We do not see that the statute determines this. It only provides that our own citizens and certain aliens, if they "are entitled to the exclusive use of any lawful trade-mark, or who intend to adopt and use any trade-mark for exclusive use within the United States," may be protected in such use by using the means indicated. As any one may buy, and any one may sell, there would seem to be no exception to the rule that every one who makes and sells a particular article may put his trade-mark upon it, and have his rights therein respected by all persons. Hence our courts have heretofore protected aliens equally with citizens; and they have done this without reference to the question whether the country to which the alien belongs protects a similar right in our citizens who may be there, on the ground that this protection of the manufacturer's trade-mark is the protection of the community against fraud; and that it is equally the duty of our own courts to give this protection to our own community, whether another government does or does not protect its own community. (h)

The recent statute, however, expressly confines the right to citizens of foreign countries which,"by treaty or convention, afford similar privileges to citizens of the United States." It would seem, therefore, not to be enough if the courts of that fordamages between the same parties, Judge Woodbury, after an able examination of the rights of aliens in the courts of the United States, confirmed the doctrine laid down by Judge Story and Chancellor Walworth, 2 Wood. & M.1. So Coates v. Holbrook, 2 Sandf. Ch. 586; Gillott v. Esterbrook, 47 Barb. 455; affirmed in 48 N. Y. 374; Clark v. Clark, 25 Barb. 76. The English case of Delondre v. Shaw, 2 Sim. Ch. 237 has been thought to maintain an opposite doctrine; but the point actually derided in that case was that the court would not protect the copyright of a foreigner, and on the question of trade-mark no opinion was given. Later English cases fully adopt the views expressed by the American courts. Thus, in the Collins Co. v. Brown, 3 Kay & J. 428, in which the plaintiffs were American citizens, Vice-Chancellor Wood, after showing that the question in these cases is one of fraud, says: "Any fraud may be redressed in the country in which it is committed, whatever be the country of the person who has been defrauded." So The Collins Co. v. Cowen, 3 Kay & J. 423; Farina v. Silverlock, 39 Eng. L. & Eq. 577; Cartier v. Carlile, 8 Jur. (n. s.) 183.

(h) Taylor v. Carpenter, 2 Sandf. Ch. 60S, 3 Story, C. C. Rep. 450, 2 Wood. & M. 1; The Collins Co. v. Brown, 3 Kay & J. 428; The Collins Co. v. Cowen, 3 Kay & J. 423.

♦257 bh eign country gave our citizens that protection, in the absence of treaty or convention.

bh * Can one who is only the seller of the goods, place on them his own trade-mark, and claim protection for it? It is primarily and essentially the right of the manufacturer only. But it would seem, from authority, from practice, and for good reasons, lawful for one who is only a seller to possess this right by derivation from the manufacturer. We do not mean by transfer or assignment, - for that question will be considered presently; but by some arrangement or connection with the manufacturer, whereby the seller is made the representative of the manufacturer in this respect. (i) It seems plain that one who buys, from a domestic or foreign manufacturer, certain goods which the manufacturer sells as readily to any one else, cannot put his own mark on them, and by force thereof claim to be the only seller of those goods. But if a manufacturer - we will say of gloves, in Paris - has acquired an extensive reputation by the excellence of his goods, and arranges with a merchant in New York that the goods shall be sold to him, and to no one else in this country, that merchant would have a right to call himself the exclusive importer of these goods, and to indicate this by hi the use of the manufacturer's trade-mark, or his * own, or by both united into one. This would not prevent any person who could get these goods in Europe from bringing them

(i) Walton v. Crowlev, 3 Blatchf. C. C. Rep. 440. In this case the plaintiffs were by an arrangement with the English manufacturers the sole importers of the goods to which they affixed their own trade-mark. It was objected that the manufacturers should have been made parties to the bill, but the objection was overruled, and the court said: "The party whose interests are directly affected by the wrong is entitled to proceed in his own name to procure its suppression, and the person for whom goods are manufactured has the same legal right to affix and maintain a special trade-mark as the manufacturer himself." In Partridge v. Menck, 2 Sandf. Ch. 625, Chancellor Walworth says: " The question in such cases is, not whether the complainant was the original inventor or proprietor of the article made by him, and upon which he now puts his trade-mark, or whether the article made and sold by the defendant under the complainant's trade-mark is an article of the same quality or value; but the court proceeds upon the ground, that the complainant has a valuable interest in the goodwill of his trade or business; and that having appropriated to himself a particular label or sign or trade-mark, indicating to those who give him their patronage that the article is manufactured or sold by him, or by his authority, or that he carries on business at a particular place, he is entitled to protection against a defendant who attempts to pirate upon the good-will of the plaintiff's friends or customers, or the patrons of his trade or business, by sailing under his flag without his authority or consent." See Taylor v. Carpenter, 2 Sandf. Ch. 603; Amoskeag Manuf. Co. v. Spear, 2 Sandf. S. C. 599; Dixon Crucible Co. v. Guggenheim, 2 Brews. 321 ; Lockwood v. Boatwick, 2 Daly, 521. One may bring a suit in his own name for the infringement of a trademark, although others are also interested in the mark. Dent v. Turpin, 2 J. & II 139; Hine v. Lart, 10 Jur. 106.