A lunatic is under a quasi contractual obligation to pay for necessaries furnished his wife, similar to his obligation to pay for necessaries furnished himself. Read <•. Legard, 6 Ex. 636; Pearl v. McDowell, 3 J .J. Marsh. 65S; Shaw v. Thompson, 16 Pick. 198; Stuckey v. Mathes, 24 Hun, 461. See also Drew v. Nunn, 4 Q. B. D 661

1 The burden of proving the restoration to reason is upon him who seeks to enforce a contract against the one alleging insanity. Gangwere's Est. 14 Penn. St. 417: Elston v. Jasper, 45 Tex. 409. See Turner v. Husk, 53 Md. 65. - An insane person's contract made during a lucid interval is binding, McCormick v. Littler, 85 Ill. 62: as well as a contract ratified during a lucid interval, although entered into when insane, Blakeley v. Blakeley, 6 Stewart, 502, and reporter's note. - K.

The deed of an insane person is not void, but it is voidable. His heirs may avoid as to the grantee or subsequent purchasers, although the deed was not obtained by fraud, nor for an inadequate consideration. (cc)1

He may repudiate a contract made by him when insane, although his temporary insanity was produced by his own act, as by intoxication. (d) But he must not make use of his intoxication as a means of cheating others. If he made himself drunk with the intention of avoiding a contract entered into by him while in that state, it may well be doubted whether he would be permitted to carry this fraud into effect. And if he bought goods while drunk, but keeps them when sober, his drunkenness is no answer to an action for the purchase-money. (e) A distinction has been taken between express contracts and those implied by law, as for money paid, goods sold, etc. And it is

(cc) Hovey v. Hobson, 53 Me. 451.

(d) In Pitt v. Smith, 3 Camp. 33, Lord Ellenborough held that an agreement signed by an intoxicated man is void, on the ground that such a person " has no agreeing mind." And he reasserted this rule in Fenton v. Holloway, 1 Stark. 126. See Cook v. Clayworth, 18 Ves. 15; Cole v. Robbins, Bull. N. P. 172; Barrett v. Buxton, 2 Aik. 167; Burroughs v. Richmond, 1 Green (N. J.), 233; Foot v. Tewksbury, 2 Vt. 97; Reynolds v. Waller, 1 Wash. (Va.) 164; Reinicker v. Smith, 2 Har. & J. 421; Curtis v. Hall, 1 Southard, 361; Rutherford v. Ruff, 4 Desaus. 364; Seymour v. Delaney, 3 Cowen, 445; Duncan v. McCullough, 4 S. & R. 484; Taylor v. Patrick, 1 Bibb, 168; Prentice v. Achorn, 2 Paige, 30; Harrison v. Lemon, 3 Blackf. 51; Drum-mond v. Hopper, 4 Harring. (Del.) 327; Van Wyck v. Brasher, 81 N. Y. 260. And the legal representatives of a party contracting while intoxicated have the same right as the party himself to avoid such contract, although the drunkenness was not procured by the sober party, Wigglesworth v. Steers, 1 Hen. & M. 70. It seems to be held in equity that intoxication does not avoid a contract, unless the intoxication was produced by the other party or unless fraud had been practised upon him. Cory v. Cory, 1 Ves. Sen. 19; Johnson v. Medlicott, 3 P. Wms. 130, n.; Stockley v. Stockley, 1 Ves. & B. 23; Cooke v. Clayworth, 18 Ves. 12; Crane v. Conklin, Sexton, 346; Wright v.

Fisher, 65 Mich. 275. Dealing with persons non compotes raises a presumption of fraud; but it may be rebutted; and if the evidence of good faith and of benefit to the unsound person is clear, equity will not interfere. Jones v. Perkins, 5 B. Mon. 225. - As to frauds on drunkards, see Gregory v. Frazer, 3 Camp. 454; Brandon v. Old, 3 C. & P. 440. Some of the above authorities certainly seem to be inconsistent with the principle, that a person in a state of intoxication has no agreeing mind, and therefore there never was a contract between the parties. We think this principle, however, the true one. [It was held that a contract of a drunken man may be ratified when he becomes sober, in Matthews v. Baxter, L. R. 8 Ex. 132; Carpenter v. Rodgers, 61 Mich. 384.]

(e) See Alderson, B., in Gore v. Gibson, 13 M. & W. 623. From Sentance v. Poole, 3 C. & P. 1, it might be inferred that an indorsement, made in a state of complete intoxication, could not be enforced against the drunkard by a bond fide holder without knowledge of the circumstances. Such a rule must rest on the assumption that the act was a nullity; but it is difficult to see how one could indorse a bill or note in such a way that its appearance would excite no suspicion, and yet be so drunk as to know nothing of what he was doing; and unless the indorser were utterly incapacitated, it should seem that a third party, taking the note innocently and for value, ought to hold it against him.

1 Great weakness of mind, also, together with a grossly inadequate consideration, will afford ground for the setting aside a conveyance upon seasonable application. Allore v. Jewell, 94 U. S. 506. See Taylor v. Atwood, 47 Conn. 498. - K.

said that these last contracts, especially where the things furnished were necessaries, cannot be defeated by showing the drunkenness of the defendant. (/)

If the condition of lunacy be established by proper evidence under proper process, the representatives and guardians of the lunatic may avoid a contract entered into by him at a time when he is thus found to have been a lunatic, although he seemed to have his senses, and the party dealing with him did not know him to be of unsound mind. (g) But this rule has one important qualification, quite analogous to that which prevails in the case of an infant, and resting undoubtedly on a similar regard for the interests of the lunatic. This is, that his contract cannot be avoided, if made bond fide on the part of the other party, and for the procurement of necessaries, (h) which, * as in the case of infants, would not be restricted to absolute necessaries, but would include such things as are useful to him, and proper for his means and station. And it has been recently held, that a bond fide contract made with a lunatic, who was apparently sane, cannot be rescinded by him or his representatives, unless the parties can be placed in statu quo. (i)1