(v) Coles v. Hulme, 8 B. & C. 568.

(w) Moore v. Magrath, Cowp. 9; Cholmondeley v. Clinton, 2 B. & Ald. 625.

(x) Coldham v. Showler, 3 C. B. 312; Makepeace v. Harvard College, 10 Pick 298; Sibley v. Holden, id. 249; Odiorne v. Sargent, 6 N. H. 401; Raymond v. Roberts, 2 Aikens, 204; Strong v. Barnes, 11 Vt. 221; Taylor d. Atkins v. Horde, and priority as will carry into effect the intention of the parties, as the same may be gathered from all the instruments taken together. (y) And the recitals in each may be explained or corrected by a reference to any other, in the same way as if they were only several parts of one instrument. (z)

Another rule requires that the contract should be supported rather than defeated. (a) Thus, a deed which cannot operate * in the precise way in which it is intended to take effect, shall yet be construed in another, if in this other it can be made effectual. (b) For example, a deed intended for a release, which cannot operate as such, may still take effect as a grant of the reversion, as a surrender, or an atonement; or even

1 Burr. 60,117; Jackson v. Dunsbagh, 1 Johns. Cas. 91; Hills v. Miller, 3 Paige, 254; Sewall v. Henry, 9 Ala. 24; Applegate v. Jacoby, 9 Dana, 209; Cornell v. Todd, 2 Demo, 130; Craig v. Wells, 1 Kern. 315; Rutland & Burlington R. Co. v. Crocker, U. S. C. C, Vt. 1858, 21 Law Reporter, 201. So, also, though the instruments are not made at the same time, if they can be connected together by a reference from one to the other, van Hagan v. Van Rensselaer, 18 Johns. 420; Sawyer v. Hammatt, 15 Me. 40; Adams v. Hill, 16 id. 215.

(y) Whitehurst v. Boyd, 8 Ala. 375; Newhall v. Wright, 3 Mass. 138.

(z) Sawyer v. Hammatt, 15 Me. 40.

(a) Smith v. Packhurst, 3 Atk. 135; Pollock v. Stacy, 9 Q. B. 1033. In Pugh v. Leeds, Cowp. 714, there was a power to make leases in possession, but not in reversion. A lease was granted for twentyone years, to commence from the day of the date. Held, that "from the day," etc., was to be regarded as inclusive, and not exclusive, of the day of the date. Lord Mansfield said: "The ground of the opinion and judgment which I now deliver is, that 'from' may, in the vulgar use, and even in the strictest propriety of language, mean either inclusive or exclusive; that the parties necessarily understood and used it in that sense which made their deed effectual; that the courts of justice are to construe the words of parties so as to effectuate their deeds, and not to destroy them; more especially where the words themselves abstractedly may admit of either meaning." In Brown v. Slater, 16 Conn. 192, the following agreement was entered into: "Farmington, Oct. 15th, 1825. In consideration of Mrs. Nancy Hart's becoming my wife, I promise to give her at the rate of one dollar per week, from the date of our marriage, so long as she remains my wife. Elias Brown." This contract was put in suit after the death of the husband, and the defence was, that it was extinguished by the marriage of the parties. Held, however, that the contract, being made in contemplation of marriage, and purporting to hold forth a benefit to the promisee, a court of law would construe it as providing for the payment of a sum of money to her after the termination of the coverture, the amount to be ascertained by its duration. Williams, C. J., said : "If a contract admits of more than one construction, one of which will render it inefficacious or nullify it, that construction should be adopted which will carry it into effect. For there is no presumption against the validity of contracts." See, in illustration of this principle, Broom v. Batchelor, 1 H. & N. 255. In Atkins v. Sleeper, 7 Allen, 487, it was held, that a lease "from the first day of July" begins on the second day of July.

(b) Goodtitle v. Bailey, Cowp. 600; Doe v. Salkeld, Willes, 673; Haggerston v. Hanbury, 5 B. & C. 101; Wallis v. Wallis, 4 Mass. 135; Parker v. Nichols, 7 Pick. Ill; Russell v. Coffin, 8 id. 143; Brewer v. Hardy, 22 id. 376; Jackson v. Blodget, 16 Johns. 172; Rogers v. Eagle Fire Ins. Co. 9 Wend. 611; Barrett v. French, 1 Conn. 354; Bryan v. Bradley, 16 id. 474. "The judges in these latter times (and I think very rightly) have gone further than formerly, and have had more consideration for the substance, namely, - the passing of the estate according to the intent of the parties, than the shadow, namely, - the manner of passing it." Per Willes, C. J., in Roe v. Tranmarr, Willes, 684. See also ante, p. * 495, note as a covenant to stand seised. (c) So a deed of bargain and sale, void for want of enrolment, has been held to take effect as a grant of the reversion. (d) If several grantors join in a deed, some of whom are able to convey and others not, it is the deed of him or them alone who are able. (e) And if there be several grantees, one of whom is capable of taking and the others not, it shall enure to him alone who can take. (f) So if a mortgagor and mortgagee join, it is the grant of the mortgagee and the confirmation of the mortgagor. (g) And if a charter will bear a double construction, and in one sense it can effect its purposes, and in the other not, it will receive the construction which will make it efficacious. (h) The court cannot, however, through a desire that there should be a valid contract between the parties, undertake to reconcile conflicting and antagonistic expressions, of which the inconsistency is so great that the meaning of the parties is necessarily uncertain. Nor where the language distinctly imports illegality, should they construe it in a different and a legal sense, for this would be to make a * contract for the parties which they have not made themselves. But where there is room for it, the court will give a rational and equitable interpretation, which, though neither necessary nor obvious, has the advantage of being just and legal, and supposes a lawful contract which the parties may fairly be regarded as having made. So, for the same reason, all the parts of the contract will be construed in such a way as to give force and validity to all of them, and to all of the language used, where that is possible. (i) And