(v) See the preceding note; and especially Farmers & Mechanics Bank v. Champlain Transportation Company, 23

Vt. 186, 909. See also Williams v. Vanderbilt, 28 N. Y. 217, and Lock Company v. W. & N. R. R. 48 N. H. 339.

1 Ins. Co. v. Railroad Co. 104 U. S. 146, affirms the rule that a carrier, in the absence of a special contract, is liable only until he delivers to the next carrier, in spite of the fact that through transportation was undertaken by a despatch company under contracts with the several connecting lines, and that the freight money received at established tariff rates was divided by agreement between the several lines in proportion to the length of their respective roads. See also Whitworth v. Erie R. Co. 87 N. Y. 413; Barter v. Wheeler, 49 N. H. 9.

shared in certain proportions by all of them, * would estop the carriers from denying a partnership for the whole line; extends to Nottingham, do they make themselves liable for its carriage beyond their own line? This question was much considered in Muschamp v. The Lancaster & Preston Junction Railway Co., and I think it was there properly decided, that where goods are received at one terminus for conveyance to another, the company are answerable for all the intermediate termini, and the receipt of such goods is prima facie evidence of such liability." The same doctrine was declared by the Supreme Court of New York, in the case of St. John v. Van Santvoord, 25 Wend. 660. But their judgment in that case was reversed by the Court for the Correction of Errors. See 6 Hill (N. Y.), 157. The English rule is said also to have been adopted in Bennett v. Filyaw, 1 Fla. 403. See Angell, Com. Car. 100. A somewhat similar question arose in the case of Wilcox v. Parmelee, 3 Sandf. 610. There the plaintiff purchased in the city of New York a quantity of merchandise, which the defendant undertook to forward from thence to Fairport, Ohio, by a written agreement, for fifty cents by sail, and sixty-five cents for 100 lbs. by steam. Those goods marked "steam," to go by steam, all other goods "to be shipped by vessel from Buffalo." Certain goods were marked to go by steam, but they were sent forward from Buffalo in a sailing vessel, and were lost in a sale on Lake Erie. It appeared that the defendant owned a line of boats on the canal between Albany and Buffalo, but that he had no vessels on Lake Erie. Held, that the defendant, by the terms of his contract, was a common carrier from New York to Fair-port, and not merely on the canal; and that he was liable for the loss. - The English rule is condemned in very strong terms by Mr. Justice Redfield, in the case of Farmers & Mechanics Bank v. Champlain Transportation Co. 23 Vt. 186, 209. In speaking of the obligation of the carrier to make a personal delivery, the learned judge says: "There has been an attempt to push one department of the law of carriers into an absurd extreme, as it seems to us, by a misapplication of this rule of the carrier being bound to make a personal delivery. That is, by holding the first carrier, upon a route consisting of a succession of carriers, liable for the safe delivery of all articles at their ultimate destination. Muschamp v. The L. & P. Railway Co. 8 M. & W. 421, is the only English case much relied upon in favor of any such proposition, and that case is, by the court, put upon the ground of the particular contract in the case; and also, that 'All convenience' is in favor of such a rule, 'and there is no authority against it,' as said by Baron Rolfe, in giving judgment. St. John v. Van Santvoord, 25 Wend. 660, assumed similar ground. But this court, in this same case (16 Vt. 52), did not consider that decision as sound law, or good sense; and it has since been reversed in the Court of Errors. Van Santvoord v. St. John, 6 Hill (N. Y.), 158, and this last decision is expressly recognized by this court, 18 Vt. 131. Weed v. Schenectady & S. Railroad Co. 19 Wend. 534, is considered by many as having adopted the same view of the subject. But that case is readily reconciled with the general rule upon this subject, that each carrier is only bound to the end of his own route, and for a delivery to the next carrier, by the consideration that in this case there was a kind of partnership connection between the first company and the other companies, constituting the entire route, and also that the first carriers took pay, and gave a ticket through, which is most relied upon by the court. But see the opinion of Walworth, Ch., in Van Santvoord v. St. John, 6 Hill (N. Y.), 158. And in such cases, where the first company gives a ticket, and takes pay through, it may be fairly considered equivalent to an undertaking to be responsible throughout the entire route. The case of Bennett v. Filyaw, I Fla. 403, is referred to in Angell, Com. Car. £ 95, n. 1, as favoring this view of the subject. The rule laid down in Garside v. Trent & Mersey Nav. Co. 4 T. R. 581, that each carrier, in the absence of special contract, is only liable for the extent of his own route, and the safe storage and delivery to the next carrier, is undoubtedly the better, the more just and rational, and the more generally recognized rule upon the subject. Ackley v. Kellogg, 8 Cowen, 223. This is the case of goods carried by water from New York to Troy, to be put on board a canal boat at that place, and forwarded to the north, and the goods were lost by the upsetting of the canal boat, and the defendants were held not liable for the loss beyond their own route. The cases all seem to regard this as the general rule upon this subject, with the exception of those above referred to; one of which (8 M. & W. 421), considers it chiefly a matter of fact, to be determined by the jury as to the extent of the undertaking; one (25 Wend. 660) has been diaand at the same time would perhaps permit the * plaintiff, if his person or goods were injured on any part of the route, regarded by this court, and reversed by their own Court of Errors (6 Hill (N. Y.), 158); one (19 Wend. 534) is the case of ticketing through upon connected lines; and one (1 Fla. 403) I have not seen." And in Nutting v. Conn. River R. R. Co. 1 Gray, 502, it was held, that a railroad corporation, receiving goods for transportation to a place situated beyond the line of their road, on another railroad, which connects with theirs, but with the proprietors of which they have no connection in business, and taking pay for the transportation over their own road only, is not liable, in the absence of any special contract, for the loss of the goods, after their delivery to the proprietors of the other railroad. And Metcalf, J., delivering the opinion of the court, said: "On the facts of this case, we are of opinion that there must be judgment for the defendants. Springfield is the southern terminus of their road; and no connection in business is shown between them and any other railroad company. When they carry goods that are destined beyond that terminus, they take pay only for the transportation over their own road. What, then, is the obligation imposed on them by law, in the absence of any special contract by them, when they receive goods at their depot in Northampton, which are marked with the names of consignees in the city of New York? In our judgment, that obligation is nothing more than to transport the goods safely to the end of their road, and there deliver them to the proper carriers to be forwarded towards their ultimate destination. This the defendants did, in the present case, and in so doing, performed their full legal duty. If they can be held liable for a loss that happens on any railroad besides their own, we know not what is the limit of their liability. If they are liable in this case, we do not see why they would not also be liable if the boxes had been marked for consignees in Chicago, and had been lost between that place and Detroit, on a road with which they had no more connection than they have with any railroad in Europe. . . . The plaintiffs counsel relied on the case of Muschamp v. Lancaster & Preston Junction Railway, 8 M. & W. 421, in which it was decided by the Court of Exchequer, that when a railway company take into their care a parcel directed to a particular place, and do not, by positive agreement, limit their responsibility to a part only of the distance, that is prima facie evidence of an undertaking to carry the parcel to the place to which it is directed, although that place be beyond the limits within which the company in general profess to carry on their business of carriers. And two Justices of the Queen's Bench subsequently made a like decision. Watson v. Ambergate, Nottingham, & Boston Railway, 3E.L.& E. 497. We cannot concur in that view of the law; and we are sustained in our dissent from it by the Court of Errors in New York, and by the Supreme Courts of Vermont and Connecticut. Van Santvoord v. St. John, 6 Hill (N. Y.), 157; Farmers & Mechanics Bank v. Champlain Transportation Co. 18 Vt. 140, and 23 Vt. 209; Hood v. N. York & N. Haven Railroad Co. 22 Conn. 1. In these cases, the decision in Weed v. Saratoga & Schenectady Railroad Co. 19 Wend. 534 (which was cited by the present plaintiff's counsel), was said to be distinguishable from such a case as this, and to be reconcilable with the rule, that each carrier is bound only to the end of his route, unless he makes a special contract that binds him further." See also, on this subject, Fowles v. Great Western Railway Co. 16 E. L. & E. 531; s. c. 7 Exch. 699; Scotthorn v. South Staffordshire Railway Co. 18 id. 553; s. c. 8 Exch. 341; Wilson v. York, Newcastle, & Berwick Railway Co. id. 557; Walker v. York & North Midland Railway Co. 22 id. 315; 8. C.2E.& B. 750; Hellaby v. Weaver, 17 Law Times, 271; Briggs v. Boston, etc. R. R. Co. 6 Allen, 246; Darling v. Boston, etc. R. R. Co. 11 Allen, 295; Converse v. Norwich, etc. R. R. Co. 33 Conn. 166; Detroit, etc. R. R. Co. v. Farmers' Bank, 20 Wis. 122; Salinger v. Simmons, 8 Abb. Pr. (n. s.) 409; Gass v. New York, etc. R. R. Co. 99 Mass. 220; Knight v. Portland, etc. R. R. Co. 56 Me. 234. In the case of Hood v. New York & New Haven Railroad Co. 22 Conn. 1; s. c. id. 502, it was held, that the corporate power of a railroad did not extend to a contract for the carriage of a person by staging beyond their own length of road, and that the fact that they had been for a long time in the habit of making and executing such contracts, could not estop them from setting up this lack of power when sued by a person to whom they had given a ticket for conveyance beyond their line of route, and who was injured on such passage. See also, as recent American cases, holding what we think the American doctrine in regard to connected railroad companies, Elmore v. Nangatuck R. R. Co. 23 Conn. 457; N. R. R. Co. v. Waterbury to sue the carrier, on whose route the injury took place, separately. (w) l But when a carrier is in possession of goods to be delivered to a subsequent carrier for transportation, his liability as insurer will continue, even though the second carrier, after notice and request to receive the goods, has neglected for an unreasonable time to do so. In order to exonerate himself, the first carrier must in some way clearly indicate his renunciation of the relation of carrier. (x) 2 If the owner proves the delivery of the goods to the first carrier, in good order, and the delivery of them to the second carrier, this last will be held unless he proves that they were not injured while in his hands, or were not in good condition when he received them. (xx)