2 A contract to cut trees standing upon the contractor's land into cord-wood, and to deliver the wood at so much per cord, is not a contract for the sale of an interest in lands within the statute. Killmore v. Howlett, 48 N. Y. 569. An oral license to cut timber at fixed price for stumpage is not within the statute, either as a sale of an interest in lands or of chattels. Greeley v. Stilson, 27 Mich. 153. Where the defendant, having a written contract for the delivery of lumber by the plaintiff's assignor, made a subsequent oral agreement to purchase for the latter the stumpage on certain land and debit him with the expense, the sum so paid was not allowed to be set off in a suit on a note given as an advancement on the written contract. Wetmore v. Neuberger, 44 Mich. 362. - K.

3 Gordon v. Gordon, 56 N. H. 170. See Madigan v. Walsh, 22 Wis. 501. That it may be assigned orally, see Lenfers v. Henke, 73 111. 405. - K.

4 An agreement for lodgings in a hotel or boarding-house, though the rooms the boarder is to occupy are designated, does not create an interest in land, but is merely a license. White v. Maynard, 111 Mass. 250. So an oral agreement with the owner of a hall for the use of it on certain afternoons is a contract for a license and is enforceable. Johnson v. Wilkinson, 139 Mass. 3.

Bat that only is a license in this respect, which, while it is an excuse for a trespass as long as it is not revoked, conveys no rights over the land, and subjects it to no servitude. For any contract, of which the effect is to give to one party an easement on the land of another, is within the statute, (x) But if a landlord agrees with a present lessee to make further improvements on the estate for an additional compensation, this has been held to be an agreement collateral only to the land, and not within the statute, (y)

Generally, in this country, and in England, the stock of a corporation is personal property; (z) and this is so, even though the whole property of the corporation be real, and the whole of its business relate to the care of real estate; if it be the surplus profit alone that is divisible among the individual members, (a) * But where lands are vested, not in the corporation, but in the individual shareholders, and the corporation has only the power of management, in that case the stock or shares are real property. (b) And it would follow, that a contract for the sale of this stock, or for these shares, is within the statute, as a contract for the sale of an interest in lands.

When a contract, originally within this clause of the statute, has been executed, and nothing remains to be done but payment of the consideration, this may be recovered notwithstanding the statute, (c)1 But in such case the declaration should be framed,

Ch. 72; Dubois v. Kelly, 10 Barb. 496. And see ante, vol. ii. p. * 511, n. (h). But in Bennett v. Scott, 18 Barb. 347, it is held, that a verbal agreement between A and B, whereby A is to cut the wood and brush upon the land of B, and heap the brush for the wood, A being allowed until the ensuing winter to draw the wood away by sleighing, is within the statute of frauds, and void as an agreement, but it operates as a license to A to cut the wood, and seems sufficient to vest the title in A to the wood cut under it.

(x) Foot v. New Haven and Northampton Co., 23 Conn. 214; Smart v.

Harding, C. B. 1855,29 Eng. L. & Eq. 252. And see cases cited in preceding note.

(y) Hoby v. Roebuck, 7 Taunt. 157; Donellan v. Reed, 2 B. & Ald. 899.

(z) Bligh v. Brent, 2 Young & C. 268; Tippets v. Walker, 4 Mass. 595. But see contra, Welles v. Cowles, 2 Conn. 567.

(a) Bligh v. Brent, 2 Young & C. 268; Watson v Spratley, 10 Exch. 222, 28 Eng. L. & Eq. 507.

(b) Id.

(c) Thus, if a verbal contract is made for the conveyance of land, and the land is conveyed accordingly, the statute of

1 Or if that portion of a contract, originally within the statute, is carried out, remaining matters not required to be in writing may be enforced. Thus a lessee, after the delivery and acceptance of a lease orally agreed upon, was held to recover on the lessor's agreement to keep down the rabbits on the demised premises. Morgan v. Griffith, L. R. 6 Ex. 70. So an agreement by A. at the same time with a valid lease, that if B. would become his tenant he would make repairs and put in furniture, was held to be collateral to the lease and not within the statute, on the authority of Morgan v. Griffith, supra. Angell v. Duke, L. R. 10 Q. B. 174. In an action for breach of an agreement to grant a lease of a house which did not satisfy the statute, it was held that the plaintiff might recover on the common counts for the Value of work done by him on the house with the defendant's consent. Pulbrook v. Lawes, 1 Q. B. D. 284. See Hodgson v. Johnson, not upon the original contract, but upon the contract implied by law from the plaintiff's performance, (d)

A contract to convey lands for certain services is within the statute; and if the services are rendered, the contract cannot be enforced, unless in writing. But a quantum meruit will lie for the services, and the value of the land may be considered by the jury, although it cannot be regarded as the fixed and determinate measure of the damages, (e)1

An oral promise to pay for land, by the acre, after the delivery and acceptance of the deed, is not within the statute, (ee)

The oral transfer of claims to mining grounds, in the adverse possession of a third party, is not sufficient, (ef) But a parol license to dig minerals on the land of the licensor, is valid, if possession be taken and held under it, though not otherwise, (eg)

It has been recently adjudged, that a verbal license by an owner of land to do certain acts upon it; (eh) that agreements for the division of the parcels of land to be sold to other parties; (ei) or to pay for improvements made on land;(ej)2 or to rectify the frauds furnishes no defence to an action brought to recover the price. Brackett v. Evans, 1 Cosh. 79; Preble v. Baldwin, 6 id. 549; Linscott v. Mclntire, 15 Me. 201; Thayer v. Viles, 23 Vt 494; Morgan v. Bitzenberger, 3 Gill, 350; Thomas v Dickinson, 14 Barb. 90, 2 Kernan, 364; Gillespie v. Battle, 15 Ala. 276. And see Moore v. Ross, 11 N. H. 655; Holbrook v. Armstrong, 1 Fairf. 31; per Tindal, C. J., in Souch v. Strawbridge, 2 C. B. 808. See Marcy v. Marcy, 9 Allen, 8; and Curtis v. Sage, 35 111. 22; Long v. White, 42 Ohio St 59; McCarthy v. Pope, 56 Cal.561.