•In cases of mutual gift or mutual promise, where neither party is more the giver or undertaker than the other, this rule would have no application. (y) Nor does it seem that it is permitted to effect the construction when a third party would be thereby injured. As if tenant in tail make a lease "for life" generally, this shall be construed to be a lease for the life of the lessor, that the reversioner may not suffer. (z) Another reason is, that a tenant in tail cannot legally grant a lease for another's life, and the rule of Lord Coke is applied; namely, that an intendment which stands with the law shall be preferred to one which is wrongful and against the law. (a) This rule, that words shall be construed "contra proferentem" was, says Lord Bacon, "drawn out of the depth of reason;" (b) but we have already intimated that it is among those principles of interpretation which have the least influence or value.

No precise form of words is necessary even in a specialty. (c) * Thus, words of recital in a deed will consti of the court, said: "There is considerable difficulty in reconciling all the cases on this subject; which principally arises from the fact that they are not quite at one on the principle to be followed in deciding questions of this sort; some laying it down that a liberal construction ought to be made in favor of the person giving the guaranty; and others that it ought to be in favor of the party to whom it is given; which was the rule adopted by the Court of Queen's Bench in Mason v. Pritchard. Now, the generally received principle of law is, that the party making any instrument should take care so to express the nature of his own liability, as that he may not be bound beyond what it was his intention he should be, and, on the other hand, that the party who receives the instrument, and on the faith of it parts with his goods, which he would not, perhaps, have parted with otherwise, and is, moreover, not the person by whom the words of the instrument constituting the liability are used at all, should have that instrument construed in his favor. If, therefore, I were obliged to choose between the two conflicting principles which have been laid down on this subject, I should rather be disposed to agree with that given in Mason v. Pritchard, than with the opinion of Bayley, B., in Nicholson v. Paget." See also Mason v. Pritchard, 19 East, 227; Hargreave v. Smee, 6 Bing. 244. And see ante, vol ii. p. * 21, and notes, (y) Co. Litt. 42 a, 183 a. The condition of an obligation is considered as the language of the obligee, and so is construed in favor of the obligor. In the language of Baldwin, C. J., and Fitzherbert, J., in Bold v. Molineux, Dyer, 14 b, 17 a, "every condition of an obligation is as a defeasance of the obligation, as well as if the obligation were single, and after the obligee made indentures of defeasance, and it is all one, for the condition is the assent and agreement of the obligee, and made for the benefit of the obligor, and for that reason it shall always be taken most favorably for the obligor: as if a man be bound in an obligation to pay ten pounds before such a [feast] day, the obligor is not bound to pay it till the last instant of the next day preceding the feast, for he hath all that time for his liberty of payment. So is the law, if I be bound to you on condition to pay ten pounds before the feast of St. Thomas, and there are two feasts of St. Thomas, the latest feast is that before which I am bound to pay, and not sooner, for that is most for my advantage." See also Shep. Touch. 875, 376; Powell on Contracts, 396, 397, Laughter's case, 5 Rep. 22 a.

(z) Co. Litt. 42 a. (a) See ante, p. * 500, note (r). (b) Bac. Max. Keg. 3. (c) "In our law," says Catline, Serjeant, arguendo, in Browning v. Beaton, Plowd. 140, "if any persons are agreed upon a thing, and words are expressed or written to make the agreement, although tute an agreement between the parties on which an action of covenant may be maintained. (d) And the recital in a deed of a previous agreement is equivalent to a confirmation and renewal of the agreement. (e) And words of proviso and condition will be construed into words of covenant, when such is the apparent intention and meaning of the parties. (f) And even words of reservation and exception in a lease have been held to operate as a grant of a right. (g) So a license may have effect as a grant of an incorporeal hereditament, if it be sealed and delivered, and authorizes the party to whom it is made to go on the licensor's land, and make some use of the land to his own profit. Not so if it be only a license to do some particular act, as to hunt in a man's park. The distinction between these is not always obvious; and the same license may operate as a grant as to some things, and as a mere license as to other things. (h) they are not apt and usual words, yet if they have substance in them tending to the effect proposed, the law will take them to be of the same effect as usual words; for the law always regards the intention of the parties, and will apply the words to that which, in common presumption, may be taken to be their intent. And such laws are very commendable. For if the law should be so precise as always to insist upon a peculiar form and order of words in agreements, and would not regard the intention of the parties when it was expressed in other words of substance, but would rather apply the intention of the parties to the order and form of words, than the words to the intention of the parties, such law would be more full of form than of substance. But our law, which is the most reasonable law upon earth, regards the effect and substance of words more than the form of them, and takes the substance of words to imply the form thereof, rather than that the intent of the parties should be void." And see Tench v. Cheese, 6 De G., M. & G. 453, 31 Eng. L. & Eq. 392, 397, per Cran-worth, L. C.

(d) Severn v. Clerks, 2 Leon. 122.