Trust and confidence in another often form a sufficient consideration to hold that other to his undertaking. As if one intrusts money, goods, or property of any kind, to any person, on the faith of that person's promise to act in a certain way in reference to those goods, or that money or property, such person, having accepted the trust, will be held to his promise, because the trust is itself a sufficient consideration for a promise to discharge and execute the trust faithfully. (w) 1 * Questions involving this * 448
(w) Doctor & Stud. Dial. 2 c. 24; Holt, C. J., in Coggs v. Bernard, 2 Ld. Raym. 919. Thus, where a coffee-house keeper accepted a large sum of money from the plaintiff, and promised to take proper care of it for a certain period, it was held that an action would lie on this promise for gross neglect and want of caution, whereby the money was lost. Doorman v. Jenkins, 2 A. & E. 256. So where the plaintiff delivered the sum of £700 to the defendant, to be laid out by him in the purchase of an annuity, and the defendant promised to get the annuity well and properly secured, but was guilty of gross neglect and want of care, whereby both the money and the annuity were lost, it was held that the plaintiff was entitled to maintain an action against the defendant, to recover compensation for the injury he had sustained, although the defendant was to receive no reward for his services. Whitehead v. Greetham, 10 Moore, 182, 2 Bing. 464, McClel. & Y. 205. In the absence of an express undertaking to procure good security, the party would only be bound to use reasonable care and caution. Dartnall v. Howard, 6 Dow. & R. 443; s. c. 4 B. & C. 345. In Shillibeer v. Glyn, 2 M. & W. 143, the declaration stated that the plaintiff, being about to proceed to Northampton, paid money to the defendants in London, that they might cause it to be paid to him at Northampton on a certain day; that the defendants received the money for that purpose from the plaintiff, and that thereupon afterwards, in consideration of the premises, the defendants promised to cause the money to be paid to the plaintiff at Northampton. The court were inclined to hold that the declaration disclosed a sufficient consideration. See also the case of Wheatley v. Law, Cro. J. 668, where a similar declaration was held good, if the case is correctly reported. Where the defendant received certain notes from the plaintiff to collect or return, it was held that the delivery of the notes constituted a consideration for the defendant's agreement, and that if he neglected to use ordinary diligence in endeavoring to collect them, he was liable therefor to the plaintiff. Robinson v. Threadgill, 13 Ired. L. 39. And where the plaintiff intrusted " divers boilers of great value " to the defendant, to be weighed, and the defendant promised to return them in the same state and condition that they were in at the time he received them, but sent them back in detached pieces and unfit for use, it was held that the plaintiff was entitled to maintain an action on the promise, to recover compensation for the injury he had sustained. Bainbridge Firmstone, 8 A. & E. 743; s. c. 1 Per. & D. 3; and see Smith, Lead. Cas. vol. i. p. 96 (ed. 1841).
1 As in Hammond v. Hussey, 51 N. H. 40, where a teacher undertook to examine pupils for admission to a high school at the request of the school committee, and was held liable for a false report that the plaintiff was not qualified. See Jenkins v. Bacon, 111 Mass. 373, which was to the effect, that a person gratuitously undertaking to buy and keep a government bond for another is responsible for its loss to the extent of its value irrespective of his negligence; Morton, J., dissenting, on the ground that it was for the jury to decide whether he was liable or not by reason of negligence. - K.
principle seldom arise except in the case of bailments, and will be considered hereafter when we treat of that subject. Here we will only say, that, in general, an agent without remuneration cannot be required to undertake an employment or trust, or held liable for not doing so; but if he undertake and begin it, he is liable for the consequences of neglect or omission in completing his work.