Whenever chattels are deliverable by contract on a demand, this demand must be reasonable; that is, reasonable in time, and place, and manner. (r) And the conduct of the promisor will always receive a reasonable construction. Thus, in general, if a proper demand be made upon him, his silence will be held equivalent to a refusal to deliver the chattels. (s) And by application of the same universal principle, all the obligations of both parties receive a reasonable construction. Thus, if the promise be to do within a certain time a certain amount of labor on materials furnished, they must be furnished in season to permit that work to be done within that time, by reasonable exertions. (t) And if certain work is to be done, that certain * other work may be done, all to be completed and the whole delivered within a certain period, the work first to be done, must be finished early enough to permit the other work to be done in season. (u)

If, by the terms of the contract, certain specific articles are to be delivered at a certain time and place, in payment of an existing debt, this contract is fully discharged, and the debt is paid, by a complete and legal tender of the articles at the time and place, although the promisee was not there to receive them, and no action can be thereafter maintained on the contract. (v) l

(q) Russell v. Nicoll, 3 Wend. 112.

(r) Higgins v. Emmons, 5 Conn. 76.

(s) Higgins v. Emmons, 5 Conn. 76. And see Dunlap v. Hunting, 2 Denio, 643.

(t) Clement v. Clement, 8 N. H. 210. See also Goodwin v. Holbrook, 4 Wend. 377.

(u) Clement v. Clement, 8 N. H. 210.

(v) Mitchell v. Merrill, 2 Blackf. 87; Slingerland v. Morse, 8 Johns. 474. In this last case the time of the delivery was rendered certain by the contract, but no place. The debtor tendered the property at the place where it was (it being cumbrous articles); but the creditor refused to receive it there, and then appointed another place, but the same not being delivered, he brought his action on the contract, which was either to deliver the property or pay a certain sum of money

1 See Council Bluffs Iron Works v. Cuppey, 41 la. 104.

* But the property in the goods has passed to the creditor, and he may retain them as his own. (w) These two things

The tender was held to be a bar to the action, and the creditor was held bound to resort to the specific articles tendered, and to the person in whose possession they were. See also Curtis v. Greenbanks, 24 Vt. 536; Zinn v. Rowley, 4 Barr, 169; Games v. Manning, 2 Greene, 254. Garrard v. Zachariah, 1 Stew. 272, is to the same effect. Case v. Green, 5 Watts, 262, is a strong case to the same point. There the creditor was prevented by sickness from attending at the time and place designated to receive the articles. The debtor had the property there, and left it on the ground. The creditor afterwards brought suit on the contract, and the tender was held a good bar. Parke, B., in Startup v. Macdonald, 6 M. & G. 625, said: "Where a thing is to be done anywhere, a tender a convenient time before midnight is sufficient; where the thing is to be done at a particular place, and where the law implies a duty on the party to whom the thing is to be done to attend, that attendance is to be by daylight, and a convenient time before sunset." See also Lamb v. Lathrop, 13 Wend. 95, which holds, that if the tender be not accepted, the creditor cannot, by a subsequent demand and refusal, revive his right to sue upon the contract; for the debtor is not bound, as in tender of money, to keep his tender always ready. After such tender he is but a bailee of the property for the creditor, and his rights and duties are the same as those of other bailees. Some cases hold, that a tender under the circumstances stated in the text, must always be kept good, and that a plea averring that the debtor was ready at the time and ' place to deliver the articles, but that the payee did not come to receive them, is bad, for not averring that the debtor was always and still is ready to deliver the same. Nixon v. Bullock, 9 Yerg. 414; Tiernan v. Napier, Peck, 212; Miller v. McClain, 10 Yerg. 245; and dicta in Roberts v. Beatty, 2 Penn. 63. But this, as we have seen, is not the generally recognized rule. The tender, however, must be such as to vest the property in the creditor. The articles should be so set apart, and designated, as to enable the payee to distinguish and know them from all others. The absence of the payee alone will not dispense with such designation and separation by the debtor. The fact that the latter had the articles at the time and place, ready to be delivered if the other party had been present, is not alone a sufficient tender to vest the property in the other party, or to bar an action on the contract. Smith v. Loomis, 7 Conn. 110. In this case Peters, J., said: "Though we find much confusion and contradiction in the books on this subject, our own practice seems to have been uniform for nearly sixty years, and establishes these propositions: 1. That a debt payable in specific articles, may be discharged by a tender of these articles, at the proper time and place. 2. That the articles must be set apart and designated so as to enable the creditor to distinguish them from others. 3. That the property so tendered vests in the creditor, and is at his risk. 4. That a tender may be made in the absence of the creditor." And see M'Council v. Hall, Brayton, 223; Newton v. Galbraith, 5 Johns. 119; Bams v. Graham, 4 Cowen, 452; Nichols v. Whiting, 1 Root, 443. After such tender, the property vests in the creditor, and he may maintain trover for the same. Rix v. Strong, 1 Root, 55.

(w) See preceding note. In the celebrated case of Weld v. Hadley, 1 N. H. 295, a different doctrine was declared. It was there held, that when a creditor, to whom a tender of specific articles is made in pursuance of a contract, refuses to accept the tender, he acquires no property in the articles tendered, though the contract is discharged by such tender. That was an action of trover for leather. It appeared that Hailey gave Weld a note, dated August 9, 1808, for 300 dollars, payable in good merchantable leather at cash price, in two years from January 1, 1809. When the note became due, Hadley tendered to the plaintiff a quantity of leather; but a dispute arose as to the price of leather, and Weld thinking the quantity not sufficient to pay the note, refused to receive it, and Hadley took it away and used it. Weld then brought a suit upon the note; Hadley pleaded the tender in bar, and issue being joined upon the tender, the jury found that a sufficient quantity was tendered, and judgment was rendered in favor of Hadley. After that suit was determined, Weld demanded the leather of the defendant, and tendered the expenses of keeping. Hadley refused to deliver the leather, and thereupon this suit was brought. The case was argued with great ability on both sides. And Richardson, C. J., in delivering the judgment of the court, said: "The plaintiff cannot prevail in this action, unless he has shown a legal title to the leather, which is the subject of contest, vested in him instead of the jus ad rem which he loses, an absolute jus in re.