(n) Althorfe v. Wolfe, 22 N. Y. 355.

(o) See Rich v. Basterfield, 4 C. B. 783; Rex v. Pedley, 1 A. & E. 822, 3 Nev. & M. 627; Fish v. Dodge, 4 Denio, 311; Carle v. Hall, 2 Met. 353. And this doctrine may enter into the decision in Burgess v. Gray, 1 C. B. 578, above referred to.

(p) Littledale, J., Laugher v. Pointer,

5 B. & C. 560; Quarman v. Burnett, 6 M.

& W. 510.

(q) See Allen v. Hayward, 7 Q. B. 960; and in Reedie v. London, etc. R. Co. 4 Exch. 244, this doctrine was expressly overruled. There Rolfe, B., giving the judgment said: " On full consideration, we have come to the conclusion, that there is no such distinction, unless perhaps the act complained of is such as to amount to a nuisance. ... It is not necessary to decide whether in any case the owner of real property, such as land or houses, may be responsible for nuisances occasioned by the mode in which his property is used by others not standing in the relation of servants to him, or part of his family. It may be that in some case he is so responsible. But then, his liability must be founded on the principle that he has not taken due care to prevent the doing of acts which it was his duty to prevent, whether done by his servants or others. If, for instance, a person occupying a house or a field should permit another to carry on there a noxious trade, so as to be a nuisance to his neighbors, it may be that he would be responsible, though the acts complained of were neither his acts nor the acts of his servants. He would have violated the rule of law, 'Sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas.'" Bush v. Steinman, 1 B. & P. 404; Randleson v. Murray, 8 A. & E.

*Of the general principles of the law of contracts, applicable to the contract of service, we have already considered some under the head of Agency; and we shall defer the consideration of others, and of the questions which they present, to the third Book of this Part, which relates to the subject-matter of contracts, and to the chapter upon the topic of the Hiring of Personal Service.1

109, and other cases of that class, must be regarded as substantially overruled; and such American decisions as were made before the recent investigations, in deference to those cases, will not, it is presumed, be adhered to. l)e Forrest v. Wright, 2 Mich. 368. See, however, Mayor, etc. of New York v. Bailey, 2

■Denio, 433; and Buffalo v. Holloway, 14 Barb. 101; cases which it seems difficult to reconcile with the current of recent English decisions. See also Lowell v. Boston, etc. R. Co., 23 Pick. 24; Gardner v. Heartt, 2 Barb. 165 Stone v. Codman, 15 Pick. 297.

1 Recent eases illustrative of a master's liability for acts of his servant in the course of or incident to his employment, are as follows: The owner of a cab is liable for the driver's negligence in driving hack to the stable furiously and running over a person. Venables v. Smith, 2 Q. B. D. 279; approved and followed in King v. London, etc. Cab Co. 23 Q. B. D. 281; and see Schaefer v. Osterbriuk, 67 Wis. 495. A stevedore is liable for the negligence of his foreman whose duty was to superintend the shipping of rails after a carman had unloaded them, and who being dissatisfied with hitter's unloading, so unloaded some of them himself, as to injure a passer-by. Burns v. Poulson, L. R. 8 C. P. 563. A master is liable for flooding caused by the neglect of his clerk in leaving a faucet in a lavatory running, whether the use of the lavatory was or was not within the scope of the clerk's employment, it being an incident to his employment. Ruddiman v. Smith, 60 L. T. R. 708. And see Simonton v. Loring, 68 Me. 164. But not if a separate lavatory is maintained for the use of clerks, and the use of the one where the damage occurs is in disobedience of orders. Stevens v. Woodward, 6 Q. B. D. 318. So a railway company is liable for the act of a porter in violently pulling a passenger out of a railway carriage, under an erroneous belief that the passenger was in a wrong train, part of the porter's duty being to prevent people from travelling in wrong trains. Bayley v. Manchester, etc. Ry. Co. L. R. 7 C. P. 415; L. R. 8 C. P. 148. And rail-way companies are liable for assaults of their officials upon passengers. Walker v. South Eastern Ry. Co. 23 L. T. R. 14; Western, etc. R. R. Co. v. Turner, 72 Ga. 292; North Chicago Ry. Co. v. Gastka, 128 Ill. 613; Louisville, etc. Ry. Co. v. Wood, 113 Ind. 544; Williams v. Pullman, etc. Co. 40 La. An. 417; Goddard v. Grand Trunk Ry. Co. 57 Me. 202; Dwinlle v. New York Central R. R. Co. 120 N. Y. 117. And this has been so held, though the assault arose out of a personal quarrel unconnected with the official's duty. Chicago, etc. R. R. Co. v. Flexman, 103 Ill. 546; Hanson v. European, etc. Ry. Co. 62 Me. 84; Stewart v. Brooklyn, etc. R. R. Co. 90 N. Y. 588. But see Little Miami R. R. Co. v. Wetmore, 19 Ohio St. 110. Railroad companies have also been held liable to a female passenger for improper advances made by a conductor or porter. Campbell v. Pullman, etc. Co. 42 Fed. Rep. 484; Louisville, etc. R. R. Co. v. Ballard, 85 Ky. 307; Craker v. Chicago, etc. R. R. Co. 36 Wis. 657. See also Pittsburgh, etc. Ry. Co. v. Kirk, 102 Ind. 399; Atchison, etc. R. R. Co. v. Randall, 40 Kan. 421; Mott v. Consumers' Ice Co. 73 N. Y. 543.

On the other hand, where a ticket clerk of a railway company gave into custody one whom he wrongly suspected of robbing the company was held not liable, as the act was entirely without the scope of the ticket clerk's authority. Allen v. London, etc, Ry. Co. L. R. 6 Q. B. 65. So where a porter in charge of a station gave into custody one whom he wrongly suspected of stealing the company's property, Edwards v. London, etc. Ry. Co. L. R. 5 C. P. 445; and where a station-master detained the plaintiff for alleged non-payment of freight on goods, it being said that as the company itself had only a right to detain the goods in such a case, no authority could be implied for the station-master to detain the owner. Poulton V. London, etc Ry. Co. L. R. 2 Q. B. 534. And see Charleston v. London Tramways Co, 36 W. R. 367. And a banking corporation is not liable to an action for malicious prosecution on account of a prosecution instituted by its manager against the plaintiff for an alleged attempt to defraud the bank, without evidence that the manager was authorized to institute such a prosecution. Bank of New South Wales v. Owston, 4 App. Cas. 270. Where it was the duty of a carman to deliver beer with a horse and cart and collect the empty casks, and he used the horse and cart on an errand of his own, his master was held not liable for an accident occurring while the carman was returning, though he had incidentally picked up some empty casks. Rayner v. Mitchell, 2 C. P. D. 357, of Whatman v. Pearson, L. R. 3 C. P. 422. A master sent his servant on an errand directing him to return by a certain route. On reaching his destination, the servant, at the request of a third person, went four miles further, instead of returning. Held, the master was not liable for an accident occurring while the servant was deviating from the course directed. Stone v. Hills, 45 Conn. 44.

Recent cases illustrative of the proposition that one hiring work done by an independent contractor is not liable for the negligence of the contractor or his servants are, Hale v. Johnson, 80 Ill. 185; Wabash, etc. Ry. Co. v. Farver, 111 Ind. 195; Brown v. McLeish, 71 Ia. 381; Waltemeyer v. Wisconsin, etc. Ry. Co. 71 Ia. 626; St. Louis, etc. R. R. Co. v. Willis, 38 Kan. 330; Davie v. Levy, 39 La. An. 551; McCarthy v. Second Parish, 71 Me. 318; New Orleans, etc. R. R. Co. v. Reese, 61 Miss. 581; Devlin v. Smith, 89 N. Y. 470; Hughes v. Railway Co. 39 Ohio St. 461; Edmundson v. Pittsburgh, etc. R. R. Co. 111 Pa. 316.