(d) Act 1870, §§ 93, 94.

(e) Abernethy v. Hutchinson, 1 Hall ft Tw. 28. In this case the plaintiffs lectures on surgery had been taken down in short-hand, and published in a medical journal without his consent. The chancellor granted an injunction, saying: "I am clearly of opinion that when persons were admitted as pupils or otherwise to hear these lectures, although they were orally delivered, and although the parties might go to the extent, if they were able to do so, of putting down the whole by means of short-hand, yet they could do that only for the purposes of their own information, and could not publish for profit that which they had not obtained the right of selling." See also Keene v. Kimball, 16 Gray, 545; Bartlette v. Crittenden, 4 McLean, 300; Turner v. Robinson. 10 Ir. Ch. R. 510.

(f) Thus, in the case of Prince Albert v. Strange, 1 Hall & Twells, 1, 1 McN. & Gor. 26, the defendants had surreptitiously obtained impressions of etchings and engravings made by the plaintiff and the Queen for their own amusement, but

1 Merrell v. Tice, 104 U. S. 557, is, however, to the effect that such a deposit of books is a condition precedent, failure to show proof of which will prevent the issuing of an injunction for an infringement

•267 ah and other cases which would lead to an opposite conclusion. (g) In practice, the publication is supposed to take place when the book is advertised; for then it is offered to the public for a price. If the giving away of a few copies was not a publication, the sale of them would * seem to be, and to have the effect ah of making the copyright invalid. (h) The acting or representing a play will not avoid a subsequent copyright. (i) which had never been published or exhibited, although a few copies had been given to particular friends. The defendants had announced an exhibition of these etchings, and had published a descriptive catalogue of them; but were enjoined not only from exhibiting or copying the impressions which they had, but from publishing their catalogue, which the court considered as but another means of publishing the contents of the etchings. So in Bartlette v. Crittenden, 4 McLean, 800. The plaintiff, a teacher of book-keeping, had reduced the system he taught to writing on separate cards, for the convenience of instructing his pupils, who were permitted to copy the cards for that purpose. The defendant, one of his pupils, afterwards embodied the contents of the plaintiff's manuscripts in a work on book-keeping, which he published as his own composition. In granting an injunction, McLean, J., said: "Copies of the manuscripts were taken for the benefit of his pupils, and to enable them to teach others. This, from the facts and circumstances of the case, seems to have been the extent of the plaintiff's consent. It is contended that this is an abandonment to the public, and is as much a publication as printing the manuscripts; that printing is only one mode of publication, which may be done as well by manuscript copies. This is not denied; but the inquiry is, Does such a publication constitute an abandonment? The complainant is, no doubt, bound by this consent, and no court can afford him any aid in modifying, or withdrawing it The students of the complainant, who made these copies, have a right to them, and to their use, as originally intended. But they have no right to a use which was not in the contemplation of the complainant, and of themselves, when the consent was first given. Nor can they, by suffering others to copy the manuscripts, give a greater license than was vested in themselves." And, again: "No length of time, where the invention does not go into public use, can invalidate the right of the inventor. He may take his own time to perfect his discovery, and apply for a patent And the same principle applies to the manuscripts of an author. If he permit copies to be taken for the gratification of his friends, he does not authorize those friends to print them for general use. This is the author's right, from which arise the high motive of pecuniary profit and literary reputation." See also s. c. 5 McLean, 82; Paley's case, cited 2 V. & B. 23: White v. Geroch, 2 B. & Ald. 298; s. c. 1 Chitty, 24; Keene v. Wheat-ley, 9 Am. Law Keg. 65; Keene v. Kimbail, 16 Gray, 547.

(g) In Novello v. Ludlow, 12 C. B. 177, 16 Jur. 689, the plaintiff was the owner of the copyright of a certain musical composition. A musical society, of which the defendant was a director, desiring to perform this piece, caused a sufficient number of copies to be printed for their own use, which were used by the members, and then restored to the library of the society, but none were offered for sale. This was held to be a publication, rendering the defendant liable as an infringer. See also Gee v. Pritchard, 2 Swanst. 402; Alexander v. McKenzie, 9 Sess. Cas. 2d ser. 748.

(h) Baker v. Taylor, 2 Blatchf. 82. "It is argued for the plaintiffs that these alleged sales were only consignments of the work in advance of the publication, and that publication, by putting the book in circulation, was not made till after the date of the deposit of the title. There is no proof to support this version of the facts. A sale naturally imports publication. The purchaser, having the right to know the contents of the book, and make them known to others, no presumption can be raised that the right was not exercised, or that an actual publication did not follow the sale. On the contrary, the presumption is the other way." (i) Boucicault v. Fox, 6 Blatchf. 87; Roberts v. Myers, 38 Law Rep. 397. And, in England, it is held, that the public representation of a copyrighted play is not a publication within the statute of Anne, so as to render the performers liable for infringement. Coleman v. Waltham, 6 T. R. 245; Murray v. Ellisai

A book, in the law of copyright, means every volume, ai or *part or division of a volume, a pamphlet, a sheet of letter-press, or of music, or a map, chart, or plan separately published. (j) A man cannot copyright a map of London and thereby prohibit every one from making a map of London. No one can copy his map; but any one may make and publish another map of the same place. (k) What may conton, 5 B. & Ald.657. By Stat. 6 & 6 Vict. ch. 45, § 20, it is now provided that the first public representation or performance of any dramatic piece or musical composition shall be deemed equivalent to the first publication of any book. And in § 101 of our Copyright Act, a penalty is imposed upon the unauthorized performance of a dramatic composition for which a copyright has been obtained. See poet, note (kk), p. ai. But it is held that the representation of an uncopyrighted play, by the author's consent, is so far a dedication of it to the public that any person may memorize it and perform it himself. The law on this subject is thus laid down by Hoar, J., in Keene v. Kimball, 16 Gray, 547, giving a summary of the elaborate opinion of Cadwalader, J., in Keene v. Wheatley, 9 Am. Law Keg. 33: "An unqualified publication, such as is made by printing and offering copies for sale,"dedicates the contents to the public, except so far as protection is continued by the statutes of copyright. But there may be a limited publication by communication of the contents of the work by reading, representation, or restricted private circulation, which will not abridge the right of the author to the control of his work any further than necessarily results from the nature and extent of this limited use which he has made, or allowed to be made, of it. And, in the absence of legislation, when a literary proprietor has made a publication in any mode not restricted by any condition, other persons acquire unlimited rights of republishing in any modes in which his publication may enable them to republish; so that the literary proprietor of an imprinted play cannot, after making or sanctioning its representation before an indiscriminate audience, maintain an objection to any such literary or dramatic republication by others as they may be enabled, either directly or secondarily, to make from its having been retained in the memory of any of the audience. In other words, the public acquire a right to the extent of the dedication, whether complete or partial, which the proprietor has made of it to the public." But the liberty thus granted does not extend to taking notes of the performance for publication, either by printing them or acting from them. Macklin v. Richardson, Amb. 698. So in Crowe v. Aiken, 4 Am. Law Rev. 460. Nelson, J., admitting that one might lawfully repeat a play from memory, said that the improbability of this being done was so great that very strong evidence would be required to support such a defence. "I am also of opinion," he says, "that, as the law now exists in this country, the mere representation of a play does not of itself appropriate it to the public, except so far as those who witness its performance can recollect it; and that the spectators have no right to cause its reproduction by phonographic or other verbatim reports, independent of memory." Both in this case and in Keene v. Wheatley, supra, it was held, that where the defendant's performance was from copies surreptitiously obtained, an injunction would be granted. So also Boucicault v. Wood, 16 Am. Law Beg. 639. (j) Clementi v. Goulding, 11 East, 244. 2 Camp. 25; Hime v. Dale, 2 Camp. 27 n.; Bach v. Longman, Cowp. 623; University of Cambridge v. Bryer, 16 East, 317; White v. Geroch, 2 B. & Ald. 208, 1 Chitty, 24; Clayton v. Stone, 2 Paine, 383; Keene v. Wheatley, 9 Am. Law Reg. 68.