A ratification is too late if it defeats the intervening rights of a third party. (il) l

Where the party who undertakes to act as agent has affixed a seal to an instrument which did not need a seal, a parol ratification will make the instrument obligatory upon the principal as a simple contract. (m) And where one acting as agent has, without authority, entered into a contract in writing required by the Statute of Frauds to be in writing, the principal is bound by an oral ratification. (m)2 But it has been held, that a parol ratification cannot make that the deed of the principal which originally did not bind him from the agent's want of an authority under seal. (o)3

It may be stated as a general rule, that no act operates a ratification, unless, with a full knowledge of the circumstances, it was intended so to operate, or unless it was such an act as justifies third parties who are interested in the question, in believing that it was a ratification. (oo) And the ignorance of the principal, v. Ashley, 19 id. 300; Bigelow v. Den-nison, 23 Vt. 565; Hodnet v. Tatum, 9 Geo. 70; Elam v. Carruth, 2 La. An. 375. Mercier v. Copelan, 73 Ga. 636; Henderson v. Cummings, 44 Ill. 325; Krider v. Western College, 31 Ia. 547; Eberts v. Selover, 44 Mich. 519; Crans v. Hunter, 28 N. Y. 389; Hyatt v. Clark, 118 N. Y. 563; Rudasill v. Falls, 92 N. C. 222; Tasker v. Kenton Ins. Co., 59 N. H. 438; Mundorff v. Wickersham, 63 Pa. 87; Seago v. Martin, 6 Heisk. 380; McClure v. Briggs, 58 Vt. 82; Ruffner v. Hewett, 7 W. Va. 585.

(ll) Stoddart's case, 4 Court of Claims, 511. See 25 Am. L. Rev. 74.

(m) Hunter v. Parker, 7 M. & W. 322; Despatch Line v. Bellamy Manuf. Co., 12 N. H. 205; Worrall v. Muun, 1 Seld. 229; Randall v. Van Vechten, 19 Johns. 61; Bank of Metropolis v. Guttschlick, 14 Pet. 29: Mitchell v. St. Andrew's, etc. Co., 4 Fla. 200: Wood v. A. R. R. R. Co., 4 Seld. 160; Crozier v. Carr, 11 Tex. 376; Hammond v. Hannin, 21 Mich. 374; Adams v. Power, 52 Miss. 828; Briggs v. Partridge, 64 N. Y. 357; State v. Spartansburg, etc. R. R. Co. 8 S. C. 129. But see Wheeler v. Nevius, 34 Me. 54; Pollard v. Gibbs, 55 Ga. 45.

(n) Maclean v. Dunn, 4 Bing. 722.

(o) Steiglitz v. Eggington, Holt, 141, per Gibbs, C. J.; Despatch Line v. Bel-amv Manuf. Co., 12 N. H. 205; Parke, B., Hunter v. Parker, 7 M. & W. 343; Mc-Cracken v. San Francisco, 16 Cal. 591; Pollard v. Gibbs, 55 Ga. 45; Heath v.

Nutter, 50 Me. 378; Blood v. Goodrich, 9

Wend. 68; Grove v. Hodges, 55 Pa. 504.

(oo) Dickenson v. Conway, 12 Allen, 487; Coombs v. Scott. 12 Allen, 493; Johnson v. Craig, 21 Ark. 539; Bennecke although it arose from his own negligence, will invalidate the ratification. (op)1 The evidence of ratification should be as clear as that required for an original authority. (oq)

1 Where one without authority, hut purporting to act as agent for A, entered into a contract with B,and the latter on discovering the agent's lack of authority attempted to withdraw from the contract, it was held in Bolton v. Lambert, 41 Ch. D. 295, that a subsequent ratification by A related back to the date of the contract, and by making it binding from that time, prevented B's attempted withdrawal from having any effect.

On similar facts the Supreme Court of Wisconsin reached the conclusion that A could not ratify such a contract without B's consent. Atlee v. Bartholomew, 69 Wis. 43.

2 But if the law requires that the authority of the agent be under seal or in writing, parol ratification is ineffectual for any purpose. Salfield v. Sutter County, etc. Co., 94 Cal. 546; Ragan v. Chenault, 78 Ky. 545.

3 It has been said that this rule will not be applied in partnership cases, but that a partner may ratify by parol a deed of his partner in regard to partnership business. Peine v. Weber, 47 Ill. 41; Skinner v. Dayton, 19 Johns. 513. And in Massachusetts the execution of a deed may in all cases be ratified by parol. Holbrook v. Chamber lin, 116 Mass. 155. See also Fouch v. Wilson, 59 Ind. 93.

The ratification of the tort of an agent does not, in general, relieve the agent from liability; although by such ratification in tort as well as in contract, a liability is incurred by the principal. (p) 2 v. Insurance Co. 105 U. S. 355; Miller v. Board of Education, 44 Cal. 166; Lester v. Kinne, 37 Conn. 9; Iuternat. Bank v. Ferris, 118 Ill. 465; Bohart v. Oberne, 36 Kas. 284; Bannon v. Warfield, 42 Md. 22; Hovey v. Dover, 59 N. H. 522; Craighead v. Peterson, 72 N. Y. 279; Zoebisch.v. Reuch, 133 Pa. 532; Spooner v. Thompson, 48 Vt. 259; Curry v. Hale, 15 W. Va. 869.

(op) Coombs v. Scott, 12 Allen, 493.

(oq) Wisconsin Bank v. Morley, 19 Wis. 62.

(p) The cases recognize no greater difficulty in becoming a trespasser by ratifying the trespass of the agent, than in becoming liable ex contractu by ratifying the agent's contract. In neither case can the principal be made liable, unless the agent, at the time of the tort or the contract, undertook to act for him; but if the agent, though without any precedent authority, did undertake to act for the principal, and he subsequently ratify, "in that case," in the language of Tindal, C. J., Wilson v. Tumman, 6 Man. & G. 242, "the principal is hound by the act, whether it be for his detriment or his advantage, and whether it be founded on a tort or a contract, to the same extent as, by, and with all the consecpiences which follow from, the same act done by his previous authority." Wilson v. Tum-man was an action of trespass against T., who had ratified the trespass of agents; but they in committing the trespass had not acted for T., but for another person; and on this account it was held that T. was not liable. In Barker v. Braham, 3 Wils. 376, De Grey, C. J., said explicitly, " one assenting to a trespass. after it is done is a trespasser." In Co. Lit., 180 b, it is stated, that "if A disseize one to the use of B, who knoweth not of it, and B assent to it, in this case, till the agreement, A was tenant of the land, and after the agreement, B is tenant of the land, but both of them be disseizors; for omnis ratihabitio retrotrahitur et mandate aequiparatur." And where a bailiff seized a beast for a heriot where none was due, and the lord agreed to the seizure and took the beast, the whole court agreed that the lord was liable in trespass, and the only question made was, whether the plaintiff might elect to bring trover instead. Bishop v. Montague, Cro. E. 824. See also Wilson v. Barker, 4 B. & Ad. 614, 616, where 4 Inst. 317, is cited by Parke, J.; Hull v. Pickersgill, 1 Br. & B. 282, 286; Pollock, C. B., Bird v. Brown, 4 Exch. 786, cited supra, p. *49, note (). This matter of trespass by ratification was very thoroughly discussed, and the law respecting it settled substantially as it has ever since remained, so early as 38 Ed. 3, 18; Lib. Ass. 223, pl. 9, s. c.; and see the resolution of the court stated Bro. Abr., Ejectione Custodie pl. 5, 8, Trespass, pl. 113, 256. - As to trespass with battery, or a trespass constituting a statutory offence, see Bishop v. Montague, Cro. E. 824; Hawk. P. C, B. 2, Ch. 29, § 4; but with this last compare Gould, 42; Moore, 53, pl. 155; and Co. Lit. 180 b, note 4. [That torts generally may be ratified, see Morehouse v. Northrop, 33 Conn. 380; Nat. Life Ins. Co. v. Minch, 53 N. Y. 144; Tucker v. Jerris,