(e) McLean v. Dunn, 4 Bing. 722; Mertens v. Adcock, 4 Esp. 251; Girard v. Taggart, 5 S. & R. 19; Sands v. Taylor, 5 Johns. 395.

(f) Crooks v. Moore, 1 Sandf. 279; Conway v. Bush, 4 Barb. 564.

(g) Tooke v. Hoilingworth, 5 T. R. 215; and see Bloxam v. Sanders, 4 B. & C. 948; Hanson v. Meyer, 6 East, 614; Grice v. Richardson, 3 App. Cas. 319. And if the seller has despatched the goods to the buyer, and he becomes insolvent, the seller has a right, by virtue of his original ownership, to stop the goods if yet in transitu. Mason v. Lickbarrow, 1 H. Bl. 357; Ellis v. Hunt, 3 T. R. 464.

(h) Schneider v. Foster, 2 Exch. 4.

ft) 2 Kent, Com. 505; Lobdell v. Booking, 5 Cowen, 516; Goodwin v. Holbrook,

4 Wend. 380; Barr v. Myers, 3 W.& S 295. See Devine v. Edwards, 101 Ill.138. If, however, a particular place be appointed by the contract, the goods must be delivered there before an action will lie for their price. Savage Man. Co. v. Armstrong, 19 Me. 147; Howard v, Miner, 20 id. 325.

(j) Bean v. Simpson, 16 Me. 49. In tin's case it was held, that if no place be appointed in the contract for the delivery of specific articles, it is the duty of the debtor to ascertain from the creditor where he would receive the goods; and if this be not done, the mere fact that the debtor had the articles at his own dwelling-house at that time is no defence. And see Bixby v. Whitney 5 Greenl 192,

1 The seller, after notifying the buyer to come and take the goods, need not give him notice of resale. Ullman v. Kent, 60 Ill. 271.

But in the latter case, if the contract be merely that the creditor "may have them," with no words or acts implying that they were to be carried to him, it should be enough if they are ready for him when he comes for them. There seems to be also a distinction between the case of very cumbersome goods and those more easily portable; and the seller is held more strictly to the duty of transporting the latter, and tendering them in specie. (k)

In general, if anything be ordered of a mechanic or manufacturer, the maker may deliver it where he makes it, unless he have a shop or depository where his manufactured articles are usually taken for sale or delivery, in which case such place may be the place of delivery.

The vendee is bound to receive and pay for the thing sold at the time and place expressed or implied in the contract of sale, and to pay all reasonable charges for keeping it after sale and before delivery. (l) 1 And if he refuse so to take or pay for the goods sold, he will be liable in an action for the price, or in a * special action for damages, unless he can show incapacity to contract, or sufficient error, duress, or fraud.

"When payment of a debt is to be made by some specific article, it is not quite settled where the article is to be delivered; whether by the payor at his own residence, to the payee who must come for it, or to the payee at his residence or place of business, whither the payor must carry it. It might seem from some statements that local usages affect or decide this question in some cases. And possibly the distinction between bulky and portable articles might be carried so far as to lead to the conclusion that one who has thus to deliver an article easily carried, as a watch or a book, might be bound to take it to the payee. But we consider the law in general to be, that it is enough if the payor delivers the article at his own residence or shop. And if he there tenders it to the payee, and it be in all respects the article he should have tendered, and the payee refuse or neglect to receive it, with no valid objection grounded on the article itself, or on a stipulation in the contract, then the payor is no further responsible for what may happen to it. If it were, for instance, a carriage, and he had tendered it as it stood in his barn or warehouse, he would have no right - certainly none without sufficient notice to the payee - to roll it out into the street, and there let it perish. For this would be a wanton injury. But if it was in the street when he tendered it, and he said, I offer it to you as your carriage, and I shall have no more to do with it, he would not be bound to take any further care of it.

(k) Stone v. Gilliam, 1 Show. 149; Currier v. Currier, 2 N. H. 75; 2 Kent, Com. 508.

(/) In Cole v. Kerr, 20 Vt. 21, it was held, that there is no implied contract upon the sale of personal property that the vendee shall pay the vendor for any services, in relation to the property, rendered previous to the completion of the sale by delivery. In this case the plaintiffs sold to the defendants the wool lying unsacked in three rooms, to be paid for upon delivery, the quantity to be ascertained by weighing, but without any express contract as to who should be at the expense of sacking. The plaintiffs sacked the wool in sacks furnished by the defendants, and then caused it to be weighed and shipped to the defendants; and it was held, that as the sacking preceded the delivery of the wool, the law would not imply a contract on the part of the defendants to pay the plaintiffs for sacking.

1 A buyer ought to pay the price when due without waiting for any demand, if the goods are ready for delivery, and if he does not, he may be sued at once. Brandon Manuf. Co. v. Morse, 48 Vt. 322; Davis, etc. Co. v. McGinnis, 45 Ia. 538. The buyer, if he has agreed to assume the risk of delivery on which the price is to be payable, must pay the price if the goods are destroyed. Martineau v. Kitching, L. R. 7 Q. B. 436. When payment is to be made after demand or notice, the buyer must be allowed a reasonable time to bring the money. Bass v. White, 65 N. Y. 565. - K.

But questions of this kind generally arise in the defence to actions founded upon such contracts; and we shall again consider the subject of contracts for the delivery of specific articles, in our third volume, under the head of Defences.