Lewis v. Burr, 2 Caines Cas. 195; Barlow v. Planters' Bank, 7 How. (Miss.) 129; Offut v. Stout, 4 J. J. Marsh. 332. But if no grace is allowed, and the day on which the bill or note by its terms fails due is a holiday, it is not payable until the day after. Salter v. Burt, 20 Wend. 205; Avery v. Stewart, 2 Conn. 69; Delamater v. Miller, 1 Cowen, 75; Barratt v. Allen, 10 Ohio, 426. - If, however, the nominal day of payment in an instrument, which is entitled to grace, happens to fall on Sunday or on a holiday, the days of grace are the same as in other eases, and payment is not due until the third day after. Wooley v. Clements, 11 Ala. 220.

(n) Wiggle v. Thomason, 11 Sm. & M. 452; Walter v. Kirk, 14 Ill. 55.

(v) See McKenzie v. Durant, 9 Rich. L. 61; Ammidown v. Woodman, 21 Me. 580.

1 "A promissory note entitled to grace is payable on demand at any reasonable time and place on the last day of grace, and, if the maker neglects or refuses payment upon such demand, the note is dishonored and may be put in suit immediately; but if no such demand is made and he has done nothing amounting to a waiver of it, he has the whole of the day in which to make payment, and is not liable to an action until the expiration of the time within which such demand might have been made upon him." Estes v. Tower, 102 Mass. 65, 66. To the same effect are Leftley v. Mills, 4 T. R. 170, 174; Heise v. Bumpass, 40 Ark. 548; Veazie Hank v. Winn. 40 Me. 62; Vandesande v. Chapman, 48 Me. 262; Nat. Exchange Hank v. Nat. Bank of North America, 132 Mass. 147; Fletcher v. Thompson, 55 N. H. 308; McKenzie v. Durant, 9 Rich. 61; Coleman v. Ewing, 4 Humph 241.

In some jurisdictions, it is held, however, that though payment be demanded and refused on the last day of grace, no action will lie till the next day. Davis v. Eppin-ger, 18 Cal. 381; Osborn v. Moncure, 3 Wend. 170; Coleman v. Carpenter, 9 Pa. St. 178. In the following cases there are dicta to the same effect, but in fact no demand had been made on the makers, so that it was rightly held that actions begun on the last day of grace were premature. Wells v. Giles, 2 Gale, 209; Hinton v. Duff, 11 C. B. N. S. 724; Randolph v. Cook, 2 Port. 286; Wilcombe v. Dodge, 3 Cal. 260; Benson v. Adams, 69 Ind. 353; Wiggle v. Thomason, 19 Miss. 452; Hopping v. Quin, 12 Wend. 517; Taylor v. Jacoby, 2 Pa. St. 495; Hamilton, etc. Co. v. Sinker, 74 Tex. 51.

As to when the statute of limitations begins to run, see Blackman v. Nearing, 43 Conn. 56; Watkins v. Willis, 58 Tex. 521.

liable to other parties. No precise form is necessary; but it must be consonant with the facts, and state distinctly the dishonor of the bill, and either expressly or by an equivalent implication, that the party to whom the notice is sent is looked to for the payment. (w) And it is held by the *best authority, that this implication arises from the actual notice of dishonor. (x) Nor will a slight mistake in the name or description of the note or party vitiate the notice, unless the party receiving it is misled thereby; (y) nor need the notice state who owns or who protests the note. (z) Any party may give notice, and it will enure to the benefit of every other party, (a) provided the party giving the notice be himself the holder or an indorser already fixed by notice, (b) and gives the notice to the party sought to be charged within one day after the dishonor, or after receiving notice himself. (c) The holder may leave without notice whom he will, and hold by due notice those whom he will; and the indorser having due notice, must himself notify prior parties to whom he would look. (d) But if a holder prevents an indorser from having recourse to a prior party, by discharging that prior party, he cannot look to the indorser whom he notifies. And notice given to one party does not hold another; thus if a second indorser having notice, and thereby being bound, neglects to give notice to the first indorser, the latter would not be liable.(e) Nor does authority to an agent to indorse a note imply authority to receive notice of dishonor. (/) And if one partner makes a note which another indorses, regular notice of the dishonor must be given to the indorser. (g) If the paper be in fact dishonored, a notice may be good, although the party giving it had no certain knowledge of the fact. (h)

(w) Hartley v. Case, 4 B. & C. 339; Solarte v. Palmer, 7 Bing. 530; Boulton v. Welsh, 3 Bing. N. C. 688, remarked upon in Houlditch v. Cauty, 4 id. 411; Grugeon v. Smith, 6 A. & E. 499; Strange v. Price, 10 id. 125; Cooke v. French, id. 131; Furze v. Sharwood, 2 Q. B. 388; King v. Bickley, id. 419; Robson v. Cur-lewis, id. 421; Hedger v. Steavenson, 2 M. & W. 799; Lewis v. Gompertz, 6 id. 399; Bailey v. Porter, 14 id. 44; Messenger v. Southey, 1 Man. & G. 76; Armstrong v. Christiani, 5 C. B. 687; Everard v. Watson, 18 E. L. & E. 194; Barstow v. Hiriart, 6 La. An. 98; Deuegre v. Hiri-art, id. 100; Cook v. Litchfield, 5 Sandf. 330; Beals v. Peck, 12 Barb. 245; Spann v. Baltzell, 1 Fla. 302; Reedy v. Seixas, 2 Johns. Cas. 337; United States Bank v. Carneal, 2 Pet. 543; Mills v. Bank of United States, 11 Wheat. 431; Shed v. Brett, 1 Pick. 401; Gilbert v. Dennis, 3 Met. 495; Pinkham v. Macy, 9 id. 174; Dole v. Gold, 5 Barb. 490; De Wolf v. Murray, 2 Sandf. 166; Youngs v. Lee, 2 Kern. 551; Smith v. Little, 10 N. H. 526; Cowles v. Harts, 3 Conn. 516; Wheaton v. Wilmarth, 13 Met. 423; Cayuga County Bank v. Warden, 1 Comst. 413; Platt v. Drake, 1 Dougl. (Mich.) 296; Spies v. Newberry, 2 id. 425; Bank of Cape Fear v. Sewell, 2 Hawks, 560. See also 1 Am. Lead. Cas. 231-237; Boehme v. Carr, 3 Md. 202; Farmers' Bank v. Bowie, 4 id. 290; Woodin v. Foster, 16 Barb. 146; Wynn v. Alden, 4 Denio, 163; Townsend v. Lorain Bank, 2 Ohio (n. s.), 345; Paul v. Joel, 4 H. & N. 355. And if a party to a note gives positive notice of dishonor, which afterwards turns out to be true, it is immaterial whether he had knowledge of the fact at the time when he gave the notice or not. Jennings v. Roberts, 29 E. L. & E. 118.