1 Russ. & M. 78; Mawman v. Tegg, tion will be given him upon such terms as the rights and interests of all parties seem to require. (u)

2 Russ. 285; Lewis v. Chapman, 3 Beav. 133; Buxton v. James, 5 De 6. & Sm. 80; Robinson v. Wilkins, 8 Ves. 824 n.

(p) Spottiswoode v. Clarke, 2 Phil. 154; McNiel v. Williams, 11 Jur. 344; Bramwell v. Halcomb, 3 My. & Cr. 737; Saunders v. Smith, 3 My. & Cr. 711.

(q) Sweet v. Maugham, 11 Sim. 51.

(r) Baskett v. Cunningham, 2 Eden, 137; Jeffreys v. Baldwin, Ambl. 164; Blanchard v. Hill, 2 Atk. 485; Hills v. Univ. of Oxford, 1 Vera. 275; Redfeld v. Middleton, 7 Bosw. 649, 2 Story, Eq. Juris. § 985.

(s) In such case the motion for injunction is usually directed to stand over till the hearing, or till after a trial at law, the defendant in the mean time being ordered to keep an account of the number of copies sold; but where circumstances require it, an injunction is sometimes granted pending the trial of the legal right. See Walcot v. Walker, 7 Ves. 1; Wilkins v. Aikin, 17 Ves. 422; Jollie v. Jacques, 1 Blatchf. 626; Miller v. McElroy, 1 Am. Law Reg. 205, and cases cited supra, note (p).

(t) Sweet v. Cater, 11 Sim. 572; Colburn v. Duncomb, 9 Sim. 151.

* It may be added, that, if the mischief by the in ay fringement be obviously insignificant, the court will not hear the case. (v)

It may be that the infringement complained of is of such a kind that its existence may be ascertained at once by inspection. This, then, the court will do. But in this country it is seldom that the judges go into any detailed comparison of the two books, to ascertain whether there be or be not an infringement. In England, it may be inferred from some cases that the courts go farther in this direction than they do here. (w) With us it is a very general practice to refer the case to a master, with general directions, or sometimes with very special directions, to examine the two books, and report in detail all the facts he finds, which may bear upon the question of infringement. Upon this report the final hearing is usually had. (x)

The bill commonly prays for an account by the defendant. And this is commonly granted. The terms and method of account are specified with greater or less minuteness, as counsel may suggest or require, and the court think right. The main purpose of the court is, that, if on a final hearing the plaintiff prevails, the court may have in their possession all the facts necessary to enable them to do him, by their decree, whatever justice the law allows. (y)

(u) Mawman v. Tegg, 2 Russ. 385; Bohn v. Bogue, 10 Jur. 420; Univ. of Oxford v. Richardson, 6 Ves. 689, 706; Chappell v. Purday, 4 Y. & C. 485; Pierpout v. Fowle, 2 Wood. & M. 85. As to the extent of the injunction where only next of the original work has been appropriated, see ante, note (d).

(v) Baily v. Taylor, 1 Rus. & M. 73; Whittingham v. Wooler, 2 Swanst. 428; Webb v. Powers, 1 Wood. & M. 522.

(w) Jarrold v. Houlston, 3 K.&.J.706; Spiers v. Brown, 6 W. R. 352; Pike v. Nicholas, L. R. 5 Ch. Ap. 251; Murray v. Bogue, 1 Drew. 858.

(x) The American practice is thus stated by Judge Story: "In some cases of this nature a court of equity will take upon itself the task of inspection and comparison of books alleged to be a piracy. But the usual practice is to refer the subject to a master, who then reports whether the books differ, and in what respects; and upon such a report the court usually acts in making its interlocutory, as well as its final decree." 2 Story, Eq. Jur. § 941. See also Folsom v. Marsh, 2 Story, 100; Webb v. Powers, 2 Wood. & M. 497; Story v. Holcombe, 4 McLean, 306; Greene v. Bishop, 1 Clif. 186; Lawrence v. Dana, C. C. U. 8. Mass. Dist. 1869.

(y) See Colburn v. Simms, 2 Hare, 543; Grierson v. Eyre, 9 Yes. 341; Kelly v. Hooper, l Y. & C. (Ch.) 197; Bally v. Taylor, 1 Rus. & M. 73; Hogg v. Kirby, 8 Ves. 215; 2 Story, Eq. Jur. § 988.