; Mar-tine v. International Ins. Soc. 53 N. Y. 339; Slocomb v. Lizardi, 21 La. An. 355; Canfield v. Hard, 6 Conn. 184; Burwell v. Mandeville, 2 How. 560; Knapp v. Mc-Bride, 7 Ala. 19. - In such case the dissolution takes effect from the time of the death, however numerous the association, and this not only as to the deceased partner, but also as to all of the survivors. Dyer v. Clark, 5 Met. 575; Scholefield v. Eichelberger, 7 Pet. 586. And the same rule applies to a silent partner. Washburn v, Goodman, 17 Pick. 520.