(j) Kennedy v Strong, 14 Johns. 128; Hepburn v. Sewell, 5 Harris & J. 211; Kennedy v. Whitwell, 4 Pick. 466, Pierce v. Benjamin, 14 Pick. 356, 361; Parks v. Boston, 15 Pick. 198; Johnson v. Sumner, 1 Met. 172; Clark v. Whitaker, 19 Conn. 319; Smethnrst v. Woolston, 5 Watts & S 106; Watt v. Potter, 2 Mason, 77; Lillard v. Whitaker, 3 Bibb. 92; Sproule v. Ford, 3 Litt 25; Ripley v. Davis, 15 Mich. 75. See also Sturges v. Keith, 57 111. 451. In the case of Suydam v Jenkins, 3 Saudi 614, this subject was discussed with great ability, in a very elaborate opinion, delivered by Duer, J The cases of West v Went worth, 3 Cowen, 82, and of Clark v. Pinney, 7 Co wen, 681, in which it was held, that the measure of damages in cases where property has been withheld, fs the highest market price between the time of the wrongful withholding and the time of the trial, were questioned, and the general measure of damages was held to be the value of the property at the time the right of action accrued, with interest thereon. But if it can be shown that the addition of interest fails to compensate the owner for his actual loss, or to prevent the wrong-doer from realizing a profit, it was held, that a further compensation should be made Duer, J , said: "It may be shown, that had the owner retained possession, he would have derived a larger profit from the use of the property than the interest upon its value; or that he had contracted to sell it to a solvent purchaser at an advance upon the market price; or that when wrongfully taken or converted, it was in the course of transportation to a profitable market, where it would certainly have arrived; and in each of these cases the difference between the market value when the right of action accrued, and the advance which the owner, had he retained the possession, would have realized, ought plainly to be allowed as compensatory damages, and as such to be included in the amount for which judgment is rendered. So where it appears that the owner in all probability would have retained the possession of the property until the time of trial or judgment, ana that it is then of greater value than when he was dispossessed, the difference may fairly be considered as a part of the actual loss resulting to him from the change of possession, and should therefore be added to the original value to complete his indemnity. . . . Even where the market value of the property, when the right of action accrued, would more than suffice to indemnify, it is not, in all cases, that the liability of the wrong-doer should be limited to that amount, it is for the value that he has himself realized, or might realize, that he is bound to account, and for which judgment should be rendered against him. Hence, should it appear in the evidence upon the trial, that he had in fact obtained on the sale of the property a larger price than its value when he acquired possession, or that he still retained the possession, and that an advauced price could then be obtained, in each case the increase upon the original value (which would otherwise remain as a profit in his hands) ought to be allowed as cumulative damages ... It seems to us exceedingly clear, that the highest price for which the property could have been sold at any time after the right of action accrued, and before the entry of judgment, cannot, except in special cases, be justly considered as the measure of damages. When the evidence justifies the conclusion, that a higher price would have been obtained by the owner, had he kept the possession, or has been obtained by the wrong-doer, we have admitted and shown that it ought to be included in the estimation of damages; in the first case, as a portion of the indemnity to which the owner is entitled, and in the'second, as a profit which the wrongdoer cannot be permitted to retain; but we cannot admit that the same rule is to be followed where nothing more is shown are by no means in agreement on this point; and some exceptions to the rule should certainly be admitted. Thus, if it can be shown that the plaintiff suffered, by the wrong-doing of the defendant, a specific injury, as by the failure of a specific purpose for which he had bought the goods, or perhaps by the loss of a specific opportunity of selling them, at a certain profit, the principle of compensation would require that this should be taken into consideration, (k) And if a wilful and actual tort enter into the plaintiff's case, it has been held, that the defend ant should be compelled to pay to the plaintiff all that the plaintiff may have lost in any way by his wrong-doing. (l)

We have considered the subject of accession or confusion of goods, to some extent, in the first volume. If a question arises in such a case as to the damages to be recovered, the law on this subject, as stated generally by Blackstone,(m) is, no doubt, than a bare possibility that the highest price would have been realized, and still fees where it is shown that it would not have been obtained by the owner, and has not been obtained by the wrong-doer." The highest market value, between the time of the conversion and that of the trial, was held to be the measure of damages in the following cases: Greening v W ilkin-son, 1 C. & P. 625; West v. Weutworth, 3 Cowen, 82; Clark v. Pinney, 7 Cowen, 691; Schley v. Lyon, 6 Ga. 530; Ewing v. Blount, 20 Ala. 694; Kid *. Mitchell, 1 Nott & McC. 334: Romaine v. Van Allen, 26 N. Y. 809; Bush c. Dutcher, 34 N. Y. 493; Morgan v. Gregg, 46 Barb. 183. In debt on bonds for the replacement of stock, the higher value of the stock at the time of the trial has been held the just measure of damages. Shepherd t. Johnson, 2 East, 211; McArthnr e. Sea-forth, 2 Taunt. 257; Harrison v. Harrison, 1 C. & P. 412. These cases are examined in Snvdam v. Jenkins, 3 Sandf. 614, 632. But see Kortright v Buffalo Com. Bank, 20 Wend. 91, 22 id. 348. In Massachusetts, the rule which makes the value at the time the right of action accrues, with interest thereon, the measure of damages lor withholding property, seems to be established in ail cases. Gray v. Portland Bank, 3 Mass. 364; Sargent v. Franklin Ins. Co. 8 Pick. 90, and cases cited sttpra; Sticknev v. Allen, 10 Gray, 352; Parsons e. Martin, 11 Gray, HI; Briggs v. Boston, 4c R. K. Co. 6 Allen, 246.